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Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 44, Number 2, Spring 2000

Andrew J. Bacevich
On the DoD Anthrax Charade

21ST CENTURY SECURITY THREATS . . .

Rogue States with Missiles
Keith B. Payne

Asymmetrical Strategies
Winn Schwartau

Biological and Chemical Weapons
Henry Sokolski

. . . AND ETHNIC CONFLICT CONUNDRUMS

Third-Party Intervention Can Work
Dean G. Pruitt

The Art of Mediation
I. William Zartman

The Sudan—A Study in Failure
Harvey Glickman

Myths and Realities
Foulie Psalidas-Perlmutter

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

As Keith Payne reports in this issue, a Washington consensus in favor of deploying a ballistic missile defense system has finally been achieved, some forty years after it was initially proposed in the wake of the first Soviet *Sputniks*. All that is lacking in this 1958 plan for the Defence of America are space-based sensors and missile killers. Source: Lt.-Gen. James Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1959), p. 264.

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Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 44, Number 2, Spring 2000

Editor's Column Walter A. McDougall 175

LOOMING THREATS TO U.S. SECURITY

The Case for National Missile Defense Keith B. Payne 187

Asymmetrical Adversaries Winn Schwartau 197

Rethinking Bio-Chemical Dangers Henry Sokolski 207

Bad Medicine for Biological Terror Andrew J. Bacevich 221

WHEN AND HOW TO RESOLVE ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The Interplay of Myths and Realities Foulie Psalidas-Perlmutter 237

The Tactics of Third-Party Intervention Dean G. Pruitt 245

Mediating Conflicts of Need, Greed, and Creed I. William Zartman 255

Islamism in Sudan's Civil War Harvey Glickman 267

The Mentality of Messianic Assassins Sonia L. Alianak 283

Better Tools for Humanitarian Missions James F. Miskel 295

Review Essays

Imagining Wars Yet to Come Bruce D. Berkowitz 307

Trachtenberg on Europe's Cold War Chessboard Timothy Naftali 315

Economists to the Rescue Francis J. Gavin 324

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

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

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Editor's Column

By the time this issue appears in late March 2000 the major parties' nominees for the presidency will probably be known. It's no fun knowing who will play in the World Series before spring training is even over, and I predict the American voters will rebel. Forget campaign finance: the real reform needed is abolition of the absurdly premature and front-loaded primary election process. Not only does the present system drain most of the excitement from the races (the last time a convention had any suspense was in Chicago in 1968, and the suspense was in the streets, not the hall), it also extends the already protracted lame-duck period for the outgoing administration. The president is unlikely to take any major initiatives in foreign policy unless a crisis erupts, whereupon the candidates must mince their own words lest they appear unpatriotic, opportunistic, or just irresponsible. Meanwhile, all other nations must endure the customary eighteen months of drift in world affairs between the time one American administration prepares to clean out its desks and the time when a new administration gets up to speed. Examples abound: the Clintonites were notoriously slow in coming up with a foreign policy team and game plan; the Bushies took cover in an interminable policy review before the collapse of the Soviet bloc forced them to act; the Reaganauts, remember, concentrated on domestic economics for two years or more; and the Vance and Brzezinski factions never did find the same page during the Carter years. Aside from the presidents who took office during wars—Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon—the only one who hit the ground running in foreign and defense policy was Kennedy (albeit with controversial results). Will foreign policy at least play a major role in the campaign this time around? Again, most likely not, unless some foreign issue can be linked in the voters' minds to some pressing domestic agenda. That is why Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, illegal immigration, and drugs are the most likely subjects of campaign rhetoric, because they have much to do with the sort of nation the United States itself will soon become. And that is why we shall devote the next issue of *Orbis* to a thorough examination of Latin American affairs.

In These Pages

For the moment, however, the two trends in world affairs most likely to obsess foreign policy pundits go by the shorthands of OOTW ("operations other than war," made

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necessary by spreading ethnic conflicts) and RMA ("revolution in military affairs," driven by the application of computer and space satellite systems to war). The dilemmas posed by each are thorny enough, but together they oblige the Pentagon to ask how the U.S. military can possibly recast its Cold War–era forces for peacekeeping missions while at the same time preserving its war-winning edge in an era of revolutionary technology. Such dilemmas are plumbed in these pages.

What causes ethnic conflicts, and under what conditions can they be resolved? No panaceas will emerge any time soon, if at all, but some initial contributions have begun to build a body of data and a theoretical framework by which to make sense of experience. Dean Pruitt, for instance, describes the spectrum of techniques available to third parties who intervene in hopes of resolving ethnic conflicts, with some real-world examples of relative success. William Zartman zeroes in on the tactics of mediation. Harvey Glickman examines in depth a negative example: the seemingly endless strife in Sudan and the conspicuous failure of the world community to inhibit the slaughter or mediate the conflict. Sonia Alianak analyzes the agonizing phenomenon of the murder of peacemakers such as Anwar Sadat by zealots within their own camp, and James Miskel calls for nonmilitary ways to provide and protect humanitarian missions.

Turning to the future of war, four high-tech experts stare at nightmare scenarios without blinking. Keith Payne takes on the threat, made chillingly plausible by the recent North Korean tests, posed by rogue states possessed not only of weapons of mass destruction, but long-range missiles to deliver them. Winn Schwartau reports on the prospects for "cyber-war" that targets the computer systems on which an enemy's civilian economy as well as military depends. Henry Sokolski contemplates the dangers of biological and chemical assault, and Andrew Bacevich argues that what little the U.S. government has done about it so far is worse than useless. Finally, Bruce Berkowitz brings all the above into perspective in a rich review essay on books about war in the twenty-first century. Speaking of meaty reviews, Tim Naftali critiques Marc Trachtenberg's massive, provocative interpretation of what the Cold War in Europe was really about, and Frank Gavin explains what we must learn, or unlearn, from books purporting to explain the international economic order.

Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor

Harvey Sicherman, the president of FPRI, likes to say that my greatest regret is allowing him to talk me into assuming the editorship of *Orbis*. It is on occasions such as this that I take my revenge.[1] Har-

[1] The following is adapted from Walter A. Mc-

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vey must keep white-knuckled silence for half an hour while the unpredictable McDougall sounds off in the name of the institute. Indeed, for an accomplished speech writer like Harvey, the only thing worse than to hear a speaker botch the eloquent material you wrote for him is to sit by helplessly while a speaker elocutes botched material you didn't write for him.

What is more, I purposely chose a title for this address so broad and vague—"America and the World at the Dawn of a New Century"—that I could say pretty much whatever was on my mind at the moment. But any of three approaches occurred to me. First, I might choose to look backward, reviewing the history of American foreign relations and suggesting what lessons to draw from it. That would have put me on safe ground, but I rejected that approach because it would just give you all an excuse not to read my last book.

Secondly, I could have chosen to prophesy regarding the dire trends that may shape world politics in the future. But that, I realized, would only send the audience home to bed with heads filled by nightmarish visions of failed states, famines, ethnic violence, financial meltdowns, rogue states with nuclear weapons, terrorism on American soil, an angry Russia, a threatening China, and a unified Europe becoming a competitor, rather than partner, of the United States. It is even possible that the United States will cease to exist as we know it over the next century, either because Mexican immigrants reconquer the Southwest, or because American society fragments into hostile ethnic and special interest groups, or because of some unforeseen breakdown in our constitutional government.

Thirdly, I could have taken this centennial as an occasion to mix history and prophecy by recalling the many predictions made around the year 1900. Pessimists, such as H. G. Wells, Jules Verne, and the German socialist August Bebel, foresaw a twentieth century tortured by world wars made all the more hellish by modern technology. At the same time optimists, such as Andrew Carnegie and Norman Angell, foresaw a twentieth century in which war would become obsolete through the workings of free trade and spreading democracy. Call it ironic, coincidental, or just curious, but when the century was done, both camps were right!

In recent years, with 2000 approaching, we have again been teased by contradictory prognostications. Francis Fukuyama has pronounced an end to ideological conflict and predicted the gradual triumph of democracy and free markets. But Robert Kaplan has warned of two twenty-first century worlds—a zone of peace and wealth and a zone of chaos and despair—that cannot coexist for long. Samuel Huntington believes

Dougall's address at the annual dinner of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, Nov. 10, 1999.

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that the bipolar Cold War world is being replaced by a clash among civilizations, with the Islamic and Chinese those most likely to cross swords with the West. And the U.S. Commission on National Security in the Twenty-first Century, in the first installment of its "New World Coming" project, outlined four possible futures for the world: first, the Democratic Peace, in which national sovereignty survives, but the major powers cooperate to secure peace and free trade, and eventually bring Russia and China into the club; secondly, Globalization Triumphant, in which sovereignty erodes and multilateral institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and above all multinational corporations lead the world to greater and more equal prosperity at the cost of a more uniform and commercial "McWorld"; thirdly, Protectionist Nationalism, in which free trade breaks down and the major powers compete for military and commercial power in a poorer, more dangerous world; and finally, Mayhem triggered by a global depression, environmental disaster, or ethnic violence, and characterized by wars, refugee floods, and terrorism.

But what would be the point in telling you that human beings cannot know what the next hundred years will bring? Our leaders cannot craft policy on the basis that the future will pretty much resemble the past, because to assume that past patterns will continue only guarantees that any new challenge will come as a shock. But to assume that the future is bound to be wild and unpredictable is also no use, because even the sole superpower cannot prepare for every conceivable disaster.

And that is why I rejected all the above approaches and decided instead to speak of mundane things: not mundane in the sense of boring or trivial, but in its true sense of worldly, here-and-now, real. Henry Kissinger's precept holds that the most any statesman can aim for is to build the foundation for a generation of peace, and thus, while speculating about the millennium is fun, our task remains that of identifying the most likely challenges that world affairs may present over the next twenty-five years. That task may suggest some laundry list of problems and solutions, but I think the best way to prepare for a mysterious future is to stress not our ends or even our means, but our *assets*. That is because the strength and flexibility of our foreign policy assets will determine America's ability to employ various means in pursuit of multiple goals, adjust to unanticipated threats and challenges, and lead other nations to adjust to them, too.

Today, at the end of America's second century in foreign affairs, it may appear that little agreement exists about the nature of the international system and what America's role in it ought to be. We see Republicans, who were bold interventionists so long as the Soviet Union existed, criticizing President Clinton's diplomacy as opportunistic, unrealistic, inconsistent, or simply incompetent. The administra-

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tion, in turn, accuses anyone who resists its foreign initiatives of that wickedest of heresies: isolationism. In truth, the leaders of both political parties and most foreign policy experts display a surprising consensus in favor of continued American leadership in pursuit of similar goals. To be sure, there is disagreement over priorities and tactics in a given case such as Kosovo or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But I think almost everyone from Patrick Buchanan to Madeleine Albright would agree on the following basic goals of our foreign policy: (1) security for the territory, citizens, and property of the United States, and for those nations whose welfare directly affects our own; (2) stability in as much of the world as possible, because the more stable our environment the more we can anticipate possible breakdowns and the less we will be called upon to fix; (3) an open, transparent, and fair system of trade, both to increase our prosperity and the stake that all nations have in security and stability; and (4) promotion of respect for those inalienable rights with which, Americans believe, all human beings have been endowed by their Creator—and not only because it is just, but because the more governments respect their own people's rights, the more likely they are to respect those of others.

Rather, the debates we hear are less over goals than over the best means to pursue them and the priority to be given to each whenever two or more goals seem to clash. Should we rank human rights in China above or below commercial interests—and should we define the word "should" in moral or practical terms? Should we occupy the Balkans, police the Persian Gulf, and support Taiwan because of the moral and commercial stakes involved there, or are those gratuitous entanglements that spread our military too thin, manufacture enemies, and thus harm our security? Should America take the lead in reducing nuclear arsenals through treaties, sanctions, and controls, or is preserving our own deterrent the best way to dissuade implacable adversaries from getting or using weapons of mass destruction?

Those are serious questions and I do not mean to discount them. Indeed, I say in my book *Promised Land, Crusader State* that the tensions in American statecraft are a product of the many strategies we have adopted, sometimes simultaneously, in hopes of influencing the world, from Teddy Roosevelt's progressive imperialism and Woodrow Wilson's international law and organization to containment, foreign aid, and human rights. But just as most Americans agree on basic goals, so, too, can they reach rough accord on priorities and means so long as they are effectively led by the president and Congress, and so long as the policies in place appear to work. Philosophical hand-wringing does not occur except in the absence of leadership, success, or most likely both.

That is why I believe the real sources of contention today arise from a profound uneasiness

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with a foreign policy agenda that reduces our military power even as it expands our commitments and diverts our power into such hopeless (or at least perpetual) exercises as the creation *ex nihilo* of tolerant multicultural democracies in the Balkans. What is more, the outbreak of partisan ill-will centered on the president himself has aggravated the situation because the politicians, whether in attack or defense, have taken to invoking false historical analogies. These historical myths must be cleared away before any constructive debate can commence over how the United States "should" conduct itself abroad in an unprecedented era that, by definition, has no past analogs. The first myth is based on a reading of history that posits America's diplomatic "default mode" to be isolationism, just as European diplomacy was always driven by nationalism and balance of power. To be sure, Wilson tried to reinvent U.S. diplomacy as liberal internationalism, but his rejection only proved how stubborn our isolation was. It took Pearl Harbor to shock Americans out of their illusions, permitting FDR during the war, and Truman in the late 1940s, to invoke the lessons of Versailles, Munich, and Pearl Harbor, and persuade Americans to take up global leadership and global responsibilities. According to this reading what would risk World War III was not involvement with the world, but trying to avoid getting involved. And this simple history served well throughout the Cold War. But it has a troublesome corollary today, because if totalitarian threats were what pushed America into a leadership role, then it follows that the disappearance of such threats might induce America to fall back into an isolationist mood. But those who see every vote in the Senate on U.N. dues, African trade pacts, or the test ban treaty as proof of "creeping isolationism" are just spinning the straw in a straw man. As Fareed Zakaria of the journal *Foreign Affairs*, H. W. Brands in the *Wall Street Journal*, and I myself in *Orbis* have written, American internationalism arose long before any totalitarian threats, isolationism of the 1930s "head-in-the-sand" variety was the exception, not the rule, and in any case Americans today know that they have never had it so good as during the past fifty years, so why rock the boat by resigning their membership in international clubs? Polls show that the public is keenly aware of the stake it has in global stability and prosperity, and that so-called isolationism is just not an option.

The other prevalent myth, by contrast, teaches that the deepest wellspring of U.S. foreign policy was not isolationism, but militant idealism as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Open Door policy. According to this liberal myth Wilsonianism is best understood not as a repudiation of past isolationism, but as the culmination of America's congenital idealism. Jumping ahead to the Cold War, the Soviet threat thus appears not as the main motive for American leader-

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ship of the Western alliance, but as the main barrier to American leadership of the whole world! Hence, the ebullient corollary of this reading of history is that today, with the Soviets gone, America is finally free to "enlarge" without limits the spheres of democracy, markets, and human rights.

Accordingly, we have been told that the Atlantic Alliance must go "out of area," devote itself to ethnic conflicts, peacekeeping, and state building, and pursue a worldwide political, economic, and humanitarian agenda. Thus Clinton proclaimed a doctrine as universal as Truman's when he promised, "if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, ethnic background, or religion, and it's within our power to stop it, we will stop it." But turning the Balkans into a NATO laboratory for multicultural experiments is only the tip of the iceberg. In its 1999 report "The Future of Transatlantic Relations," the Council on Foreign Relations called for "a global U.S.-European partnership" to: manage the Asian economic crisis and overhaul the world's financial architecture; dismantle Russia's nuclear weapons and promote Russian democracy; suppress all Balkan conflicts and "keep it that way"; forge a "single transatlantic market" with open investment and trade; preserve Turkey's pro-Western orientation; broaden NATO strategy to include the whole Middle East, and present a united front toward Iran, Iraq, and the Arab-Israeli peace process; make Europe abandon its "purely commercial" orientation toward Asia and help to manage conflicts among China, Japan, Korea, India, and Pakistan; make a larger American, and much larger European, defense effort in order to modernize and project military force worldwide; and, finally, forge common stances toward weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, the environment, drugs, health, crime, and human rights.

Those are all laudable goals, but together they verge on utopianism. First, any effort to arrogate to the Western alliance the roles of world policeman, nanny, and civics instructor will be denounced by other countries as neo-imperialism. Secondly, such a rapid expansion of missions will multiply points of discord within the alliance, and thus weaken cooperation even when the allies see eye to eye. Thirdly, such a global agenda, in the absence of public trust in the White House and Congress, may perversely erode the American will to exercise leadership. And fourthly, it risks causing collateral damage—from the destruction of Serbia's civilian economy to relations with Beijing and Moscow—that far outweighs whatever ephemeral good it may do.

If talk of a new isolationism is paranoid, but the hyper-Wilsonian agenda is self-defeating, where do we look for answers to our original question: how should Americans prepare for the most likely challenges facing them in the next generation?

First, by getting their history

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right, which in my judgment shows that Americans are by nature neither ostriches nor angels: they are control freaks. And that is not meant pejoratively. What nation would not want to "control" its own destiny and environment if it had the power to do so? And thanks to fundamental facts of geography and demography Americans have from the start possessed the potential, as Alexander Hamilton wrote in *The Federalist Papers*, "to dictate the terms of their relationship with the Old World." Thus, during the first American century in foreign affairs, say from Washington's Farewell Address in 1796 to the election of McKinley in 1896, U.S. foreign policy was designed to prevent the outside world from perturbing the unique experiment that was America. The country was not isolationist—it had constant and intense dealings with the outside world, and could never have grown so rapidly without the immigrants, trade, capital, and technology it absorbed from abroad. But the nation did remain wisely aloof from Europe's alliances, wars, and imperialism, thereby leaving itself free to control events in the Americas and the Pacific.

But starting in 1898, U.S. diplomacy changed in response to: the growing stake America had in foreign markets; the surge of revolution, first in Cuba and Mexico, then in China, Russia, and around the world; World War I, which threatened to rend the fabric of civilization itself; and America's own power, which had increased to the point that the United States might hope to control events not only "over here," but "over there." So Republicans and Democrats, from TR and Wilson to Charles Evans Hughes, Herbert Hoover, and FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, presided over an ongoing search for ways to employ American power to control events overseas. Why? Because Americans were imperialistic, altruistic, realistic, or idealistic? No, although we have been all of those things at one time or another. The root cause was our need to manage seemingly out-of-control events that were happening far away, but could have had damaging consequences at home and undermined that most basic of American rights: the right to control our own fate, the right to build America as we see fit without interference from any "damned furriners." In that sense, Lyndon Johnson was right when he said American foreign policy is always rooted in domestic policy. What we do or don't do abroad is a reflection of what we, or at least our leaders, want America to do and be at home.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the best way to control our own fate was to keep America off-limits to the games played by the Great Powers elsewhere. But in the twentieth century it seemed that the best way to control our own fate was to go overseas, end wars, crush or support revolutions, lower trade barriers, promote our own values, and fashion institutions under our leadership. American tactics differed radically as we lurched from imperialism to Wilsonianism, to the business-oriented approach of the

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Republicans in the 1920s, to the United Nations and dollar-backed financial system established by FDR, to Truman's and Eisenhower's containment, nuclear deterrence, and CIA, to Kennedy's foreign aid, counterinsurgency, and state building in the Third World. But all were driven by an urge to control.

That is why the British upper classes resent us, French Gaullists have contempt for us, Germans and Japanese are sullen toward us, Muslim fundamentalists call us Satan, Chinese accuse us of seeking hegemony, Indians call us hypocrites, and the Russians wish they knew our secret. We have exercised control, more or less, over them and played a big role in shaping their histories. They have had far less control over us, and when they succeeded for a time in disturbing us, they generally paid a terrible price. What is the lesson of this? That we should stop trying to control our environment because other nations resent our intrusions? Of course not. They would resent us just as much if we turned inward and did not intervene when crises occurred. Our power exists, and we affect events elsewhere by refusing to use it as much as if we assert it. What is more, the United States has every right to throw its weight around when its clearly defined and enunciated national interests are being threatened or trampled upon. But nothing is so damaging to a great nation as overbearance, overextension, and overkill, especially in the pursuit of alleged interests that are not clearly defined and enunciated, or are not really being threatened or trampled upon. For by attempting to control everything, you eventually lose the power to control anything, because you will squander the capital, the assets that endow you with power in the first place.

And that is what leads me to conclude that the best way to prescribe an approach to U.S. foreign policy in the unpredictable era to come is not to draft A, B, and C lists of our various goals and interests—we all pretty much agree on what a perfect world would look like—but to concentrate instead on the assets that make any sound foreign policy possible. Here, then, is an A list of conditions that make everything else possible.

(1) A strong U.S. economy subject only to mild recessions and modest inflation.

(2) A robust military boasting technological superiority, a full complement of well-trained and well-rested personnel enjoying high morale, and sufficient to fight and win at least one regional war while supporting (but not dominating) multilateral "operations other than war."

(3) Presidential leadership, which is to say a commander-in-chief with an ambitious, consistent, and prudent vision of America's role in the world, skilled at communicating that vision to the public and foreign leaders, and self-confident and patriotic enough not to mortgage U.S. foreign policy to a political, much less personal, agenda.

(4) A bipartisan internation-

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alist consensus in Congress, which should not be difficult for a strong president to revive, but which is easily dissipated by an executive that is too arrogant, insecure, or distracted to give Congress the attention and consultation it needs.

(5) Sturdy regional alliances, because not even the sole superpower can address threats to its security or economic interests by itself. But alliances, like the Congress, require care and feeding, and nothing harms alliances more than taking them for granted, invoking them only when crisis erupts, asking them to do too little (as if their members really had few interests in common), or insisting they do too much (as if their members shared everything in common).

(6) Balances of power in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, which means American efforts to manage relations among Russia, China, Japan, India, Iran, Iraq, and their neighbors, because the prevention of war among the big powers is the most *moral* task we can undertake, and because we can scarcely hope for peaceful solutions to future crises over Korea, Taiwan, Central Asia, the Caucasus, or Eastern Europe if Washington is not on speaking terms with Beijing and Moscow.

(7) Finally—and this may surprise you—the United States must wield the asset of strong pan-American institutions including a broader and deeper NAFTA and Organization of American States, because the most predictable and direct challenges are liable to stem from the invasion of the United States by illegal immigrants and drugs on our southern tier, and the prospect of civil strife tearing Colombia, Mexico, and the lands in between to shreds.

Note that nowhere on that A list does human rights appear, or free trade, or public opinion. The latter is clay, made to be shaped by presidential leadership backed by Congress. As for human rights and free trade, they are goals that cannot be advanced in the absence of the seven assets on the A list.

Just remove any of them—one by one—and try to imagine progress toward our four goals of security, stability, free trade, and human rights. You can't do it. A U.S. economy in reverse, a weak and demoralized military, a floundering president, a divided, partisan Congress, a crack-up of our alliances, a Europe or Asia gripped by wars cold or hot, with China or Russia checking U.S. diplomacy at every turn, or an America fixated on crises within the Hispanic world: if only one or two of these conditions exist, then America's sermons and sanctions will suffice to control very little abroad.

It is on this question of assets, therefore, that the realist and idealist positions converge, and a new bipartisanship ought to emerge. Without ideals the United States of America would be just another selfish empire, standing for nothing and bound to decay. But without leadership, power, and unity America would become a ridiculous caricature of itself.

Mark Twain, ever the cynic,

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said statesmanship was a matter of getting the formalities right, and never mind the moralities. Edmund Burke expressed this principle more soberly when he defined statesmanship as "a disposition to preserve and ability to improve." But the most telling observation is that of historian Arnold Toynbee, who wrote that great empires do not die by murder, but by suicide. And their moment of greatest danger is their moment of greatest strength, for it is then that complacency and hubris infect the body politic, squander its strength, and mock its virtues.

To be sure, we cannot know just which challenges will arise. But no nation in history has possessed more foreknowledge of how it needs to prepare, or more resources with which to prepare. We need only exercise the wisdom and will to prepare. And if, this time, we do it, then we may finally put to rest Winston Churchill's dictum to the effect that Americans always do the right thing, but not until they have tried all the alternatives.

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Looming Security Threats

The Case for National Missile Defense

by Keith B. Payne

After spending more than $70 billion over three decades on more or less urgent research and development, the United States appears finally to be moving toward the deployment of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. It will consist of interceptor missiles and sensors designed to protect all fifty states from a small long-range ballistic missile attack. Such a system, now called National Missile Defense (NMD), has been the subject of fierce debate in Washington in three distinct periods: first in the late 1960s and early 1970s, again in the latter half of the 1980s, and finally since the mid-1990s.

Of these three debates, the most heated polemics followed Ronald Reagan's 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (or SDI, pejoratively dubbed "Star Wars" by Senator Edward Kennedy). The SDI debate, however, did little more than restate the positions for and against NMD that had first been raised during the earlier debate of the 1960s, and both these debates concluded with decisive policy decisions against NMD deployment. Despite various points during those years when a decision for NMD appeared plausible, the political consensus necessary for deployment could not be sustained. Throughout this thirty-year period, therefore, the United States consciously chose not to deploy NMD, preferring instead to rely almost exclusively on deterrence to protect the American people against the threat of intercontinental missile attack.

In contrast, the current NMD debate, ongoing since the mid-1990s, contains many important new elements and appears to be concluding with a political consensus in favor of deployment. The 1999 National Missile Defense Act, backed by majorities in the Senate and the House and signed by President Clinton, states that it is U.S. policy to deploy NMD "as soon as technologically possible." As a reflection of this new political consensus, President Clinton or his successor is likely to move forward with a decision for NMD deployment.

Keith B. Payne is president of the National Institute for Public Policy and adjunct professor at Georgetown University. His most recent book is *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (University Press of Kentucky, 1996).

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The defeat of NMD proponents in the past was self-inflicted to a considerable extent. They continually fought the fiercest battles against one another, and frequently failed even to rebut the standard and by now tired ideological arguments against NMD. The modus operandi of NMD proponents was, and largely remains, to pour their energies into political battle against any but their own favored NMD concept—oblivious to the fact that the policy war for any sort of NMD deployment was yet to be won. The result was that no NMD program could survive the gauntlet of critics.

Why is it that NMD seems finally ready to become a reality, and why is it happening now? Neither the Reagan nor Bush administration was able to establish the necessary consensus, and the Clinton administration clearly has shown little sympathy for NMD deployment, giving ground to Congress only grudgingly. Indeed, opposition to NMD has been a core element of the Clinton administration's ideology. In 1993, for example, it shut down discussions with Russia on the subject of cooperative NMD deployment that had made rapid progress during the final year of the Bush administration (the "Ross-Mamedov Talks"). It then proceeded to cut, revise, and rename the SDI, shifting it away from NMD and toward theater missile defense (TMD, the defense of overseas allies and U.S. expeditionary forces sent abroad). How could it happen, then, that during the final months of the Clinton administration a political consensus in favor of NMD deployment emerged, and Washington is close to a decision for at least some protection of American cities?

Several developments converged at the end of the century to create momentum in favor of NMD sufficiently strong to gain the support of the majority in Congress and to overcome the Clinton administration's ideological opposition. These developments include the changed nature of the ballistic missile threat, corresponding changes in American goals and technical requirements, changes in thinking about the effectiveness of deterrence, and a serious reconsideration of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that severely constrained BMD deployments. Together, these interrelated developments have produced a working consensus in favor of NMD deployment where, alone, none would have sufficed, a fact illustrated by a comparison of the present NMD debate with those of the past.

Offense Is Defense and Vice Versa

Previous NMD debates occurred during the Cold War and understandably focused on the U.S.-Soviet balance. To risk understatement, the Soviet long-range missile arsenal constituted a formidable technical challenge for NMD. Armed with over 9,000 strategic nuclear warheads by the late 1980s, the Soviet Union posed an enormous threat. Effective NMD protection for American cities against a deliberate Soviet attack, if feasible, would have

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required a huge and expensive NMD system. That in itself was sufficient to limit support for the program, particularly within the military and Congress.

Given the cost and technical challenges confronting a system intended to protect cities from Soviet missile attack, most NMD proponents, including Reagan administration officials, quickly retreated to the less ambitious goal of protecting not the population, but U.S. strategic retaliatory capabilities against a Soviet nuclear first strike. This goal certainly appeared affordable and technically feasible, and made sense from the perspective of strategy. But it lacked the necessary political appeal to galvanize support, and there was no obvious and immediate need for missile defense to protect U.S. strategic forces. According to critics, U.S. strategic forces already were protected adequately, and arms control was the preferred method for further reducing the Soviet first-strike threat. In short, given the nature of the Soviet threat, President Reagan's goal of protecting people was undercut politically by the apparent expense and technical challenge, while the more obviously attainable NMD goal of protecting strategic forces appeared to lack urgency.

In addition, Washington had come to rely quite comfortably on nuclear deterrence as the proper way to address the Soviet missile threat. Over the decades of the Cold War, prominent military and civilian officials had generally come to believe that deterrence, if managed properly, was a reliable tool for preventing Soviet missile attack. Why pay more for missile defense if deterrence provides protection? NMD was contrary to the prevailing theory of deterrence, commonly known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which positively relied on the mutual vulnerability of the United States and Soviet Union to prevent a nuclear holocaust. Washington had become accustomed to spending considerable resources on offensive forces to maintain its side of the mutual vulnerability stalemate. Any threat to mutual vulnerability, but particularly that posed by NMD, was considered "destabilizing." Indeed, the ABM Treaty, the "crown jewel of arms control," was presented to the Senate for ratification as the codification of the "stability" supposedly guaranteed via mutual vulnerability.

As a result, NMD for the purpose of defending American cities faced a triple challenge: prevailing wisdom about the effectiveness of deterrence suggested that NMD was unnecessary; the particular approach to deterrence that dominated U.S. thought specifically identified NMD as a threat to "stability"; and after 1972, U.S. NMD programs came up against the ABM Treaty and thus the vested interests of Washington's arms control lobby. Consequently, NMD proponents not only had to battle politically with the usual arms controllers and opponents of military spending, they were also frequently at odds with the proponents of America's strategic nuclear deterrent. In short, NMD faced severe critics on the left and the right, hardly a favorable position from which to build a political consensus supporting NMD deployment. The changed circumstances attending the end of the Cold War, however, have made the rationale for NMD deployment persuasive to many past

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foes, and all but the most doctrinaire critics now acknowledge, at least in principle, a potentially useful role for NMD.

What factors have led to this dramatic change in the prospects for NMD? First, the ballistic missile threat against which NMD now is expected to play is not remotely comparable to that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is mercifully gone and the probability of a deliberate missile attack from Russia generally is considered to be very low. The sources of concern today are "rogue states" such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, which are openly hostile to the United States and intent on acquiring long-range missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Their prospective arsenals of long-range missiles, however, are likely to remain relatively modest for decades, so U.S. NMD programs need only to neutralize missiles numbering in the dozens as opposed to the thousands. This reduction in threat has gone far to ease concerns over cost and technical feasibility. Even organizations that in the past argued vociferously against SDI, such as the Arms Control Association, have acknowledged that defending against a limited rogue missile threat is practicable. Likewise, where cost estimates for an NMD addressing the Soviet missile threat ranged in the hundreds of billions of dollars, systems designed to counter the rogue missile threat run at most to the few tens of billions as projected by the Congressional Budget Office (never known for having sympathies for NMD). Finally, several recent successful interceptor tests have provided some empirical evidence that defense against a small missile threat is well within America's technical and financial reach.

Even the controversy surrounding the pace of the emerging rogue missile threat to the United States has contributed to the consensus in favor of NMD. At first, National Intelligence Estimate 95-19 appeared to place a serious obstacle in NMD's path. In the midst of the 1996 congressional and White House wrangling over missile defense, the intelligence community publicly released to NMD opponents in the Senate its conclusions concerning the missile threat to the United States: There would be no new missile threats to the continental United States for at least fifteen years. Curiously, this intelligence estimate ignored the two states Alaska and Hawaii, closest to North Korea, but its conclusion nevertheless dampened any sense of urgency for NMD deployment. Senior military and civilian leaders disposed to view NMD unfavorably now could point to the absence of any threat in their arguments against it.[1] Russian officials, always eager to steer Washington away from NMD, similarly pointed to America's own intelligence estimate to challenge the officially declared "rogue rationale" for NMD and to charge that renewed interest in it was part of an American conspiracy to destroy Russia.

[1] See, for example, Gen. Henry Shelton's statements in Rowan Scarborough, "Chiefs defend stand on missiles," *Washington Times*, Aug. 27, 1998.

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In this context, President Clinton and Senate Democrats were able to head off serious movement toward NMD deployment in 1996–97.

However, the congressional response to this intelligence estimate was to establish a bipartisan, blue-ribbon commission to reexamine the emerging missile threat to the United States. The commission's mandate was simply to assess potential threats, not to make any recommendations on how they might be addressed. Chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, the widely respected former secretary of defense, the commission issued its public report in July 1998. This "Rumsfeld Report" was a dramatic rebuke to the intelligence community's earlier benign forecast. It identified several potential near-term rogue missile threats and pointed to serious methodological problems with the previous sanguine forecasts. As if on cue, on August 31 the North Koreans tested a three-stage missile reportedly with enough potential range to target portions of the United States. The fact that the North Korean test came as an admitted surprise to the intelligence community effectively underscored the Rumsfeld Commission's rebuke, and left some senior military and civilian leaders embarrassed.

The intelligence community quickly revised its earlier "fifteen-year rule." Indeed, most recently the National Intelligence Council released an unclassified report forecasting that North Korea would indeed pose a near-term missile threat to the United States, and that within fifteen years Iran probably, and Iraq possibly, would also pose missile threats.

It is difficult to exaggerate the impact that the Rumsfeld Commission had on the NMD debate in Washington. It validated beyond reasonable doubt the new threat that NMD was to address. North Korea's missile test led even a member of the commission to remark that its conclusions had been overly optimistic.

The subsequent change in the tone of the debate was immediate and dramatic. Prior to the commission's report, NMD opponents, including senior political appointees in the Department of Defense, could and did tar as naive or extremist those who expressed concern about a near-term, rogue missile threat. After the report and North Korean test, it was the opponents of NMD who appeared naive.

Deterrence Theory Dethroned

A new perspective on the reliability of deterrence also helped to move Washington toward a consensus on NMD. It may appear that a subject as seemingly esoteric as deterrence theory could have little impact on Washington's rough and tumble NMD debates. And, in fact, most theoretical discussions of deterrence will frighten away any audience, military or civilian, whatever its view of NMD. Nevertheless, there has always been a significant link between confidence in deterrence and opposition to NMD. Unfortu-

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nately for NMD prospects, part of American strategic culture for decades has been great overconfidence in Washington's mastery of deterrence theory, particularly nuclear deterrence. During the 1960s and 1980s debates, for example, the assumed effectiveness of deterrence was presented as reason enough for rejecting NMD. In short, it is better to deter than to defend, particularly when we know how to deter but not how to defend. Although such confidence in deterrence is folly, it has until recently been a matter of conventional wisdom in Washington.[2]

This faith in deterrence was again trotted out to shoot down NMD during the debate of the 1990s. NMD opponents argued that since deterrence never failed throughout the entire Cold War, Washington's mastery of that approach was proven, hence the absence of any compelling need for missile defense. For example, Jan Lodal, a senior Clinton appointee in the Pentagon, claimed in 1995: "Nuclear deterrence worked throughout the Cold War, it continues to work now, it will work into the future. . . . The exact same kinds of nuclear deterrence calculations that have always worked will continue to work."[3] Some opponents of NMD took the theology of deterrence to an absurd level in their efforts to denigrate the rationale for NMD. For example, Spurgeon Keeny, executive director of the Arms Control Association, claimed, "Even fanatical, paranoid regimes are deterred by the prospect of catastrophic consequences."[4]

Because deterrence is no longer reliable, the U.S. must have some defense.

Such vain assertions, however, make the mistake of viewing the practice (as opposed to the theory) of deterrence as relatively simple and predictable. In fact, deterrence frequently is difficult or impossible in practice.[5] Beyond the presence of a fearsome threat, its success requires a variety of contextual conditions that generally pertained to U.S.-Soviet relations during much of the Cold War, but are far from ubiquitous. These include well-informed decision makers, a prevalent rationality on both sides, a degree of mutual familiarity, effective channels of communication, and leaders who are sensitive to cost and risk. Because these conditions did generally obtain in U.S.-Soviet relations, Cold War–vintage discussions of deterrence simply came to assume their presence. Consequently, deterrence calculations became a deceptively simple matter of posing a severe enough threat to stay the hand of the Kremlin leadership. The simplistic notion that deterrence was ensured by a fearsome threat was even blessed with the term of art "existen-

[2] See, for example, George Lewis, Lisbeth Gronlund, and David Wright, "National Missile Defense: An Indefensible System," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1999–2000, pp. 120–37.

[3] Jan Lodal, principal deputy under secretary of defense, with selected reporters, July 31, 1995, Washington, D.C., news conference transcript, pp. 9–10.

[4] Spurgeon Keeny, "Inventing and Enemy," *New York Times*, June 18, 1994.

[5] See Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1996).

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tial deterrence," meaning that because nuclear weapons exist, they will deter. Such confidence was misplaced even during the Cold War, and it certainly has no place now that the challengers confronting Washington are so various, unfamiliar, and possibly fanatical, at least by Washington's standards.

Fortunately, the Gulf War and the various post–Cold War crises with Iraq, Serbia, North Korea, and China have encouraged a more sober assessment of what may reasonably be expected from deterrence. Defense Department, White House, and congressional reports increasingly acknowledge that the deterrence of regional challengers may not follow Cold War patterns. Given the rogues' relatively unfamiliar goals and values, deterrence cannot be predictable, and indeed may simply fail.

For example, the U.S. Commission on National Security, chaired by former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, stated the point succinctly in its recent report on the emerging international security environment: "Deterrence will not work as it once did; in many cases it may not work at all."[6] This markedly reduced confidence in the reliability of deterrence has led to an increased appreciation of the need for NMD in the post–Cold War period—to provide a hedge of protection for the United States in the event deterrence fails. In short, a generally accepted proposition now is that because the deterrence of missile attack cannot be considered reliable, the United States must have some defense. What is more, NMD is also viewed widely as necessary if regional challengers are to be denied the capability to deter or coerce the United States. That is, a principal and oft-expressed reason why some regional powers seek long-range missiles and WMD is to dissuade the United States from intervening against whatever aggressive designs they have within their region. Their logic is simple and possibly accurate: if, by virtue of acquiring long-range missiles and WMD, a regional power can easily threaten American cities, then American leaders (well known to be highly sensitive even to military, let alone civilian, casualties) are not likely to risk military intervention against that regional power. For second-tier military powers who could not hope to compete with U.S. conventional force projection capabilities, long-range missiles and WMD are effective tools of deterrence and coercion.

The potential for such "asymmetrical responses" to U.S. conventional force projection has highlighted the potential value of NMD in the post–Cold War period. It is increasingly understood in Washington that for the United States to have the freedom to act globally it must be able to limit its vulnerability to threats against the American homeland. The question can be posed starkly: if Saddam Hussein had posed a nuclear-armed missile threat to Washington and New York in 1991, would President Bush have been able to rally sufficient support to wage the Gulf War? The tenuous political support

[6] U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century*, Sept. 15, 1999, p. 8.

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he did receive (based on the fear of significant casualties, and reflected in the very close Senate vote affirming the use of force) suggests strongly that the answer is no.

There are, of course, other suggested approaches to addressing rogue threats, including arms control and preemptive strikes, and these measures should be exploited where practicable.[7] The Gulf War and its aftermath, however, have provided graphic demonstrations of the limited effectiveness of arms control (even with unprecedented international inspections) and preemptive strikes for dealing with rogue missile or WMD threats. Consequently, NMD increasingly is recognized as a necessary ingredient in any effort to counter the emerging rogue missile or WMD threat and correspondingly to limit the prospects for the deterrence and coercion of Washington by regional challengers.

Why NMD and why now? In large measure the answer is that few today still challenge the fact of an emerging rogue missile danger, the fact that a sufficiently modest NMD system is practicable and affordable, the fact that deterrence is just not reliable, and the fact that NMD can help to maintain American freedom of action even in the face of coercive missile threats from otherwise second-rate regional powers.

It is important to note here that these NMD roles and the resultant new consensus for NMD have been driven by the practical realities of emerging threats, which themselves stem from the seemingly unstoppable process of proliferation. NMD is not, as some of the remaining critics contend, a program in search of a mission. The consensus behind NMD exists largely because wishful thinking about deterrence and missile/WMD proliferation has been corrected by cold reality in such persuasive ways that even Washington has had to pay attention.

Moscow's Objections

A final significant factor concerns the ABM Treaty, originally a reflection of orthodox deterrence theory. As noted above, U.S. strategic thought posited that stability was the fruit of mutual vulnerability, which the ABM Treaty was intended to cast in iron. Even to the present day, the Clinton administration regards it as "a cornerstone of strategic stability," hence any consideration of NMD deployment has been marginalized by arms control advocates and government lawyers on the grounds that it would threaten the ABM Treaty. However, the logic of continued, willful U.S. vulnerability to missile attack, along with the treaty designed to ensure that vulnerability, has not fared well in the post–Cold War environment. With Washington's new

[7] Paul Nitze, for example, suggests conventional preemption of rogue nuclear capabilities upon "unambiguous indication" of their intended use. See "A Threat Mostly to Ourselves," *New York Times*, Oct. 28, 1999.

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appreciation of the need for a limited NMD, assaults on the previously sacrosanct ABM Treaty have mounted.

For example, some legal scholars challenge the validity of the treaty altogether since one of the two parties (the Soviet Union) no longer exists, and the collapse of the Soviet Union into more than a dozen successor states involves material changes to the treaty.[8] Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush has expressed a position regarding the treaty that would have been considered extreme just a few years ago, but now is wholly mainstream: the treaty must be amended promptly to permit the type of NMD America needs for its security, in cooperation with the Russians if possible, but without their cooperation if necessary.

Even Clinton's State Department appointees who are strongly committed to the ABM Treaty have stated that the administration will pursue negotiations with Russia to modify it if the NMD system to be deployed so requires. Clearly, therefore, the entire direction of discussion concerning NMD and the ABM Treaty has radically shifted, and the treaty is no longer considered sacrosanct in Washington. To observe that the United States must either modify it or withdraw from it is now more or less commonplace, and the question is only one of optimal means: to negotiate with Russia, withdraw upon six months' notice as provided by Article 15 of the treaty, or negotiate in the context of an announced U.S. intention to withdraw? Debate will continue with regard to how to get out from under the ABM Treaty, but the principle of so doing is now widely accepted.

How Moscow plays out its own hand regarding the ABM Treaty will be critical to the future of NMD. The official Russian position is one of implacable opposition to any American NMD and to any modification of existing treaties. This position is largely a reflection of the ideological rigidity and ignorance of the Russian leadership and Duma on the subject: to oppose anything proposed by Washington is seen as a sign of patriotism and strength in Moscow at this point. If the United States honestly offered to put a chicken in every Russian pot and a car in every driveway, the Communists and nationalists in Moscow would see in that a dark conspiracy to destroy Russia.

Nevertheless, more reasonable and pragmatic Russian leaders recognize that rigidity regarding the treaty could compel Washington to choose between withdrawing from it in order to deploy limited NMD, or continuing to remain vulnerable to *all* missile threats, whatever their source. If Russia were to force that choice on Washington, it would be shooting itself in the foot, because Americans would almost certainly opt for withdrawal and unconstrained NMD, the worst possible outcome for Moscow. Consequently,

[8] See, for example, Robert Turner, *The ABM Treaty and the Senate: Issues of International and Constitutional Law*; report, Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Va., May 14, 1999.

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it is possible and even likely that Moscow ultimately will decide to engage the United States on the matter.

In sum, the answer to the question of why a consensus for NMD deployment has been established after so many years of intense debate and opposition involves a complex mixture of changes in the international security environment and domestic opinion about strategy. While that consensus appears relatively stable, the prospect for limited NMD deployment could still be derailed for a season by an overly solicitous attitude toward Moscow (or Beijing), or by some spectacular failures in the testing of NMD technology. Even so, the variety of factors driving the political consensus in favor of NMD, most notably the continuing pace of missile and WMD proliferation, are beyond the control of the Clinton administration and NMD critics. In short, the "objective conditions" (to borrow a Marxist expression) that have been the dynamic behind the creation of an NMD consensus show no sign of abating, and ultimately point to a decision by Clinton or his successor in favor of limited NMD deployment. Ronald Reagan should take a bow.

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Looming Security Threats

Asymmetrical Adversaries

by Winn Schwartau

Attrition is generally considered to be "the American way of war," inasmuch as the United States has been able to bring to bear overwhelming firepower thanks to its industrial and technological superiority. But what American-style warfare generates more than anything is—paper. The conventional wisdom in the halls of the Pentagon is that developing the average American weapon system generates between five and ten million pieces of paper, while "big ticket" items such as the M-1 tank, B-2 bomber, or the Advanced Tactical Fighter may take twenty years to get from concept to battlefield and generate over 200 million pieces of paper. All that paper means that a large number of paper-pushers are needed to fight the war. To support the paper-pushers, other people have to buy the paper, pens, and computers, and still others—the bean counters—have to count how much paper the paper-pushers are pushing, and still others—the filing clerks—must sort it all out and make it accessible.

The new breed of potential adversaries that challenge U.S. military power in the post–Cold War era, however, do not need to generate a single shred of paper in order to vex an American-style bureaucratic war machine. They need only strap together some discarded military hardware and make of it the terrorists' equivalent of a "Saturday night special." Better yet, they may simply download a file of aggressive source code from the Internet or even buy the (readily available) *Anarchist's Cookbook* in order to learn how to manufacture explosives on the scale of the bomb in Oklahoma City. What do they have to fear? That their superpower adversary will threaten to escalate its paperwork? In truth, the fewer Western-style cost/benefit analyses involved in their calculations and the simpler their chains of command, the greater their efficiency. As David Shukman has summed it up, "While Western militaries struggle for a decade on average to acquire new weapons, a country with commercially available computer equipment and *less rigorous*

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democratic and accounting processes could field new systems within a few years. It is the stuff of military nightmares."[1]

The End of Symmetry

The best way to appreciate perfect symmetry in a conflict situation is to contrast the typical board game with real-world warfare. In games such as chess, checkers, Chinese checkers, Parker Brothers' *Stratego*, or the Japanese pebble game *go*, two opposing forces with identical resources begin in mirror-image positions, and the outcome of the game is determined by the players' skills alone. In backgammon, by contrast, the rolling of dice introduces the element of luck to an otherwise symmetrical conflict, just as in real war many extraneous factors such as weather, topography, and morale can render an otherwise "fair fight" unequal. But both sides possess roughly the same equipment and play by the same rules.

Such was the fundamental nature of war throughout early modern and modern history. To be sure, in World War I the Germans broke (or rewrote) the rules when they employed mustard gas, and weaker opponents in imperial conflicts such as the Boer War, Cuban insurrection, and Filipino War against the United States resorted to guerrilla tactics. But the weapons and "game pieces"—cannon, rifles, and soldiers—remained largely symmetrical. In the same fashion, while the Germans invented a new style of war in World War II, the Blitzkrieg, that conflict continued the pattern of industrial, symmetrical war in which millions of men fought for territory, matching tank against tank, bomber against bomber. Once again, new weapons were invented that appeared to revolutionize war, such as the German V-2 rockets and especially the atomic bomb. But after the onset of the Cold War, the Soviets soon developed their own nuclear weapons, both sides raced for the intercontinental ballistic missile, and symmetry was reestablished. By the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara heralded this symmetry in his doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction and extended deterrence.

Now, it seems, the mathematical and moral certainties of symmetrical war-gaming are giving way to a "postmodern era" in international conflict. U.S. warplanes bury the Iraqi Republican Guard under a million tons of sand and deliver destruction on Serbia with hardly a casualty. What is more, no current adversary can even aspire to meeting NATO forces on a "level" playing field.

It is in response to such asymmetry that those who are resistant to U.S. hegemony have pursued asymmetries of their own. In a recent book called *Unrestricted War*, the Beijing regime declared that since it cannot possibly win a conventional conflict with the United States, it intends in case of a

[1] David Shukman, *Tomorrow's Wars* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996), emphasis in original.

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conflict to target U.S. civilian infrastructures that control critical financial systems and transportation, communications, and power grids.[2] One of the authors, Colonel Wang Xiangsui of the Chinese air force, amplified those sentiments in August 1999. "War has rules, but those rules are set by the West. . . . If you use those rules, then weak countries have no chance. . . . We are a weak country, so do we need to fight according to your rules? No."[3] Future adversaries can be expected to seek asymmetries allowing them to confront superior opponents such as the United States by embracing an "indirect approach." The Chinese colonels who wrote *Unrestricted War* also suggested that Serbian president Milosevic would have strengthened his cause by launching terrorist attacks against NATO and U.S. interests in Italy.

Asymmetry gives terrorists their strength. They operate outside of accepted international behavior and according to value systems radically different from those of the United States, Europe, or even Russia. For instance, some of today's non-state combatants operate according to a "warrior clan" ethos reminiscent of Japanese samurai or medieval crusaders, a philosophy at odds with the ethic of modern, professional armed services. Culturally, the modern West has difficulty comprehending a value-based approach that legitimates atrocity as a weapon of war, such as when Serbian soldiers employ rape as a way to undermine the will of their opponents. Indeed, Colonel Charles Dunlap, a lawyer with the U.S. Air Force, was a master of understatement when he said, "Our likely future opponents will be unlike ourselves."[4]

How Western nations have handled such asymmetries up until now illustrates the legal and cultural constraints that they place on themselves. A trial of the terrorists accused of complicity in the Lockerbie tragedy finally began in late 1999—ten years after the event—a perfect example of a civil, symmetrical response to an asymmetrical attack. How many terrorist acts will it take to alter such behavior and provoke an asymmetrical response from a Western nation?

The Fish Tank

The Santa Fe Institute, a prominent think tank fostering interdisciplinary analyses, recently staged a revealing asymmetrical game. First, it designed an artificial digital "fish tank" bounded only by the quantum uncertainties of silicon storage inside memory chips. Next, it invited players to introduce artificial life forms into the fish tank to observe how they coexisted, and which life forms lived the longest and healthiest lives. "A-lifers" (the

[2] Col. Wang Xiangsui and Qiao Liang, *Unrestricted War* (Beijing: PLA Literature Arts Publishing House, Feb. 1999), trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

[3] John Pomfret, "China Ponders New Rules of 'Unrestricted War,'" *Washington Post*, Aug. 8, 1999.

[4] Private conversations with Col. Dunlap.

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self-designation of students of artificial life) from around the world participated by contributing their favorite digital life forms while the experimenters watched to see which thrived, multiplied, or died out either from their own programmed failings or from interaction with other life forms. Over a prolonged period, one life form consistently dominated: the one with the simplest set of encoded rules. Its first instruction read, "My species will always play nice with you. I will never be aggressive toward you. I will make every attempt to cooperate and work with you and everyone in our (global) fish tank." The second and last read, "If you mess with me, I will annihilate you without any warning." The rules that govern foreign and defense policy in Western nations do not allow them to function that way today. Western nations cannot tolerate televised bloodbaths, nor in any case do they have an adequate definition of what "mess with me" really means. Terrorism is considered a crime, not an act of war, and the legal system gives elaborate rights and privileges to "criminals" not accorded enemies at war. The fish tank experiment, however, should provide guidance into foreign policy, no matter how jingoistic it may at first appear.

Fundamentals of Information Warfare

Information warfare (IW) is a prominent type of asymmetrical strategy that is likely to emerge in the near future, and it can be waged at three different levels of intensity.

Class I information warfare is aimed at the individual. In cyberspace all are guilty until proven innocent, personal privacy is not legislated, and even names and buying habits are bartered and sold by commercial concerns for profit. Each year some 20,000 Americans are victims of identity theft. Thus, in time of conflict, nothing prevents a military adversary from researching senior NATO leaders (or soldiers in the field) and threatening their families back home, turning users' very trust in the contents of computers and the algorithms running them into a tool that can be used by miscreant marketers, common criminals, or foreign enemies to "get at" them.

Class II information warfare comprises industrial and economic espionage by states or non-state organizations. Thus, British Airways can steal (and has stolen) customers from Virgin Atlantic through simple theft of its database. But the techniques can include eavesdropping on telephone or cellular calls, Internet sniffing, password cracking, and electronic breaking and entering. According to the FBI, 122 countries conduct online industrial and economic espionage against the United States, with the resulting losses to Americans of approximately $300 billion per year.

Class III information warfare is conducted by nation against nation and can include cyberterrorism by organized groups, organized militia-like groups, or narco-terrorists possessing the same high-end snooping devices as

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governments. China's declaration of "Unrestricted War" certainly fits this category, as does Russia's announcement that IW is second in seriousness only to nuclear war.

Under predominant military thought, hacking one's way to victory is asymmetrical, and it has taken many years for the U.S. military to be willing to play in this new, virtual arena. But not everyone agrees that the threat is sufficient to abandon the old, symmetrical rules. Colonel Dunlap, for one, has "never been an advocate of the position that there is the very great threat of computer network attack," because in reality "it is much more difficult to do." Perhaps the threat is not "nearly as great as some of the zealots would say," but the asymmetry of IW nevertheless makes it potentially appealing.[5]

Asymmetrical adversaries thrive on simplicity, not complexity. They shun the hierarchical, three-dimensional structure of the industrial age in favor of the far more efficient, two-dimensional leadership models adopted by many terrorist groups. Asymmetrical adversaries do not fill reams of paper with justifications. They do not attempt to build a paper trail to justify their acts at some later date to historians, judges, pundits, or armchair experts. They just do it. According to Dunlap, "Many low-tech opponents are often unfazed by orthodox calculations of what is militarily doable." If, in the commercial sector, breaking the mold or accomplishing the undoable is what breeds success and huge financial reward, why should we expect anything less on the battlefield?

Asymmetrical adversaries do things Americans only wish they could do.

We tend to miscalculate the real ability of opponents to devise low-cost, low-tech methods to offset capabilities of technologically superior adversaries. Effective psychological operations, media manipulation, atrocities, genocide, and unrestricted assaults against civilians are familiar methods used by groups that employ widely available technology, but apply to its use a different set of values than those prevailing in the West. Yet, the West has developed neither the military imagination to streamline its conventional (hierarchical, paper-intensive) way of war nor the political will to deter or defend against asymmetrical threats.

Another skeptic is Martin Libicki, a senior RAND analyst. "If this threat is so dire," he asks, "why haven't we seen anything really, really large take place?"[6] But according to that reasoning, we should only worry about disasters after they occur. Such a complacent approach scarcely prevailed during the Cold War, when the dangers of nuclear war were keenly anticipated in advance of some "really, really large" event.

At the criminal level, we are aware of a certain amount of computer

[5] Transcript of the conference, "America the Vulnerable: Three Threats and What to Do about Them," Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, Oct. 7–8, 1999.

[6] Conference transcript.

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hacking and can only speculate about how much goes undetected. True, an electronic Pearl Harbor has thankfully not occurred yet. But tests such as Eligible Receiver, run by the National Security Administration, suggest that widespread damage can occur from an asymmetrical adversary as isolated as North Korea. What is more, asymmetrical commercial adversaries do all sorts of things Americans only wish they could do. Foreign private companies are often backed by government subsidies to increase global competitiveness. Product dumping is not illegal in many countries. Banking and disclosure laws tend to be more stringent in the United States than overseas. Spying and espionage are more a matter of the nature of business, although Americans still recite, "Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail." But the world is not populated by gentlemen, and the U.S. government's Economic Espionage Act of 1996 does nothing more than threaten commercial spies with a $10 million fine. Such a deterrent is a trifling amount in industries measured in the tens of billions of dollars. When the national economic hemorrhage from Class II IW is estimated at $100–300 billion and the rest of the world asks why the rules of global capitalism are set by the United States, whose population constitutes a mere 4 percent of the population of the earth, asymmetrical attack is bound to be the norm, not the exception.

Yet Washington is, if anything, an accessory to such crime. As a result of certain environmental laws, mandatory disclosures of U.S. companies' trade secrets subsequently become part of the public domain, because trade secrets and proprietary information are not considered worth protecting in the manner of military intelligence. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office veritably trumpets the latest innovations in American technology before the rest of the world. Above all, when an American company comes under assault (cybernetic or otherwise) by an adversary (domestic or international), it finds itself virtually handcuffed to a legal system unequipped to deal with Internet crime and high-tech espionage, and offering no reasonable chance of recovery or restitution. So what is the victim company to do when law enforcement is either unable or unwilling to help? Many companies are saying that the only way to balance the asymmetry of the threat against the inadequate legal response is to engage in self-help and "fight fire with fire." Whereupon, U.S. law enforcement agencies say that if they catch an American firm aggressively defending itself, they will prosecute—the American!

Vigilantism is perhaps not the most desirable means of self-protection, but the alternative is victimization. That is why other countries are actively building vigilante-like response mechanisms to both physical and virtual assaults. Israel tolerates nothing, and France is notorious for its one-upmanship in commercial warfare. Other European countries are taking similar stands and wondering why the United States refrains from active defense of its intellectual and physical wealth. Some in the Congress say, "We have to set an example. We're not going to stoop to their level." But if the Pentagon deploys the SEALs, Special Forces, and Delta Forces to deter or

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respond to asymmetrical threats, why does Washington shrink from treating IW in the same fashion? One way or another, the United States needs to balance the odds, or it will lose by forfeit.

Ten Questions about Cyber-War

There are no easy answers to the challenges of asymmetrical conflict, but neither are those challenges new. When I myself briefed a disbelieving Congress, Pentagon, and White House in 1991 about the specter of cyber-terrorism and danger of an "electronic Pearl Harbor" I was labeled a "Chicken Little." Nearly a decade later, there is no more margin for inactivity. To continue to ignore the realities of asymmetrical personal digital assaults, global economic espionage, and terrorist or nation-state conflict is to repeat the mistakes the U.S. government made in the 1990s when it spent hundreds of millions of dollars on studies and task forces, but, out of arrogance or apathy, accomplished little.

Asymmetrical conflict is now the norm, and just as the maxim "Change is the only constant" holds true, asymmetrical assault is the only strategy that makes sense for erstwhile allies as well as enemies, since they cannot compete under the traditional rules. That is why the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is far *more* profound than even the Pentagon realizes.

What should have been (and now must be) done? To begin with, U.S. authorities need to find answers to at least the following questions, offered here as a springboard for debate, constructive criticism, and inspiration.

1. As a matter of policy, should proportional response remain the moral principle defining U.S. proactive defense, inasmuch as it gives the asymmetrical adversary the advantage of knowing the contents of the U.S. "policy box" and our sociopolitical limitations? Or should America once again threaten nonproportional response (including massive retaliation) as the only way to keep adversaries at bay? After all, it worked in the fish tank.

2. Should U.S. response to asymmetrical attacks continue to be shaped by the country's sensibilities alone, in secret or open debate, or is it time to play by international "rules" (or lack of them) to create a more even playing field?

3. Many asymmetrical adversaries are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) hiding behind the industrial era's concepts of physical borders and national sovereignty. The offensive asymmetric adversary (terrorist) who physically hides inside the border of a nation-state that may or may not be friendly knows that the United States can do little. Thus, whereas in Egypt a murderer encounters a swift and harsh police response, a terrorist on American soil is treated with kid gloves as a conventional criminal. Is it time for Americans, if they really believe in globalization, to protect their interests globally?

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4. Does the existing international court system need to be changed to meet the realities of asymmetrical conflicts? Can laws that deal directly with the nature of modern asymmetry evolve to new standards?

5. If a corporation or NGO finds itself under a virtual attack, and law enforcement—for whatever reason—chooses not to involve itself, should that organization be permitted to take the law into its own hands?

6. What sort of dynamic defenses, in contrast to a classic fortress mentality, can be mounted against IW attacks?

7. Today it is illegal for companies to disarm an online assailant, so that it has no choice but to absorb the blow and do nothing, or harm its functionality through elaborate layers of enhanced security. How can laws be rewritten to permit the electronic arms of adversaries to be electronically removed?

8. The December 1948 U.N. Declaration of Human Rights specified privacy as a citizen's guarantee. Can we now agree that passage of the Electronic Bill of Rights, put forth in 1994 and adapted by Vice President Al Gore in 1998, is overdue?[7]

9. The rear-echelon attack as discussed by former general John Sheehan is a serious U.S. military weakness. The military uses unclassified civilian infrastructure for many of its operations, yet protection for these systems is out of the control of the military. Is it not high time that the government examine its options, short of nationalization of infrastructure, for defending civilian systems against hostile attacks?

10. Colonel Dunlap thinks that we should continue to treat terrorists as criminals and give them all of the rights of any conventional criminal, unless there is "clear demonstration that the Republic is about to come unravelled."[8] But does not defining information assaults (especially if launched by agents of a foreign power) as mere criminal actions by individuals send a very bad message about our national will to protect ourselves?

Conclusion

Redefining sovereignty, the RMA, and indeed the global culture in order to counter the asymmetrical IW threats that face the American nation, companies, and citizens is a task that can no longer be shirked. We need to ask more of the tough questions above and challenge the nation and international community to search for synergy among the needs of individuals, corporations, and nation-states. Only one person is needed with the broad vision and courage to begin to make the necessary changes. That evangelist, it must be said, will doubtless be vilified for forcing a complacent public and

[7] Winn Schwartau, *Information Warfare* (New York: Thunders Mouth Press, 1998).
[8] Conference transcript.

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government into a controversial morass and shunning political expedience. But there is no other way to escape the mind-numbing paperwork Americans seem always to force upon themselves before taking the most rudimentary defensive action. Nor can one wait for Congress to act while the world moves into the future at Internet speed and adversaries of the United States adjust much more quickly than Americans themselves. Whether such an evangelist will emerge remains to be seen. But history will judge the years 1995–2005 very harshly if the United States abdicates its responsibility, or looks the other way, or caters to special interest groups. Americans must take to heart the task of defending their right to determine their own nation's fate, or that right will pass into the hands of myriad asymmetrical enemies.

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Looming Security Threats

Rethinking Bio-Chemical Dangers

by Henry Sokolski

Well before the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas subway attack of 1995, the Defense Department was forced to consider the implications of a biological weapons attack directed against the Pentagon. It was not a real threat, but rather a scenario posed by a leading biological weapons expert to a meeting of senior Defense Department officials shortly after President Bush had committed U.S. forces to defend Saudi Arabia. What, this expert asked, was the Defense Department doing to protect against the possibility of an anthrax letter-bomb being sent to the Pentagon by Saddam Hussein? All the officials at the meeting shifted uncomfortably in their chairs. There was some discussion of the difficulty of searching over 25,000 briefcases and purses carried into the building daily. This was followed by a somewhat lengthier discussion about the need to be in touch with the Centers for Disease Control and the local fire department.

The awkwardness continued until one of the junior officials present was asked what could be done. Not much, was his answer. However, he was not sure that there was much of a threat. An anthrax letter-bomb might kill officials in the Pentagon, but was unlikely to paralyze U.S. armed forces (most of whom were housed elsewhere). And in any case, he explained, such an attack would solve the White House's key problem, which was to win public support for a ground attack on Iraq. The only real worry was that Saddam could not be counted on to be so stupid. With this, the meeting ended and no action was taken.

Although Operation Desert Shield is now nearly a decade past, the relevance of this story could not be more immediate to today's popular assessment of the chemical and biological weapons threat and what our government should do. In fact, since Desert Storm and the Aum Shinrikyo attack, Americans' concern about these threats has only grown. The essential

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difference now, however, is that unlike the Pentagon of 1990, Washington has reacted with energy.

Thus, in January 1999 the president announced his intention to spend $10 billion on countering terrorism, including biological and chemical threats, for fiscal year 2000. In addition, ten National Guard response units of twenty-two men each have been created along with fifty smaller state guard units to help local authorities respond to chemical and biological attacks. Then the secretary of defense announced in the fall of 1999 that the U.S. Preparedness Command would be in charge of Homeland Defense.

The presumption in all this seems to be that what happened in Japan in 1995 is likely to happen here, and on a much grander scale. Consider the comments of high officials and the press. ABC-TV's *Nightline*, in one of the most lavish efforts to cover the chemical and biological threat, ran a week-long series in which experts commented on a hypothetical anthrax terrorist attack against the New York subway system. The pace and tragedy of the scenario is driven by the central frightening fact that most of the anthrax spread in the attack is presumed to have been inhaled on day one. Given that anthrax has an incubation period of only three to seven days, the scenario did not allow public officials to get help to those exposed. By the end of the seven-day scenario, 65,000 New Yorkers had become ill and 80 percent were expected to die.[1]

A Future Unlike Our Past?

Although gruesome, this coverage hardly seems like hyperbole when compared to the views of other top U.S. officials. Perhaps the most famous of these was the one offered by the secretary of defense on ABC's *This Week*. Holding a five-pound Domino sugar bag, the secretary explained how little anthrax would be needed to kill half the residents of Washington. In a subsequent, syndicated column, the secretary cited the Aum Shinrikyo attack of 1995 (which killed twelve) and declared that "the race is on between our preparations [against domestic chemical or biological attacks] and those of our adversaries. . . . There is not a moment to lose."[2] And then there was the

[1] In fact, there is a vaccine for anthrax. If diagnosed early, anthrax victims can be treated with antibiotics for several weeks to keep the anthrax from taking over and to allow the vaccine to kick in. See Donald A. Henderson, "Dangerous Fictions About Bioterrorism," *Washington Post*, Nov. 8, 1999. Dr. Henderson, a public health physician and director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, points out that the critical period "would extend far longer than the seven days portrayed" along with the "window of opportunity for carrying out life-saving medical interventions beyond a week." *Nightline*'s story, however, ended at day seven, "implying—incorrectly—that no further interventions would be useful." As Dr. Henderson notes, one of the largest anthrax outbreaks in recent history took place in Sverdlovsk, Russia, in 1979, and some infections occurred as early as two days after the anthrax's release and some as late as 47 days later.

[2] See William S. Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New World," *Washington Post*, July 26, 1999. For an earlier similar view, see William S. Cohen, "In the Age of Terror Weapons," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1997.

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impetus for President Clinton's first briefing on bioterrorism—a novel called *The Cobra Event*. Written to scare, the novel describes an act of domestic terrorism in which a disease that involves self-cannibalism is hatched in New York.[3] The president wanted to know from the Central Intelligence Agency: was this plausible?

Not so long as our future is unlike our past. As David C. Rapoport, editor of *Terrorism and Political Violence*, documents in his path-breaking analysis, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," the threat of biological and chemical domestic terrorism has so far been fairly remote. In fact, the CIA reports that between 1960 and 1980 there were 40,000 international terror incidents. Of these, twenty-two, or one in 2,000, had chemical or biological elements.

Going back a full century, the relative numbers are even lower. Since 1900 there have only been seventy-one known terrorist acts worldwide involving the use of chemical or biological agents. Of the 123 fatalities these attacks caused, only one was American—a California school superintendent targeted by a Symbionese Liberation Army cyanide-laced bullet. Of the 3,774 nonfatal injuries these attacks caused, no more than 784 involved Americans. Almost all of these—751—were the result of a salmonella food poisoning incident perpetrated in 1985 by an Oregon-based religious sect. As for biological attacks worldwide, seventy have occurred in the last century, causing nine deaths, but only eighteen of these seventy attacks were made by terrorists.[4]

These are not large numbers. What is perhaps worrisome (and largely a function of the media's recent coverage and so many officials' pronouncements) is that forty-five of the seventy attacks reported this century occurred within the last ten years.[5] Yet, so far, none have been very effective. The increased number of incidents, however, does make it both politically and substantively imprudent to dismiss such threats.

[3] See Richard Preston, *The Cobra Event* (New York: Random House, 1997) and the author's own review of his book (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ts/book-reviews), in which he explains, "The story of the bioterror event in New York City is fiction. But a lot of the background is totally real. The disease, which involves self-cannibalism, is real, though in reality it is not contagious."

[4] See Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/Aug. 1999, pp. 46–52; David Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Summer 1999, p. 59; and Seth Carus, *Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Elicit Use of Biological Agents in the Twentieth Century* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research, July 1999).

[5] For one of the only quantitative analyses of the relationships among press coverage, terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, and the threat perceptions of the U.S. government and public, see Martha Crenshaw, "Threat Perception in Democracies: 'WMD' Terrorism in the U.S. Policy Debate," presented before the 22nd Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, Amsterdam, July 18–21, 1999.

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Downside Risks

That said, how much should one make of the threats? There are, after all, risks not only in underestimating the chemical and biological domestic terrorist threat, but in overestimating it as well. So far, such downside risks have received scant attention. The most prominent of these include:

- Raising public consciousness about the possible threat in a manner that emboldens and empowers criminals and terrorists to attempt precisely what the government and public want to avoid.
- Reassuring the public about the preparedness of government such that any government shortcoming is likely to be magnified to politically fatal levels (i.e., to levels perhaps desired by the perpetrators).
- Preemptively undermining significant U.S. civil liberties in the name of enhanced homeland defense by encouraging overreaction on the part of law enforcement agencies. What we do not need is scenarios similar to Ruby Ridge and Waco, Texas, that inspire chemical or biological "Oklahoma City" incidents in retaliation.
- Expanding the role of the U.S. military (and of martial law) into the domestic realms of law enforcement by making the response to domestic chemical and biological attacks a core military mission.
- Distracting the military from chemical, biological, and conventional threats to U.S. bases and embassies overseas.
- Encouraging an "America first" siege mentality and a retreat from foreign commitments critical to our nation's security.

Most of these risks, of course, are far from immediate. The White House and Defense Department are sensitive to military intrusions into domestic law enforcement and are just as concerned about preserving the fullest enjoyment of civil liberties.

This, however, could change. Some of the nation's most respected security experts, after all, want to make responding to domestic terrorism a high-priority mission for our military. Others are just as convinced that it is critical to "resolve the tension" between judicial rules of due-process discovery with the demands of national security and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods.[6]

[6] See, e.g., Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, *America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp.

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The point is that ultimately the downside risks listed are at least as likely as the domestic biological and chemical terrorism threats that might generate them. Either set of threats, if realized, could jeopardize our way of life. If we are serious about one, then we need to be serious about the other. The question is how? Part of the difficulty in balancing these concerns is that it is easier to speculate on what terrorists may be able to do and design programs to mitigate such threats than it is to know when and why to stop speculating and designing. Focusing on two broad considerations, however, should help. The first of these is determining just how practical current chemical and biological agents are for military and terrorist use. The second is identifying what defensive strengths the United States can exploit to mitigate these threats.

Technical Considerations

About traditional chemical agents, history suggests that in military settings they injure far more than they kill. This makes sense if only because it takes massive amounts of chemical agent to produce military casualties with any reliability, and maximizing their military dissemination is no easy task. If the agent is released too high in the atmosphere, it will be too diluted to do much harm when it comes to the ground. If it is released too close to the ground, the lethal area of the attack will be small. Wind can blow agents off their intended path, and sun and heat can evaporate volatile ones such as sarin.[7]

If one is aiming to kill massive numbers of troops or residents with chemicals, then quantity matters. In the case of a terrorist sarin attack against Washington, D.C., terrorists would need more than a vial or a tall building to deliver much of a punch. In fact, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimated that terrorists would need a ton of sarin disseminated by airplane under ideal weather conditions to produce 3,000 to 8,000 deaths. Under breezy conditions, the same attack might only kill 300 to 800. With nerve gas, which is much more lethal, the amount needed to produce heavy casualties among an unprotected population in an open area of one kilometer square would still be measured in tons.[8]

Given these facts, it is not surprising that, even in total wars, chemical weapons have not been the absolute weapon. On the Western Front in World War I it took an average of just over a ton of agent to kill a single soldier. Only

261–336; and Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow, *Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project, Oct. 1998), pp. 6–10.

[7] See Brian Chow et al., *Air Force Operations in a Chemical and Biological Environment*, DB-189/1-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998), pp. 12–37.

[8] See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Aug. 1993), pp. 52–56.

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two or three percent of those exposed to gas on the Western Front actually died, and gas was responsible for no more than 5 percent of the war's total casualties. In Iraq's war against Iran, the story was much the same. Of the 27,000 Iranians reported to have been exposed to Iraqi gas through March 1987, only 265 died. Over the entire war, Iraqi chemical weapons killed 5,000 Iranians. This constituted less than one percent of the 600,000 Iranians who died from all causes during the war.[9]

These facts should not be used to denigrate any loss of life or suffering caused by chemical weapons. They are, however, directly relevant to how seriously we should view the chemical threat. First, they help to explain why traditional chemical agents have been used so rarely even in war. It is not merely that it takes so much agent to kill. It is that any military hoping to injure the enemy or force him into donning protective gear must be able to defend against possible chemical counterstrikes.

Having anything less than this is an invitation to trouble unless (1) one's opponent lacks nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons to strike back or sufficient passive protection to survive an attack, or (2) one is fighting a desperate war of attrition along a relatively fixed front and requires a tactical means to support an offensive breakthrough or to defend against one. On several occasions, these military criteria have been met, and in these instances chemical agents have been used. At no time, however, has such use produced strategic results.

Terrorists using biological or chemical agents face daunting technical challenges.

This may be different in the American case, however, where the toleration for casualties within the military (if not the public) is still quite low. Certainly, to the extent that the United States depends on access to overseas ports, airfields, and command centers to project force, protecting these assets against chemical and biological attack will be critical. The American military and its allies must have enough warning to don protection soon enough to avoid the worst, and since our chemical and biological sensors are quite crude, more needs to be done in this area.[10]

If military use of chemical and biological agents has been historically rare, domestic criminal and terrorist use of them has been rarer still. Part of the reason for that is technical and part operational. Technically, dissemination of chemicals to produce massive casualties is difficult, as demonstrated by the Aum Shinrikyo experience. In an attack in Matsumoto, Japan, a year

[9] For more complete reviews of this historical data, see John and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1999, pp. 46–48; and Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," pp. 52–55.

[10] Biological agents are inhaled. Protection against them is a face mask. Chemical agents, on the other hand, can enter the body through the skin as well. As such, a suit covering the entire body must be donned as protection. Inoculations and vaccines are also available for a variety of agents. However, given the inability to anticipate what agent might be used, protective gear is the first and main line of defense.

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before the famous Tokyo subway strike, things went awry. The intended targets—three judges—failed to receive fatal doses. Instead, wind blew the agent in the wrong direction and killed seven innocents.[11]

Nor are the perpetrators themselves immune. One of the Aum terrorists was overwhelmed by the agent he tried to deliver, after which the group decided to dilute the agent, rendering it less lethal. Also, in the case of the most successful of the subway attacks, the sarin was not optimized for the widest possible dissemination, i.e., as a gas. All twelve of the deaths caused by the attack were due to the victims' direct contact with liquid sarin. Optimizing effectiveness via gas delivery, however, would have increased the risk of killing the carriers. Likewise, more lethal aerosol dispensers and airplanes might have been employed, but that would have also increased the operation's complexity and the likelihood of its early detection by law enforcement officials. Finally, the production of chemical agents runs the risk of killing the producers.

The technical challenges of terrorists using traditional biological agents to produce massive fatalities are no less daunting. Effectively disseminating these agents is particularly difficult since traditional biological agents are lethal only if inhaled, and particles larger than ten microns are likely to be blocked before they reach the lungs. On the other hand, agent particles approaching one micron are likely to be exhaled and so will not remain in the lungs. Operationally, particles sized between five and ten microns are optimal.

Spreading biological agent in particles of that precise size, however, is difficult. Indeed, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has yet to find a terrorist organization that has built an effective mass-casualty biological agent delivery system. The only organizations that have done so are states. But dispersal of correctly sized biological particles still does not guarantee an effective attack. Sunlight kills or denatures most biological agents (making nighttime dispersal imperative), and wind patterns and humidity matter. An anthrax attack under optimal conditions, for example, would be at least a thousand times more lethal than one made during a sunny day in light winds.[12]

Operational Issues

For soldiers and terrorists alike, these facts have operational consequences. First, biological and chemical agents would be most attractive to desperate nations and military commanders anxious to threaten opposing

[11] See Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part I, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations*, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, pp. 15–103; and Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," pp. 56–58.

[12] On these points, see Tucker and Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," p. 51; and Chow et al., *Air Force Operations*, pp. 27–37.

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expeditionary forces and their use of local ports or airfields, or to test an invading nation's political will to continue operations. Secondly, while traditional biological agents would be potentially most effective in killing enemy forces, their delayed effect would not be anywhere near as telling as chemical agents in disrupting ongoing military operations. Thirdly, given the volatility of many chemical agents and the uncertainties associated with biological agent dissemination and their delayed and varied incubation periods, a military decision to use such agents would be complicated. At a minimum, it might turn as much on an assessment of these agents' likely physical impact as their impact on the enemy's will to continue to fight or to escalate the conflict.

As for terrorist use of traditional agents, the technical facts noted above would make their use to inflict massive casualties even less likely. First, the difficulties of acquiring and deploying chemical and biological agents and their poor past performance as compared to high explosives would weigh heavily against their initial selection. Secondly, given these difficulties (particularly with biological agents), state sponsorship or assistance would seem useful. Osama bin Laden may not have had a direct link to the Khartoum pharmaceutical plant the United States bombed in 1998, but if he wanted chemical agents, he had a clear interest in seeking Sudanese help. The problem with asking for such assistance (as bin Laden and the Sudanese learned) is that it increases the risks of being discovered and targeted.

Thirdly, foreign entities seeking asymmetric advantage in hopes of persuading the United States to withdraw from their part of the world would probably want to avoid the complications of using chemical or biological agents on American soil. As the recent arrest of the Algerian Ahmed Ressam in Washington State clearly demonstrates, merely attempting an attack with conventional explosives is risky enough.[13] Indeed, mounting terrorist operations with chemical or biological agents would only increase the likelihood that U.S. authorities might discover the affair and disrupt it or retaliate. Finally, the more indiscriminate and identifiable a foreign terrorist attack is, the more likely would be an American overseas counterstrike.

Emerging Agents

All of the above observations pertain to the use of traditional chemical and biological agents to produce massive casualties. Two developments, however, may change the way we look at chemical and biological munitions. So far, most analyses have focused on the most horrific domestic terrorist scenarios. Two new developments, however, suggest that more attention

[13] See Vernon Loeb and Steven Perlstein, "U.S. Puts Borders on High Alert," *Washington Post*, Dec. 19, 1999.

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should be focused on how the United States might be threatened by more discriminate military agent attacks overseas.

The first is Russia's development in the late 1980s and early 1990s of a far more lethal and persistent family of binary chemical substances known as *Novichok* (Russian for "newcomer") agents. The second is the possible development of a new class of biological agents known as bioregulators.

The earliest information on Russia's *Novichok* chemical weapons program came just prior to Moscow's signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) from two Russian chemists, Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov.[14] In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Russia produced several new agents that were made of chemicals not controlled by the CWC. These agents, referenced by a variety of code names including Substance 33, A-230, A-232, A-234, Novichok-5, Novichok-7, are geared for the deployment of binaries—munitions that use two agents that are benign when kept separate, but lethal when mixed.

Indeed, they were extremely lethal—at least as toxic and persistent as the most lethal nerve agent, VX, and some are reported to be ten times as toxic. At the same time, they are far more difficult to detect and far easier to manufacture covertly using common chemicals and relatively simple pesticide factories. In addition, unlike VX, which can be defeated quickly with injectable antidotes, *Novichok* agents are at least as resistant to treatment as Soman.[15]

As of late 1993, Mirzayanov believed that Russia had only produced a few tens of tons of *Novichok* agents for experimental use. Still, there is cause for concern because *Novichok* agents are made of benign industrial and agricultural chemicals and can be made quickly in quantity. There is far less need to produce and stockpile vast quantities of agent or controlled precursors in advance. In addition, despite several defectors' public revelations, the Russian government has never formally admitted developing these agents, and a disturbing division of Russian expert opinion still exists over the utility of retaining chemical weapons. Many Russian military experts see chemical agents as yesterday's weapon, but others believe that chemical weapons, especially the new *Novichok* agents, are a needed additional deterrent. What

[14] See "Mirzayanov, Fedorov Detail Russian CW Production," from *Novoye Vremya*, Oct. 27, 1992; and "Mirzayanov, Fedorov Article on CW 'War Against Environment,'" from *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Oct. 24, 1992, both in Joint Publication Research Service, Commonwealth of Independent States (JPRS-TAC-92-033), Nov. 14, 1992, pp. 44–60. See also Vil Mirzayanov, "Free to Develop Chemical Weapons," *Wall Street Journal*, May 25, 1994.

[15] See Center for Security Policy, "Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program," Decision Brief no. 97-D19, Feb. 4, 1997; Vil S. Mirzayanov, "Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider's View," in *Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects*, Amy E. Smithson et al., report no. 17 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, Oct. 1995), pp. 23–26; and Igor Khripunov and Derek Averre, "Russia's CBW Closet Poses Ongoing Threat," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, May 1999, pp. 20–23.

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is more, there is reason to fear that Russia might export its *Novichok* data to its traditional clients in Libya, Syria, Iran, or Iraq.[16]

One thing is certain. Given their relative ease of manufacture for chemical-producing nations and these agents' persistence, novelty, and lethality, the *Novichok* family of chemical weapons would be much more attractive for a military to use than traditional agents. At the very least, current chemical detector devices are unlikely to be set off by their use. This alone could prove to be fatal. If delivery were accomplished covertly with special forces, there might not be any warning at all and targeted troops would be unable to don protective gear before lethal exposure. Also, given these agents' persistence and lethality, far less would be needed to accomplish any given mission.

More remote than *Novichok* agents, but still worrisome, is the prospect that incapacitants known as bioregulators might be developed in a form that could be weaponized. Bioregulators are present in our bodies in small amounts. They determine hormone release, control of body temperature, sleep, mood, consciousness, and emotions. Using the latest recombinant-DNA techniques, scientists might modify bioregulators to enhance their potency and effect. So far, the key obstacle to weaponizing such agents has been dissemination. In one of its last reports, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment reported that although the small peptide hormone ADH (antidiuretic hormone) had been introduced into the blood stream with a nasal aerosol, similar attempts to do so with insulin failed because of the molecule's large size.[17]

Assuming further research overcomes these problems, such bioregulator agents would be militarily attractive for three reasons: their novelty would almost guarantee their ability to evade current biological agent detectors; they would, unlike other biological agents, have immediate effects and thus could be used to disrupt military operations at key ports, airfields, and command centers; and they could function without losing the key advantage of biological agents, which is their potency as compared to chemical agents.[18]

What We Can Do at Home

Given their rarity and complexity, worrying about imminent use of bioregulators or *Novichok* agents by terrorists would be a mistake. However,

[16] See Khripunov and Averre, "Russia's CBW Closet."

[17] See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction*, OTA-BP-115 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Dec. 1993), pp. 116–17.

[18] There is good reason to believe that the obstacles to weaponizing bioregulators may fall in the next five to ten years. For a projection of what biotechnology has in store regarding agent development, see House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, "Assessing the Threat of Bioterrorism," testimony of Dr. Raymond Zilinskas, senior scientist at the Center for Nonproliferation Research at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Oct. 20, 1999 (http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/zilin.htm).

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given all the attention chemical and biological terrorism has received, the possible use of traditional agents by criminals or terrorists, if only to cause panic through minor attacks, cannot be dismissed.

Fortunately, the United States has considerable resources already in place to address such threats. As Virginia governor James S. Gilmore II, chairman of a presidential terrorism commission, recently explained, "We do not need to create a new mechanism to deal with [chemical and biological terrorism]. . . . We simply need to build on what we have."[19]

All told, there are 32,000 fire departments, 8,000 emergency medical services, and 17,000 law-enforcement agencies in the United States, constituting a force of over 2 million first-responders. A good number of fire departments located in industrial areas already are trained to deal with hazardous chemicals. With additional training and equipment, chemical agents could be addressed by these and other departments merely as additional hazardous materials.[20]

As for dealing with domestic biological terrorism, the United States is blessed with a massive health care system. The country spends nearly four times as much on its public health and medical system as it does on its entire military. The government plans to spend nearly $400 million conducting research on all aspects of chemical and biological weapons defense, but the budget of the National Institutes of Health alone approaches $20 billion. Factor in the fire-fighting services and police, and it is clear that these civilian institutions (and the Centers for Disease Control) are the ones best positioned to respond to domestic terrorism.

Indeed, relying more heavily on these institutions than on the military has several advantages. First, they are already locally deployed. The newly created Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams actually are unlikely to detect or respond to terrorist attacks first, and in some cases they will not have much training to pass on. As Jerome Hauer, director of emergency planning in New York City's mayor's office, recently explained, with 40,000 police officers, 15,000 firefighters, and emergency medical teams, New York already has the "ninth biggest army in the world." Hauer insists, "I don't need RAID teams because my guys are probably better trained than RAIDs." New York firefighters already deal with more than a thousand hazardous-materials accidents a year.[21]

Secondly, in comparison with what is required of the national health-care system to deal with natural diseases, domestic bioterrorism is likely to long remain the lesser-included case. Efforts to improve the health-care system's ability to deal with natural incidents should only improve its ability

[19] See Chuck McCutcheon, "'Homeland Defense': Mobilizing Against Terrorism," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, Mar. 6, 1999, pp. 522.

[20] See Ron Laurenzo, "Front Line Is Weak Link in Homeland Defense," *Defense Week*, Mar. 15, 1999, p. 1.

[21] See Laurenzo, "Front Line."

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to cope with terrorist incidents and vice versa. As one expert put it, "Our society's response to a natural versus deliberately caused disease outbreak would differ only after there are clear signs that the disease of concern might be the result of a terrorist or criminal attack." What is critical to treating both is early detection, and there are far more natural disease outbreaks to monitor and report than terrorist acts.[22]

Finally, using civilian institutions avoids the downside risks of relying too much on the military. Not only are civil liberties likely to be safer, but our military's ability to focus on its own self-defense requirements will be improved. As it is, the military needs to concentrate on bringing its chemical and biological protection and decontamination units to bear overseas, where the likelihood of use is highest. Yet, none of the newly created Reserve and National Guard RAID units is a part of the active military. Given that the most threatening use of chemical and biological agents against Americans is likely to occur abroad, it is critical that our military focus as much as it can on addressing these dangers.

Also, as argued above, our military cannot simply focus on the domestic terrorist threats, which have to do with the possible use of traditional agents, without running even greater military risks overseas. In specific, it must do more to tackle the difficult task of developing detection and protection capabilities (especially against new agents, such as the *Novichok* family) and to stay ahead of whatever other agents hostile biotechnologists might develop.

Rethinking the Thinkable

In its first annual report of December 1999, a congressionally mandated advisory panel on domestic nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism quietly criticized the government's emphasis on massive worst-case scenarios. "As serious and potentially catastrophic as a domestic terrorist attack might prove," the panel reported, "it is highly unlikely that it could ever completely undermine the national security, much less threaten the survival of the United States as a nation."[23]

The panel did believe there was a domestic chemical and biological terrorism threat, but it judged possible attacks against U.S. agriculture, small-scale attacks designed to cause panic, and conventional terrorism to be far more likely than the "lower probability/higher consequence attacks" that are the "focus of current policy and preparedness efforts." In fact, the advisory

[22] Of the $10 billion the federal government will spend combating terrorism next year, something less than 2 percent is earmarked for public health surveillance and reporting. See Zilinskas, "Assessing the Threat."

[23] See *The First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of The Advisory Panel to Assess the Domestic Response Capabilities of the Government for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Dec. 15, 1999, available online from RAND (http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel).

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panel warned that focusing so much on the worst-case scenarios was a mistake:

> The guiding assumption has been that smaller-scale, non-mass-casualty events are a lesser-included contingency that can be addressed adequately by preparations for the higher-end mass casualty attacks. This is by no means axiomatic. . . . By continuing a policy that emphasizes high-end threats, there is a very real danger of failing to optimize state and local response capabilities to deal with the more probable terrorist threats confronting the United States today.[24]

The advisory panel, of course, was not asked to assess the foreign chemical and biological weapons threat. Yet, if it had, it is likely that it would have found that in overemphasizing the domestic threat, our government runs additional risks. These would include paying insufficient attention to the threats posed by possible chemical and biological attacks against U.S. forces and facilities overseas, by conventional terrorism generally, and by nontraditional agents.

The point here is not to dismiss the possibility of any particular chemical or biological threat, but rather to weigh how much attention each one deserves. Assuming we are not foolish enough to demand 100 percent protection against all attacks, our medical system, federal and local governments, and military should be able to ensure against a lasting, strategic calamity. The key to success, however, will be the same as it was a decade ago in Desert Shield, which is to avoid focusing on the most horrific scenarios at the expense of preparing for the most likely ones.

[24] Ibid.

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Looming Security Threats

Bad Medicine for Biological Terror

by Andrew J. Bacevich

In an op-ed published in the *Washington Post* on July 26, 1999, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen offered the most alarming depiction yet of America's vulnerability in what he called the "grave New World" of biological terrorism. In his lurid depiction of a biological Pearl Harbor, a lethal pathogen carried "across hemispheres in hours" infects "unsuspecting thousands," with devastating results. "Hospitals would become warehouses for the dead and dying. A plague more monstrous than anything we have experienced could spread with all the irrevocability of ink on tissue paper. Ancient scourges would quickly become modern nightmares." The question confronting the United States, Cohen insisted, is not *if* such an incident will occur, but *when.*[1]

Nor is the belief that Americans face the near-certain prospect of a surprise biological attack unique to Cohen. President Clinton himself confessed that worrying about a biological assault against the United States "keeps me awake at night."[2] And over the last two years—ever since *The Cobra Event*, a thriller about terrorists unleashing a deadly toxin in New York City, made it to the top of the presidential reading list—such fears have prompted the Clinton administration as a whole to make biological defense a top priority.[3]

In spite or because of its priority, however, the administration's crash program to prepare for biological war is riddled with contradictions. Growing controversy surrounding one specific aspect of that program—the vaccination of American soldiers against anthrax—is exposing the program's larger flaws. Paradoxically, that controversy also offers a ready-made opportunity to shift to a more sensible alternative course.

[1] William S. Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New World," *Washington Post*, July 26, 1999.

[2] Judith Miller and William J. Broad, "Clinton Describes Terrorism Threat for 21st Century," *New York Times*, Jan. 22, 1999.

[3] William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "Germ Defense Plan in Peril as Its Flaws Are Revealed," *New York Times*, Aug. 7, 1998.

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Soldiers Just Saying No to Anthrax Vaccine

For the most part, U.S. preparations for biological war are proceeding behind the scenes, with federal agencies currently spending several hundred million dollars to stockpile antibiotics and train emergency response teams in major cities. There is one important exception to that rule: the mandatory vaccination against anthrax of more than two million U.S. military personnel, announced with much ballyhoo by Secretary Cohen in December 1997. Apart from shielding American soldiers from the effects of one particular pathogen, this component of the administration's biological warfare program serves a second, larger purpose, which is to publicize this new threat to national security and convey the impression that the Clinton administration is already responding aggressively to it. In short, the anthrax vaccination program is as much about public relations as about military prophylaxis.

This most publicized element of the administration's biological warfare initiative is also the one that has triggered active opposition. Yet those opposing the anthrax vaccination policy are not antiwar activists, crusaders for disarmament, environmental extremists, or crackpots given to paranoid fantasies about government conspiracies. Rather, the opponents, much to the Pentagon's consternation and chagrin, are themselves members of the armed forces.

Citing anecdotal evidence from the field about adverse side effects, these protesters in uniform contend that the vaccine is unsafe and that its potential impact on long-term health is unknown. As a result, since the vaccination program began, a steadily increasing number of service personnel—now totaling more than 300—have refused to be inoculated or simply left the military to avoid taking the shots.[4] Documented instances of *collective* resistance include the following:

- Seven of thirty pilots assigned to the 115th Fighter Wing of the Wisconsin Air National Guard, along with thirteen other members of that unit.[5]
- Eight pilots, representing 20 percent of the assigned strength of the Connecticut Air National Guard's 103d Fighter Wing.[6]
- Seventeen pilots flying KC-10 tankers with the 79th Air Refueling Squadron at Travis Air Force Base in California and thirty-two pilots flying C5s with the 301st Airlift Squadron.[7]
- Thirty of fifty-eight pilots assigned to the 97th Airlift Squadron at McChord Air Force Base in Washington State.[8]

[4] Thomas D. Williams, "Failed Inspection Slows Military's Anthrax Vaccine Program," *Hartford Courant*, Dec. 15, 1999.

[5] Associated Press State and Local Wire, July 28, 1999 (http://wire.ap.org).

[6] Deborah Funk, "Anthrax Critics Continue to Stand Ground," *Air Force Times*, Feb. 8, 1999.

[7] Tom Bowman, "Military Rebels at Anthrax Vaccine," *Baltimore Sun*, Feb. 27, 1999; David Castellon, "Anthrax Vaccine Draws More Resistance," *Air Force Times*, Mar. 1, 1999.

[8] Tom Bowman, "Anthrax Vaccine Divides Military," *Baltimore Sun*, July 12, 1999.

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- Twenty pilots assigned to the 514th Air Mobility Wing or 108th Air Refueling Wing at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey.[9]
- Sixty members of the Tennessee Air National Guard in Memphis, including twenty-two of fifty pilots assigned to the 164th Airlift Wing.[10]
- Two dozen enlisted Marines on Okinawa, thirty more at Camp Pendleton, and ten at Twenty-nine Palms, California, with several having been court-martialed and issued bad conduct discharges.[11]
- Twenty-nine sailors on the aircraft carrier *Theodore Roosevelt*, seven on the carrier *John C. Stennis*, and seven more on the carrier *Independence*.[12]

With nearly 400,000 service members having at least begun the vaccination protocol (six injections administered over eighteen months, followed by an annual booster), the Department of Defense characterizes any resistance to the policy as incidental. As to the minor discontent they are willing to acknowledge, Pentagon officials blame the Internet and a malicious campaign of disinformation for misleading "our youngsters."[13]

Yet the most vocal and impassioned critics of the vaccination policy are anything but kids. Indeed, a disproportionate percentage of the refuseniks are pilots, combat veterans, and/or field-grade officers in their thirties and forties. From the Pentagon's perspective, the specific character of opposition complicates matters considerably. To the extent that those questioning the vaccination regime are mature, well-educated professionals who, in the case of the reservists and guardsmen, are also engaged in responsible civilian careers, it becomes difficult to dismiss them as naive, misinformed, or easily manipulated.

Furthermore, to the extent that the anthrax inoculation is causing experienced pilots to terminate their military careers, the program may actually be undermining rather than enhancing overall combat readiness. The services are already critically short of trained aviators, and the problem is projected to worsen over the next several years, even as the United States relies increasingly on air power as its preferred military instrument abroad.

Finally, with the Pentagon looking to the National Guard and re-

[9] "More Reservists Refuse Anthrax Vaccine," *Air Force Times*, Aug. 16, 1999.

[10] Lela Garlington, "Nearly Half of the Pilots in Memphis Air Guard Refuse Anthrax Vaccinations," *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, Oct. 5, 1999.

[11] Dwight Daniels, "Anthrax Shots Bad Medicine?" *San Diego Union-Tribune*, June 29, 1999.

[12] Steven Lee Myers, "Armed Services Opt to Discharge Those Who Refuse Vaccine," *New York Times*, Mar. 11, 1999; Steve Vogel, "Sailors Refuse Anthrax Shots," *Washington Post*, Mar. 12, 1999; "16 Gulf Troops Refuse To Take Anthrax Shots," CNN, Apr. 8, 1998 (http://www.cnn.com).

[13] Pentagon background briefing, Aug. 5, 1999 (http://www.defenselink.mil/Aug1999/x08051999-x0805ant.html). Presenters at this briefing were identified only as "senior defense and Army officials."

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serves—in Secretary Cohen's formulation, "forward-deployed forces here at home"—to shoulder the recently revived mission of "homeland defense," an unexpected show of recalcitrance emanating from the ranks of the citizen-soldiers is hardly reassuring. A central element of that mission, as envisioned by defense planners, is specifically to protect the continental United States against biological threats. The unwillingness of reservists to comply with the vaccination policy does not bode well for this initiative.[14]

Yet, suspending the vaccinations in the face of protests from the ranks could also prove difficult and costly. For their part, the generals and admirals understandably worry that such a retreat may undermine the integrity of the chain of command, setting a precedent that other service personnel could cite in order to challenge onerous or unpopular orders. More broadly, abandoning the vaccination program could unravel the administration's entire response to biological threats, discrediting a major element of Clinton's self-described legacy.[15]

But there is still another factor. Defense Department officials have draped anthrax immunization in the gauzy rhetoric of "force protection," portraying it as part of the nation's obligation to protect troops sent in harm's way. Cohen himself has made force protection the distinguishing feature of his tenure as secretary of defense. His first major decision, and in some respects his defining act, was to terminate the career of the Air Force brigadier general in command at the time of the Khobar Towers terrorist bombing in 1996. Although investigators cleared that officer of willful irresponsibility, gross negligence, and dereliction of duty, Cohen concluded that "not enough was done" to anticipate and prepare for an attack and held the commander on the ground accountable.[16] In doing so, the secretary made it clear that any oversight with regard to force protection would henceforth be considered a hanging offense. With the lesson of Khobar Towers now etched in the Pentagon's post–Cold War canon of professional standards, Cohen cannot easily exempt himself from its provisions.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the Department of Defense has tenaciously defended its anthrax policy and rejects criticism of the vaccine, licensed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) since 1970, as just wrong. "It's safe and reliable," Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon flatly states. "It works and has no side effects."[17] And it is essential, Pentagon officials assert, because at least ten nations possess or are developing biological weapons, with Iraq and North Korea typically cited as the leading

[14] Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New World"; Paul Stone, "Reserve Forces Forge Ahead Into New Millennium," Armed Forces Press Service, Aug. 10, 1999 (http://www.defenselink.mil/new/Aug1999/n08101999-9908103.html).

[15] Miller and Broad, "Clinton Describes Terrorism Threat."

[16] Department of Defense news briefing, Subject: Khobar Towers, July 31, 1997 (http://www.defenselink/.mil/news/Jul1997/t07311997-t0731coh.html).

[17] Department of Defense news release, Jan. 22, 1999 (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/n01221999-9901222.html).

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culprits for whom anthrax is "the weapon of choice for germ warfare."[18] In the words of one ranking U.S. officer, "It's the poor man's atomic bomb. It's ubiquitous, it's everywhere, it's easy to get a hold of, it's easy to grow."[19] It is also lethal: the projected mortality rate for unprotected human beings who inhale anthrax spores approaches 100 percent.

Senior defense officials, both civilian and military, counter reports of debilitating side effects to anthrax vaccine by insisting that adverse reactions are occurring at a lower rate than with vaccines used to prevent mumps or measles. According to the Pentagon's own statistics, problems are rare.[20] When reactions do occur, they are usually minor, the sort of "[take] two aspirins and see me in the morning kind of things."[21] Emphasizing that they would not subject the troops to undue hazards, civilian and military leaders alike, beginning with Secretary Cohen and each of the joint chiefs, have rolled up their sleeves and been vaccinated themselves. (The commander-in-chief has declined to indicate whether or not he has himself been immunized.)[22]

As proof of the Pentagon's willingness to go the extra mile, defense officials cite four additional preconditions that Cohen insisted be satisfied before beginning actual vaccinations: supplemental testing of existing vaccine stocks, a system of tracking all recipients of vaccinations, a comprehensive communications plan to inform soldiers of the program, and a "review of health and medical issues of the program by an independent expert."[23]

Finally, if reassurance and persuasion do not suffice, there is always ridicule. A Defense Department anthrax newsletter mocks soldiers who remain wary of the program as "people who think the 'field' is where a farmer works." According to the army officer who edits the newsletter, "Most of these people have never spent a single moment in harm's way and have no appreciation of what that sacrifice means."[24] Similarly, General Charles Krulak, until his recent retirement as commandant of the Marine Corps, belittled opponents of the vaccine program as people who "are petrified that their penis is going to fall off."[25]

[18] William S. Cohen and Gen. Henry S. Shelton, "Anthrax Editorial Did a 'Disservice' To Troops," *Army Times*, July 19, 1999.

[19] Rear Adm. Michael L. Cowan, "DoD News Briefing," Aug. 14, 1998 (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug1998/t08171998_t814ntrx.html).

[20] Through Dec. 13, 1999, the Defense Department acknowledged a total of 559 "adverse events" resulting from the vaccine, most of them categorized as minor. "DoD News Briefing," Dec. 13, 1999 (http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint).

[21] Pentagon background briefing, Aug. 5, 1999 (http://www.defenselink.mil/Aug1999/x08051999_x0805ant.html).

[22] Miller and Broad, "Clinton Describes Terrorism Threat."

[23] Department of Defense news release, Dec. 15, 1997 (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1997/b12151997_bt79-97.html).

[24] Maj. Guy Strawder, "Straight Shot," Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program website, June 9, 1999 (http://www.anthrax.osd.mil).

[25] Darlene Himmelspach, "A Born Leader to the Corps," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, Feb. 23, 1999.

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Beyond Safety

In one sense, the anthrax vaccine controversy recalls the standoff that occurred earlier in this decade over the so-called Gulf War Syndrome.[26] First, personnel report the onset of unexplained and incapacitating illnesses shortly after getting vaccinated and present their case to sympathetic congressmen.[27] The media quickly chime in, casting the story in David and Goliath terms. Next, Defense Department officials armed with reams of data respond that whatever the source of complaint, there is no scientifically verifiable link between the reported symptoms and the vaccine. As with the illnesses reported by Gulf War veterans, it seems unlikely that this exchange will yield a definitive conclusion.

Yet, in their dogged search for information relating to the vaccine's safety, skeptics of the program have turned over many rocks and revealed a plethora of concerns that range far beyond safety as such. Those revelations suggest that the program is riddled with mismanagement, reeking with impropriety, and based on a strategy that is manifestly defective. Above all, the concerns call into question the larger policy of preparing for biological war, of which the vaccination program forms an integral part. In short, even if the Pentagon were to sustain its claims that the vaccine has no malign effects, more than sufficient cause exists on other grounds to indict the administration's biological warfare policy. Indeed, a failure to do so might truly jeopardize U.S. national security, because persisting in a foolhardy vaccination program might undermine the trust that soldiers must have in

[26] Some of the same Pentagon officials who today insist upon the safety of the anthrax vaccine have themselves suggested a link between the vaccine and Gulf War illness. Lt. Gen. Ronald Blanck, currently the surgeon general of the U.S. Army and an enthusiastic defender of the vaccine, told staff representatives of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee in 1994 that the "safety [of the anthrax vaccine], particularly when given to thousands of soldiers in conjunction with other vaccines, is not well established. Anthrax vaccine should continue to be considered as a potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in Persian Gulf military personnel. . . ." Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, *Is Military Research Hazardous to Veterans' Health?* 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., Dec. 8, 1994, Senate doc. 103-97, p. 35. Investigators with the General Accounting Office (GAO) have likewise linked the two directly. According to a GAO report published in March 1999, researchers have found in the blood of sick Gulf War–era veterans antibodies for squalene, an adjuvant used in some experimental vaccines. (An adjuvant is a substance incorporated into a vaccine to accelerate or enhance a desired immune response.) In testing the effectiveness of various experimental vaccines, the Defense Department has used squalene, which has not been approved by the FDA. The GAO report suggests that government-controlled facilities producing anthrax vaccine on an emergency basis for the Gulf War may have substituted squalene for the approved adjuvant and that it may be "a contributing factor to Gulf War illnesses." Opponents of the current vaccination policy suggest that this same, unlicensed vaccine is part of the stockpile being used at present, accounting for some of the adverse reactions. The Defense Department denies ever using squalene in the production of any vaccine. See GAO, "Gulf War Illnesses: Questions About the Presence of Squalene Antibodies in Veterans Can Be Resolved," GAO/NSIAD Report 99-5 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, Mar. 29, 1999). For a detailed examination of squalene-related allegations, see Gary Matsumoto, "The Pentagon's Toxic Secret," *Vanity Fair*, May 1999, pp. 82–98.

[27] See, for example, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Affairs, testimony of Capt. Michelle L. Piel, Capt. Jonathan E. Richter, and Staff Sgt. Robert H. Soska, Jr., 106th Cong., 1st sess., July 21, 1999 (http://www.house.gov/reform/ns/hearings/testimony/july~21.htm).

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their leaders and deplete actual military capabilities, while misleading the American people as to the true nature of the challenges that they face in the aftermath of the Cold War.

The broader critique of the administration's biological warfare program consists of four major points, listed here in ascending order of importance. First, the Defense Department has entrusted the manufacture of anthrax vaccine to a single firm of dubious reputation. Serious doubts exist regarding the ability of this firm to produce a vaccine that meets established standards of purity and potency, and efforts by the Defense Department to ease those doubts have been less than persuasive.

Secondly, contrary to the public posture maintained by the Pentagon, responsible officials, including qualified medical professionals in government employ, acknowledge that the efficacy of this specific vaccine is subject to question. The Pentagon's promised consultation with an "independent expert" about the vaccination program has not occurred.

Thirdly, immunizing U.S. forces in the field against the putative threat posed by one single strain of anthrax is woefully inadequate, and the "security" ostensibly achieved is illusory. According to the administration's own forecast about the dangers of biological terrorism, many toxins *other* than anthrax pose at least as great a threat. Furthermore, the likely target of any biological attack, whatever the toxin, is American civilians, not soldiers. By erecting a defensive barrier that relies on yesterday's means and leaving its flanks exposed, the Defense Department is creating a biological Maginot Line.

The current biological defense strategy is manifestly defective.

Fourthly, and most important, the administration's biological defense policy perpetuates the peculiarly American delusion that for every security problem there exists a technological fix. In this instance, the term "fix" becomes especially apt: taking a shot will presumably purge the bad dreams that deprive the president and his secretary of defense of a good night's sleep. Yet the expectation that immunization will nullify the bioterrorist threat conflates strategy with problem-solving. Focused on the imperative of action—inoculating soldiers, training response teams, and stockpiling supplies—this technocratic approach to security is innocent of important broader considerations.

Tainted Source

The sole source of FDA-licensed anthrax vaccine is the BioPort Corporation of Lansing, Michigan. This small start-up firm came into existence in 1998 when it purchased the assets of Michigan Biologics Products Institute (MBPI), a state-owned company with a decidedly mixed record of performance. FDA inspectors had repeatedly evaluated MBPI's procedures

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for manufacturing and maintaining vaccines and always found them wanting.[28] In March 1997, the FDA issued a "Notice of Intent to Revoke" MBPI's license, but even that did not get MBPI's attention.[29] A follow-up in February 1998 showed continuing deficiencies. During the course of that inspection, the FDA found fault with, *inter alia*, the effectiveness of the firm's sporicide, the integrity of its filters, and the adequacy of its product testing, labeling, storage, and sanitation. Several lots of vaccine already on hand also failed the inspectors' potency tests. The FDA accordingly found that "the manufacturing process for Anthrax Vaccine is not validated."[30]

Rather than invest the considerable sum required to fix MBPI's problems, the state of Michigan chose to sell it. In September 1998, BioPort bought the troubled company for $25 million. This new company was the creation of three principals: Dr. Robert C. Myers, who had been MBPI's chief operating officer and who continues in that capacity with BioPort;[31] Mr. Fuad El-Hibri, a foreign national who had previously directed Porton Products, Inc., a manufacturer of biological defense vaccines in the United Kingdom; and Admiral William Crowe, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. El-Hibri describes Admiral Crowe as a long-time family friend, but in 1992, Crowe was also a prominent supporter of presidential candidate Bill Clinton and was subsequently appointed ambassador to Great Britain. According to ABC News, Crowe acquired his stake in BioPort without having "invested a penny" of his own money.[32]

Within a month of its creation, BioPort landed a government contract to "manufacture, test, bottle, and store" anthrax vaccine for the Department of Defense. The agreement called for BioPort to produce vaccine exclusively for the government at a price of $4.36 per dose. The nominal value of the contract was $29 million. However, with the total cost of the vaccination program estimated at $130 million over six years, the potential payoff is much greater.[33]

In January 1998, MBPI shut down its plant for renovations that were funded by the Department of Defense, projecting that production would

[28] For a detailed accounting of MBPI's dismal performance during inspections, see House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Affairs, statement by Dr. Robert C. Myers, Chief Operating Officer, BioPort Corporation, Apr. 29, 1999.

[29] House Subcommittee, statement by Dr. Kathryn C. Zoon, Center for Biologics and Research, FDA, Apr. 29, 1999.

[30] FDA inspection report on MBPI, Feb. 20, 1998 (http://www.dallasnw.quik.com/cyberella/Anthrax/anthrax1.html). Lots that failed inspection were subsequently quarantined.

[31] In 1996, as MBPI's problems mounted and the sale of the troubled operation was being discussed, Dr. Myers denied any interest in purchasing the company. "I am a state employee and this would be a conflict of interest," he told the *Lansing State Journal* on Nov. 30, 1996. Cited in a memorandum to Democratic members of the House Oversight and Ethics Committee, Michigan State Legislature, from David Oppliger, House Majority Counsel, Re: Sept. 24, 1998, hearing on the sale of MBPI (Sept. 23, 1998).

[32] Howard Rosenberg, "Anthrax Cloud's Silver Lining," Mar. 12, 1999, ABC News (http://more.abcnews.go.com/onair/2020/2020–990312–anthrax–feature.html).

[33] Assistant Secretary of Defense Sue Bailey, DoD news briefing, Aug. 14, 1998.

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recommence in January 2000.[34] In early 1999, El-Hibri began petitioning the government to renegotiate BioPort's contract, arguing that if the company were to remain in business it would need to increase the price charged per dose and market anthrax vaccine to outside customers.[35] Citing the lack of alternative suppliers, the Pentagon granted both requests, permitting BioPort to sell 70,000 doses elsewhere *before* meeting its government obligations and to boost the price to $10.64 per dose. The effect was to double the value of BioPort's contract. The Pentagon also agreed to provide the company (which had not yet made delivery on any vaccine) with a cash advance of $18.7 million.[36] In December 1999, the Pentagon announced that BioPort had failed the FDA inspection required to certify its production of anthrax vaccine. FDA inspectors had found some thirty deficiencies in the renovated production facility. Defense officials projected that BioPort would require an additional six to twelve months in order to meet FDA standards. They also announced plans to provide an additional $7–10 million of interim funding to keep BioPort afloat.[37]

In effect, the Pentagon locked itself in a dependent relationship with a company of questionable capabilities, which offered what appeared to be a sweetheart deal to a retired senior officer who happens to be a close supporter of the president. Relying on the same work force and the same plant management as did MBPI, the company inspires little confidence and has already demonstrated its inability to fulfill the terms of a contract it signed just one year ago. Under such circumstances, the skepticism with which some soldiers treat Defense Department assurances that all anthrax vaccine in use meets FDA standards is easily understandable.

Questions of Efficacy

Even if the vaccine does meet FDA standards, will it actually work? In public, Defense Department officials state categorically that the vaccine is effective. Behind closed doors, the military's own experts are not so sure.

Although the military touts its biological defense initiative as innovative and forward looking, the anthrax vaccine itself is anything but that. Its formula represents old technology dating from the 1950s and was developed

[34] Vaccinations administered thus far all use stocks manufactured by MBPI.

[35] House Subcommittee, statement by Mr. Fuad El-Hibri, president and chief executive officer, BioPort Corporation, June 30, 1999.

[36] Pentagon background briefing, Aug. 5, 1999 (http://www.defenselink.mil/Aug1999/x08051999–x0805ant.html). On-hand stocks of vaccine, to include four lots "not part of the original DoD stockpile," are sufficient to supply the ongoing vaccination program through Dec. 1999. See House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Affairs, statement by Brig. Gen. Eddie Cain, Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, Apr. 29, 1999. The origin of this vaccine is not clear. However, Pentagon officials acknowledge that in May 1991 the Defense Department contracted with the National Cancer Institute for the bulk production of anthrax vaccine in a quantity amounting to 6.3 million doses. See House Subcommittee, testimony of David Oliver, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology, June 30, 1999 (http://www.house.gov/reform/ns/hearings/testimony/introduction–630.htm).

[37] DoD news briefing, Dec. 13, 1999.

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not with an eye toward its potential military utility, but for civilian purposes. Specifically, the vaccine was developed to protect tannery workers at risk from handling the hides of anthrax-infected animals. The chief hazard that those workers faced was not the inhalation of anthrax spores, but infection by penetration through the skin, or cutaneously.

In the 1950s, tests involving the work force in four mills in the northeastern United States demonstrated the vaccine's effectiveness against cutaneous anthrax.[38] Although five participants in the test population did develop inhalational anthrax, none of the five had received the vaccine.[39] As Colonel Arthur Friedlander, chief of the Bacteriology Division at U.S. Army Medical Research Institute, noted in 1995, these studies of "humans working in tanneries show protection against cutaneous disease." However, there exists "insufficient data to demonstrate protection against inhalational disease."[40]

Reflecting such concerns, Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, on the eve of BioPort's purchase of MBPI in September 1998, took the unusual step of indemnifying the manufacturer against any lawsuits arising out of the use of the vaccine.[41] In justifying this action, Caldera explained that producing anthrax vaccine involves "unusually hazardous risks associated with the potential for adverse reactions in some recipients and the possibility that the desired immunological effect will not be obtained by all recipients." Caldera's memorandum continued: "There is no way to be certain that the pathogen used in tests measuring vaccine efficacy will be sufficiently similar to the pathogen that U.S. forces might encounter to confer immunity."[42] Stripped of "bureaucratese," the language employed by Caldera is unambiguous: depending on the circumstances, the vaccine might work or might not.

"Nonsense," Defense Department spokesmen reply: the secretary's memorandum is routine, boilerplate meant to satisfy the concerns of Pentagon lawyers and not reflective of Caldera's actual assessment of the vaccine's efficacy.[43] They remind critics that Secretary Cohen had ordered a compre-

[38] The test population was quite limited. During the trial, twenty-six workers developed anthrax. Of those twenty-six, twenty-three had not received the vaccine, having been given a placebo or being part of an observational group. Of the remaining three, two individuals were partially immunized and one fully immunized. House Subcommittee, statement by Dr. Kathryn C. Zoon, Apr. 29, 1999.

[39] Each of the five had either received a placebo or was in an "observational" group that received neither the vaccine nor a placebo.

[40] Department of the Army, Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, Memorandum, SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting on Changing the Food and Drug Administration License for Michigan Department of Public Health (MDPH) Anthrax Vaccine to Meet Military Requirements, Nov. 13, 1995.

[41] With regard to the management of the anthrax vaccination program, the army serves as executive agent for the entire Department of Defense.

[42] Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, Memorandum of Decision, SUBJECT: Authority Under Public Law 85-804 to Include an Indemnification Clause in Contract DAMD 17-91-C-1139 with Michigan Biologic Products Institute, Sept. 3, 1998.

[43] Apart from anthrax, the most recent government indemnification of a vaccine manufacturer occurred in 1976 and involved the notorious swine-flu vaccine. Dwight Daniels, "Anthrax Shots Bad Medicine?" *San Diego Union-Tribune*, June 29, 1999.

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hensive external review of the vaccine before implementing the vaccination program. Indeed, according to Rudy De Leon, under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness, "We asked an outside expert panel, led by the dean of the medical school at Yale University, to take a fresh look at the vaccine."[44]

Upon examination, that external review turns out to be much less than advertised. The "expert panel" was in fact a single individual, Dr. Gerard N. Burrow, and he is not the dean of Yale's medical school, but a member of the faculty with an area of specialization remote from biological warfare. He is a professor of obstetrics and gynecology. Although Burrow did give the proposed vaccination program a clean bill of health, when asked to testify before a congressional subcommittee regarding that evaluation, he begged off, claiming that his schedule would not permit him to appear in Washington. Instead, he sent a letter explaining that he had accepted Cohen's invitation to evaluate the program simply "out of patriotism." He added that he had made it clear "that I had no expertise in Anthrax."[45]

A New Maginot Line

Even if the vaccine works, does the anthrax vaccination program constitute an effective defense against the threat most likely to face the United States?

Notwithstanding the Pentagon's designation of anthrax as the "poor man's atomic bomb," the Clinton administration acknowledges that adversaries bent on using biological agents as terror weapons can choose from a veritable smorgasbord.[46] For several of these alternatives, the mortality rate approaches that of anthrax, and for some there exists no known cure. Among the candidates are smallpox, botulism, bubonic plague, and the ebola virus.[47] In the widely quoted assessment by Kathleen Bailey, a former official with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, all it would take to produce a potent biological arsenal using one of these pathogens would be 225 square feet of laboratory and $10,000 worth of equipment.[48] Indeed, U.S. intelligence agencies believe that Iraq and North Korea are already developing the capability to weaponize smallpox.[49]

[44] Staff Sgt. George Hayward, "DOD Officials Say Anthrax Vaccine Safe, Effective," Apr. 16, 1998 (http://www.af.mil/news/Apr.1998/n19980416-980507.html).

[45] Letter, Gerard N. Burrow to Congressman Christopher Shays, Apr. 26, 1999.

[46] Bradley Graham, "Clinton Calls for Germ War Antidotes," *Washington Post*, May 21, 1998. The training of reservists who form Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams (the quick-response component of "home defense") features several non-anthrax scenarios. They include botulism delivered by balloon and a nerve agent in an exploding trash can. Bradley Graham, "Sneak Attack Detectives Prepare to Prowl," *Washington Post*, Aug. 28, 1999.

[47] Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 164–65.

[48] Cited in Leonard A. Cole, "The Specter of Biological Weapons," *Scientific American*, Dec. 1996 (http://www.sciam.com/1296issue/1296cole.html).

[49] William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "Government Report Says 3 Nations Hide Stocks of Smallpox," *New York Times*, June 13, 1999. See also D. A. Henderson, "Bioterrorism as a Public Health Threat," *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, July–Sept. 1998 (http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol4no3/hendrsn.htm).

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For true believers in biological terror, the challenges of employing such an arsenal, although not trivial, are by no means insurmountable. Jessica Stern, formerly with the Clinton administration's National Security Council, recounts tests conducted by the U.S. Army in the 1950s and 1960s to demonstrate the feasibility of releasing biological weapons offshore or in subways or of employing crop dusters to spread toxins. She speculates about terrorists employing chemical or biological agents to contaminate the nation's water supply or its stocks of "cola, milk, and baby food."[50] Although Stern does not minimize the practical difficulties inherent in such operations, she leaves the clear impression that a resourceful terrorist would find ways to overcome them.

Given such a hydra-headed threat, what benefit derives from protecting less than 1 percent of the population against a single pathogen? According to Rear Admiral Michael L. Cowan of the Joint Staff, "Having the vaccine sort of takes the atomic bomb away. There's no point in dropping it if it's not going to harm anybody." But the implication that inoculating troops at Fort Hood or Camp LeJeune will frustrate an anthrax-equipped terrorist is absurd. Terrorists bent on mayhem are unlikely to target military installations in the first place. Far "softer" and more lucrative targets are readily available, ranging from the New York subway to the ventilation system of a high-rise building in any American city. As an antiterrorist measure, a program of selected inoculation will at best provide a reaction force that is protected against anthrax and can therefore respond to the disaster. But if that is the requirement, then the priority of vaccinations should go not to soldiers, but to police, fire fighters, and medical personnel—none of whom are protected under the administration's biological defense policy.

Terrorists bent on mayhem are most likely to seek "soft" civilian targets.

Furthermore, even assuming that anthrax is the terrorist's "weapon of choice," the virus actually employed may well differ genetically from anthrax found in nature. In other words, it may differ from the strain against which the existing vaccine was tested in the 1950s. As Caldera's precisely worded memorandum acknowledged, "There is no way to be certain that the pathogen used in tests measuring vaccine efficacy will be sufficiently similar to the pathogen that U.S. forces might encounter to confer immunity." Indeed, potential adversaries have been hard at work developing ways to modify anthrax, and according to Ken Alibek, a former deputy director of the Soviet Union's biological weapons research program, Soviet researchers succeeded in developing a genetically altered strain of anthrax by the 1980s.[51]

If the threat of bioterrorism depicted by Cohen and others in the administration really exists, then terrorists calculating when, where, and how

[50] Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists*, pp. 52–53.

[51] William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "Defector Tells of Soviet and Chinese Germ Weapons," *New York Times*, Apr. 5, 1999.

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to strike can choose from a wide range of options. The vaccination program currently in place will have its promised effect only if adversaries confine themselves to the particular biological weapon of *our* choosing (anthrax as found in nature) employed according to *our* preferred scenario (against U.S. troops). That assumes a willingness to accommodate American desires hardly to be expected even from a Saddam Hussein.

Defending the anthrax vaccination program, Secretary Cohen, the arch-proponent of force protection, has told his troops, "I would be derelict in my duties sending you out in an environment in which you weren't properly protected."[52] But if Cohen has assessed the bioterrorism threat accurately and if prophylactic vaccination is essential to deflect that threat—two very large and dubious assumptions—it is not soldiers who are principally at risk, but civilians.[53] Only if the United States implemented a *nationwide* program of vaccination against *all* likely pathogens might terrorists armed with the "poor man's atomic bomb" calculate that there is no point in using it.

Strategies of Illusion

In fact, barring the profoundly improbable discovery of some universal vaccine, it is not at all clear that an emphasis on vaccination makes sense, no matter how broad the population selected for immunization. The search for quick-fix solutions leads only to a dead-end, as previous American experience with weapons of mass destruction suggests.

With its discovery of an imminent biological threat, the Clinton administration would have Americans believe that they are confronted with something altogether new. Yet that is not the case. As the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, reports, "The nature and magnitude of the military threat of biological warfare has [*sic*] not changed since 1990."[54] What is new at this time when the United States reigns supreme in the realm of *conventional* warfare is the Pentagon's heightened awareness of this *unconventional* threat. That threat has long existed, but in the old days went largely ignored.

[52] Linda D. Kozaryn, "Duty-Bound to Order Anthrax Shots, Cohen Says," Mar. 9, 1999 (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar1999/n03121999_9903103.html).

[53] Interestingly, while the vaccination of all U.S. forces is mandatory, it remains optional for Defense Department civilians actually assigned to duties where the risk of exposure to anthrax exists. A directive issued by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which conducts inspections worldwide related to weapons of mass destruction, permits "Emergency Essential" civilian staff to deploy on missions abroad without immunization. The only requirement is that the individual must "execute a 'Statement of Informed Declination' attesting to the Agency's offer of anthrax immunization and the employee's decision to decline." Defense Threat Reduction Agency, "Policy Memorandum 99-22, DTRA Anthrax Immunization Program," July 23, 1999.

[54] House Subcommittee, testimony of Mr. Kwai Chan, director of special studies and evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division, GAO, Apr. 29, 1999 (http://www.house.gov/reform/ns/hearings/testimony/mrchan4-30.htm).

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Taking at face value the rhetoric employed by administration officials to describe that threat, the United States finds itself today in a position of naked vulnerability. This was precisely the perception in 1949 when the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic device. The government's response to that vulnerability (which we now know to have been exaggerated, at least into the 1960s) was civil defense. Building enough shelters and stockpiling enough water, rations, and medical supplies would enable people to survive a nuclear attack, or so the optimistic propaganda of the day led Americans to believe.

But civil defense was an exercise in self-delusion. The notion that the federal government, its vast resources notwithstanding, could engineer a defense against nuclear war was preposterous. To the extent it diverted resources from more relevant measures that *did* avert a nuclear exchange (such as early warning, a robust and credible deterrent, flexible and responsive conventional capabilities, arms control, and confidence-building measures), the misplaced emphasis on civil defense may actually have been dangerous. It only fed the public fear of Armageddon, fueling political hysteria that complicated the efforts of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower to formulate a reasoned, coherent Cold War strategy.

The Clinton administration's impassioned call to erect a barrier against biological terror recalls that earlier infatuation with civil defense. This time, instead of protection for the masses, the government is offering inoculation only for a select few. But as with civil defense, this search for absolute protection is illusory, serves to block consideration of sounder alternatives, and—as in the early Cold War—may inadvertently encourage panic. The requirement is not for more impassioned rhetoric, but for a different approach.

A Way Out

In Congress, skepticism about the anthrax vaccination policy is growing. Congressman Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) has held hearings that are highly critical of the program, and two bills are currently pending that would take the matter out of the Pentagon's hands altogether. HR 2548, "The Department of Defense Anthrax Vaccination Moratorium Act," introduced by Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman (R-N.Y.) in July 1999, would halt anthrax immunizations until independent studies have verified the safety of the vaccine. HR 2543, "The American Military Health Protection Act," introduced that same month by Congressman Walter Jones, Jr. (R-N.C.), would make anthrax immunization voluntary until an improved vaccine becomes available. But the Pentagon should act first, defusing the impending readiness crisis caused by concerns about vaccine safety and thereby creating an opportunity to reevaluate its entire biological warfare strategy. Thanks to the

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misadventures of BioPort, defense policymakers can reverse course without having to admit openly that their strategy was flawed. BioPort's failure to meet its obligations provides sufficient basis for the Defense Department to cancel its contract with the struggling manufacturer. That action would provide the necessary pretext to suspend the anthrax vaccination program pending the identification of a reliable supplier of high-quality vaccine. Admittedly, that will likely take a considerable period of time.

That action would, of course, leave the United States without a ready source of anthrax vaccine, apart from the remnants of the MBPI stocks. As an interim defense against anthrax, the Defense Department should shift its emphasis from prophylaxis to treatment, administering antibiotics and vaccine to any soldiers exposed to the virus. This, in fact, is how the Pentagon had intended to treat unvaccinated soldiers had Saddam Hussein employed anthrax against U.S. forces during the Persian Gulf War. One particularly promising antibiotic is ciprofloxacin. Indeed, on the eve of Operation Desert Storm, Defense Department medical experts were touting ciprofloxacin as "an effective treatment against anthrax provided that it is taken immediately after exposure and the SM [servicemember] also completes the anthrax vaccination series as soon as possible."[55] Relying on antibiotics reinforced with vaccine offers real advantages over vaccine alone. Unlike the vaccine, antibiotics are effective against multiple strains of anthrax, complicating efforts by adversaries to design a variant of the virus that cannot be treated.[56]

Of greater importance, both the president and the secretary of defense should restate unambiguously the intention of the United States to *retaliate massively* in response to any attack with biological weapons against Americans. That threat should encompass any state involved directly or indirectly in supporting terrorists who employ biological (or, for that matter, nuclear or chemical) weapons, thereby depriving would-be perpetrators of sanctuary and bases from which to mount such an attack. As was the case with the nuclear threat during the Cold War, there is no substitute for a credible promise of punishment: swift, potent, and unerring.

Yet all of that is, in a sense, the easier part of the problem. The larger challenge is to restore to U.S. national security policy the sense of proportion it currently lacks, as exemplified by the Clinton administration's preoccupation with a possible biological Pearl Harbor. Indeed, such preoccupations have become a signature of U.S. policymakers in the post–Cold War era: tending obsessively to operational and tactical details as a pretext for dodging fundamental strategic issues.

The issue taking precedence over all others derives from one singular fact: the dominance of the international order by a highly ideological nation

[55] DoD information paper, SUBJECT: Anthrax Inoculation Message from USCINCCENT, Dec. 10, 1990.

[56] Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, "Rationale for Antibiotics in Prophylaxis Against Inhalation Anthrax," n.d. (Sept. 1991), declassified Oct. 31, 1996.

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that is dedicated not simply to its own defense, but to the universal adoption of the values that it espouses. As the United States embarks upon a new century, the success of that project—which policymakers since Woodrow Wilson have characterized as providentially mandated—has become a predicate of genuine national security.

Throughout the last decade, however, progress made toward fulfilling the aims of that project—a world that is peaceful, democratic, and respectful of human rights and free enterprise, with the United States presiding as ultimate arbitrator—has been at best uneven. The frequency with which the Clinton administration has found itself obliged to employ U.S. military forces to warn, coerce, punish, and occupy offers the best measure of how limited this progress has been.

Certain of their own good will and of the universality of American values, policymakers have a hard time knowing what to make of those who take exception to the further spread of American power, ideals, culture, and lifestyle. Given the benign intentions of the United States, opposition can only be explained as perverse or irrational. Thus, the looming fears of terrorists who kill mindlessly, of paranoid dictators lobbing nuclear-tipped missiles at American cities, and hackers who for a lark might shut down the nation's electronic infrastructure. Thus, as well, the paradox of a growing sense of U.S. insecurity at a time when actual threats are, by any objective measure, lower than at any time since the 1930s.

In short, defining the "threat" as bioterrorism—much less rogue states, cyber-anarchists, or religious extremists—is to gloss over the larger point: even with the chief ideological alternatives off the board, the project of global transformation to which the United States has committed itself is not inspiring spontaneous compliance. Fixating on the problem of fending off a biological calamity—a danger that has existed virtually unnoticed for decades—enables policymakers to avert their eyes from the larger, disconcerting truth that there is no end in sight to the exertions that Americans will be obliged to make in pursuit of President Clinton's interpretation of the Wilsonian vision.

Are the aspirations implied by that vision feasible? What will it cost to fulfill them? How much are Americans, citizens as well as soldiers, willing to pay? However commendable their concern for protecting U.S. forces, the duty that American policymakers are called upon to fulfill, and dare not neglect, is to address precisely those larger questions.

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Ethnic Conflicts

The Interplay of Myths and Realities

by Foulie Psalidas-Perlmutter

"A nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors."[1] Karl Deutsch's harsh definition is being repeated frequently in the literature of ethnic conflict, becoming unfortunately more and more an appropriate black humor depiction of the homicidal struggles that appear, reappear, and fester in many parts of our world, haunting us like new and old nightmares.

This literature is by now prolific, prodigious, and interdisciplinary. Research and theories abound in trying to unearth the roots of ethnic conflict implosions and the reasons for their intractability and their metastatic nature.

Methodologies of diagnosis, mediation, resolution, and prevention are being developed and tested in the laboratories of harsh realities. The results are sometimes lasting and fruitful but more often fragile and short-lived. The failures, proving the law of "unintended consequences," originate at times from the mismatch of the specific problem and the remedy designed for it. Other times the failures derive from the propensity of human nature to prefer often the perpetuation of misery and drama rather than to endeavor in the efforts of peacefully shared lives.

A brief review of the field of inquiry allows us to venture some observations on certain aspects of such conflicts that seem to make them particularly insidious and intractable.[2]

Ethnic Identity Politics. The quest for ethnic identity and the ensuing internal, personal, and external intragroup and intergroup turbulence may be as ancient as human history. However, it seems that, particularly in the last few decades, such conflicts have become the basis of human and "political

[1] Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (New York: Knopf, 1969).
[2] Chester A. Crocker, "How to Think about Ethnic Conflict," *Orbis*, Fall 1999, pp. 613–20.

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fault lines in the modern world."[3] Following certain ideas of Herbert C. Kelman one can underline the internal contradictions of what he calls "ethnonational identity groups."[4] They may serve certain basic psycho-sociological human needs for the sense of "being," for belonging, or for generational, traditional, cultural and historical continuity. However, identity-driven political struggles can also provoke a destructive sense of "otherness" and hostility towards other groups that have similar needs, but which originated and developed in a different context.

Furthermore, the need (and now often the acknowledged right) of self-determination, Woodrow Wilson's noble and humanitarian concept, can then turn into a disaster, as the aroused demands for autonomy or secession tend to become contaminated with the passions of "ethnic purity."

In reality, an entirely "pure" group is extremely rare. Even ethnically homogeneous groups would include religious and/or denominational variations and possible mixtures from past ethnic encounters. As far as the ethnic purity of a state, there is hardly any in the world that was not created by smaller groups joining together and balancing, sometimes successfully and sometimes perilously, similarities and differences of cultures, origins, and levels of development.

Inevitably a group that struggled for its self-determination, its separation from a larger and/or stronger entity, in most cases can become itself an oppressor of smaller, weaker groups that are either on the same territory (or part of it) that each claims as its own, or are next-door neighbors with undefined, disputed borders and localities of origin, and with mutually contradictory historical memories.

Nationalism. A strong component of ethnic conflict, among others, is the ideology of nationalism.[5] Along the tortuous path of ethnonational identity, myths can be interwoven into the fabric of historical realities that obscure and obstruct accurate memory. That may lead to inappropriate, erroneous actions harmful for all sides, and confuses the search for correct interpretation of later ensuing civil or interethnic strife. Nationalism ought to be distinct from patriotism, which is normally manifested as loyalty and affection to one's own country of origin or a particular territory of living. The ideology of nationalism, as it is acted out particularly in ethnic conflicts, is based on a destructive (to self and others) mixture of emotions amplified and distorted by misconceived and misinterpreted real or assumed experiences, inherited

[3] Donald Rothchild and Alexander J. Groth, "Pathological Dimensions of Domestic and International Ethnicity," *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1995, pp. 69–82.

[4] Herbert C. Kelman, "Negotiating National Identity and Self-Determination in Ethnic Conflicts: The Choice Between Pluralism and Ethnic Cleansing," *Negotiation Journal*, October 1997, pp. 327–40. See also Daniele Conversi, "Nationalism, Boundaries and Violence," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 28, no. 3 (1999), pp. 553–84.

[5] Steven L. Burg, "Nationalism Redux: Through the Glass of Post-Communist States Darkly," *Current History*, Apr. 1993, pp. 162–66.

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and unexamined historical narratives and memories, all amalgamated into a rigid structure of beliefs.

Through this glass reality is often seen very darkly.

This partially subconscious, dense, psychological block can also be based on two premises. (a) The presence and territorial proximity of certain "alien others" and the imposed coexistence with them threaten the group with the inevitable fate of "cultural bastardization"[6] and eventual ethnic and cultural extinction. (b) The only means to avoid this fate would be to inflict the same fate on the alien others. Such is the route to the demonization of the real or presumed enemy. These primitive psychological processes have in most cases a mirror-image effect, both on the individual and on the collective mind, and are manifested through mutually imitative patterns of behavior.

Is it ethnic conflict or is it a civil war? One would naturally expect that such reciprocal hatreds develop and intensify between groups divided by profound differences that eventually create unbridgeable chasms. However, the chasms that are created between groups that in reality have a lot in common with each other can often be far more frightening, especially when they are reanimated from one generation to the next.

Any approach to the study of the diverse factors that affect ethnic conflict presupposes an accurate initial diagnosis of its real nature, in order to avoid the misnomer as ethnic conflict of what essentially is a civil war. Through such misunderstanding we may come across another set of obstructive myths, born again from idiosyncratic and politically exploitive interpretations of history. The former Yugoslavia is a glaring example.[7]

Components of both ethnic conflict and civil war may be very similar. Religious differences, for example, may exist and may be very strong in both. Both (or all parties) in civil strife may themselves present it to the outside world as ethnic conflict, knowing that it is more likely that external powers

[6] I heard that expression for the first time during a serendipitous discussion in Paris, when my husband and I entered a small neighborhood restaurant and we soon realized that the rest of the clientele consisted entirely of expatriate Basques. We stayed many hours and in the course of an unforgettable discussion, when we tried to share with them our cherished academic concepts of "superordinate goals," "common ground," and "dialogue," they shared with us their fears of their culture becoming "une culture bâtarde." It sounded really dramatic in French. At a later time we heard the same expression and the same fear it connotes from an Algerian Ph.D. student and taxi driver again in Paris (the city of expatriates). Only at that time the "alien others" were also Algerians who, fearing those they considered alien others, were on a "preemptive" killing spree.

[7] Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians have been viewed, discussed, treated, and presented by others and by themselves as three separate ethnic groups despite the fact that they are all South Slavs, sharing a common ethnic origin and speaking basically the same language, Serbocroatian. They became Christians under the influence of the Byzantine Empire that conquered them and through proselytizing by Byzantine missionaries. After the Ottoman conquest of the Byzantine territories a number of South Slavs were converted forcibly (and some by choice) to Islam. Therefore, Serbs and Croats share the same ethnic and cultural origin, speak the same language, and have the same religion, differing only in the denomination they belong to. The Bosnians share with the other two groups the same origin and the same language, but after a point in their history most of them have a different religion. See Warren Zimmerman, "Last Chance for Bosnia," *New York Review of Books*, Dec. 19, 1996. See also the series of articles in the *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Spring 1992, Winter 1993, Summer 1993, Summer 1994, Fall 1994, and Winter 1995.

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would take sides and support their favorite in the case of ethnic conflict, but they would avoid at least active participation in somebody else's civil war. Again, the example of the former Yugoslavia is very instructive.

The core of the problem in such cases is not the differences but, strangely enough, the similarities that seem at times to unleash internal struggles as savage as (or even more so than) those between different ethnonational groups.

Biblical literature has graphically given us the archetype of the fratricidal conflict in the tragic figures of Cain and Abel. In the realization of this archetype historically we may often have two Cains, who can become more easily the tools of nationalistic and political manipulation.

Literature and psychology have also time and again tried to interpret this most destructive propensity of the human psyche. Charles Dickens described this disturbing phenomenon with his characteristic simplicity of phrase and depth of understanding for the vagaries of human behavior. "When men are fighting unnaturally against their own countrymen, they are always observed to be more unnaturally cruel and filled with rage, than they are against any other enemy."[8]

Sigmund Freud called this "the narcissism of minor differences," observing that "it is precisely communities with adjoining territories and related to each other in other ways as well, who are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing each other."[9]

However, although undoubtedly there is a psychological "prehistory" of such divisions, the presently favored theory of "ancient hatreds" and the tendency to apply it as the main reason in all ethnic conflicts does not always correspond to the realities of many cases. This ignores or diminishes the role of internally and/or externally instigated political exploitation that should always be considered among the primary factors of erupting ethnic conflicts and may be, at least in certain cases, the principal one.[10]

The role of religion. The influence of the political exploitation factor is manifested also in cases where an important component in an ethnic conflict or in a civil war appears to be religious or even denominational differences. We then face different sets of myths that aim to make religion the primary etiology of wars that people at times declare against themselves. Again, Yugoslavia provides us with a perilous paradigm of the politicization of religion and its exploitation at the service of divisive, self-centered political goals of unscrupulous, ambitious elites. Warren Zimmerman offers an inter-

[8] Charles Dickens, *A Child's History of England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958).

[9] Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (New York: J. Cape and H. Smith, 1930).

[10] Steven Majstorovic, "Ancient Hatreds or Elite Manipulation?" *World Affairs*, Spring 1997, pp. 170–82. See also Ian Fisher, "If Only the Problem Were as Easy as Old Hatreds," *New York Times*, Jan. 2, 2000; Stephen M. Saideman, "Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability versus Ethnic Ties," *International Organization*, Autumn 1997, pp. 721–53; and articles by I. William Zartman and Dean Pruitt in this issue.

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esting commentary on that phenomenon using again the example of Yugoslavia: "Lacking a strong argument for the incompatibility of Serbs, Croats and Muslims, the national leaders tend to emphasize their religious differences; an explanation that does not sound convincing, coming from men who are, for the most part, former communists."[11]

However, dramatic examples notwithstanding, what do we really mean when we say that religion may play an important role in ethnic conflicts and in civil wars? In many of the presently imploding ethnic conflicts there are religious (or denominational) differences between the warring parties, among other dividing factors, real or fabricated. As at least some of these components intensify and become more insidious, a conflict escalates and becomes more intractable.

In this vicious self-perpetuating cycle, the religious component becomes part of what we consider a historical, psychological, and cultural patrimony with its inevitable emotional overload and the recidivism of revenge.

There are, then, some important questions to be asked. In what cases, under what circumstances, and with what other contributing factors has religion been a principal driving force in a conflict? This assumes that the conflict's nature and origins have been correctly diagnosed.

What were the primary overt and covert reasons for such a role? Were there any secondary and tertiary factors that corroborated that role? Are there any inherent components in this religion's (or denomination's) tenets, rituals, codes of behavior, or the way they are interpreted by the creed's officialdom and the faithful that lead inevitably to persecutory anxieties and intolerance towards other groups who share the same settings?

Or is it that socioeconomic inefficiencies, inequalities, educational deprivations, political incompetence, or poor physical environment create deep separation lines among the population, especially when parts of it advance more than others, because their cultural and religious beliefs are more open to the world than those of other groups in the same area?

Are, then, the religious differences dragged into the morass as a comparatively easy bait, because of the vulnerability to such influences created by the deep emotional content of the religious experience?

Thus, religious differences can be politicized, distorted, and exploited as additional powerful weapons of division and as explanation and justification for barbarities (slave trading in Sudan).

In such scenarios, then, it is not religion per se that provides the incendiary elements. It is the use of religious differences as an additional weapon by persons or groups in order to achieve dominant power. Religious leadership can also play that game, as well as political or military satraps.

[11] Zimmerman, "Last Chance for Bosnia."

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Therefore, religion cannot be analyzed as an isolated factor. In the nuclei of ethnic conflicts and civil wars churn many other contributing factors, conditions, circumstances indigenous or externally imposed, and often more actors than those that are obvious at first glance. How and by whom are those human and circumstantial components orchestrated in the cacophony of hate? By what means can they be influenced, diverted, altered, or eradicated? Which would be the appropriate models of intervention, mediation, and resolution that could not only lead to the termination of hostilities, but also to the initiation of the healing process?[12]

External intervention. In addition to the factors we have mentioned (and this is by no means an exhaustive list), one has unavoidably to include in the picture external intervention, which often is desperately needed, but which unfortunately is at times also plagued by its own myths.[13] The identity of the intervenor, the timing and form of the intervention, its motivation and impartiality (undisputed or doubtful), and the accuracy of the underlining diagnosis of the specific conflict are factors that can make it a really life-saving operation or turn it into an additional quagmire. Well-intended proclamations and promises from outside actors (such as freedom, democracy, self-determination, and autonomy) can turn into inside nightmares if the instigators are incapable or unwilling to match the "noble" rhetoric with prudent, carefully, and realistically designed action based on objective, impartial knowledge and evaluation of demographic complexities of historical realities and of internal power games. Above all, intervention should be free of "selective morality," shown, among other examples, in the selectivity as to which conflict will be addressed, while the magnitude of the human toll may be overwhelming in another, as well as in viewing the barbarities committed by "friends" as unfortunate but unavoidable protective actions and those committed by "non-friends" as war crimes.[14]

[12] Termination of hostilities is the sine qua non first aid in such conflicts. However, any method used for such first aid should also include systems that strictly and effectively eradicate acts of revenge through the creation of neutral, strong enforcement bodies that are capable (and willing) to establish the rule of law.

[13] Dominique Jacquin Berdal, "Ethnic Wars and International Intervention," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1 (1998), pp. 127–39.

[14] It is interesting that trends in the study of the role and the causal factors of external intervention present two schools of thought. The traditional theory considers that certain territories, such as the Middle East and the Balkans, are inherently turbulent, every so often "dragging" outside powers into the chaos of their instability. The intervention then becomes inevitable for humanitarian reasons, but also to reestablish order and balance, although at times the result may be a greater conflagration, like World War I. "Inside Europe," by John Gunther, published in 1940, is an older example that popularized that view, which became the predominant approach, particularly concerning the Balkans and the Middle East since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Current scholarship promotes the opposite point of view, presenting the thesis that the turbulence and instability in these regions reflects arbitrary decisions and foolhardy practices of the great powers imposed many times in the last two centuries on these areas, ignoring regional aspirations and realities and manipulating local animosities. For a treatise on this point of view, see Misha Glenny, *The Balkans, 1804–1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers* (London: Granta Books, 1999); Misha Glenny, "Exploding the Myths of the Mad, Bad Balkans," *Financial Times*, Nov. 27/28, 1999; and Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).

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The conceptual framework briefly presented in these pages is part of a testing ground of ideas and possible research directions that are being developed at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in Philadelphia, aiming at a broad and in-depth study of ethnic conflict and the related literature.

Current methodologies of ethnic conflict resolution are, despite some successes, distressingly limited in their results, and some of the currently prevailing theories and modes of application may have to be drastically revised, while the terrain of ethnic conflicts is constantly expanding and misconceptions abound.

There is a compelling need for thinking new paradigms, for further developing diagnostic models and tools, and for redesigning or creating new resolution forms, not only because new areas and kinds of ethnic conflict seem to be appearing, but also because of the further deteriorating nature of certain long-existing conflicts.

The papers presented in this issue of *Orbis* show us important and original directions toward these goals. To this end, we have also designed the following programs, as a first part of our evolving project on the study of ethnic conflict:

(a) The organization of interdisciplinary conferences of experts on the themes to be discussed. The first such conference took place in May 1999 and we examined the roles of religion, of mediation and of the media in ethnic conflict. Four of the presented papers are included in this issue of *Orbis*, while the keynote address of the conference appeared in the Fall 1999 issue of this journal.

(b) The organization of an international conference on ethnic conflict, which will bring together: academics and other experts doing pioneering research on this topic; practitioners specializing in resolution and reconstruction efforts; leaders of states where some success has been achieved in resolving severe conflicts or at least containing them; leaders or other experts of nongovernmental and governmental organizations involved in resolving conflicts. Failures in resolution will also be examined.

(c) A series of lectures, seminars, workshops, discussion groups, and specialized research projects on specific topics (such as the role of religion, the role of political and military elites, the role of external intervention and direct or indirect influence of other countries, the role of education and tradition, particular cultural dimensions conducive to violent solutions, and the role of history, mediation and peacekeeping, to mention only a few).

The first series of annual lectures on interdisciplinary studies on ethnic conflict was established in 1998 and two programs have been presented so far. A discussion group on the role of religion is planned to start early in the year 2000. It will bring together experts in the areas of religious studies, political science, sociology, international studies, history, and psychology.

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(d) Occasional special programs for educators, in collaboration with FPRI's Wachman Fund for International Education, aiming at helping teachers in the development of personal skills and pedagogical frameworks enabling them to find and teach creative, nonviolent solutions to personal, group, and broader cross-cultural conflicts. A day-long conference for teachers in the framework of the Wachman program took place in April 1999.

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Ethnic Conflicts

The Tactics of Third-Party Intervention

by Dean G. Pruitt

There is no best third-party approach to conflict resolution, because the function of third parties is to compensate for the deficiencies of the disputants themselves. Hence, they must deploy as many cures as there are maladies. But that is not to say that no patterns exist. It is useful to sort the myriad of possible third-party tactics on a scale from light to heavy, following the theoretical work by Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman.[1] At the light, more facilitative end of the scale lie communication tactics. The third party arranges for the disputants to meet, tries to improve their relationship, or at least transmits messages between them. In the moderate, middle range lie formulation tactics by which the mediator undertakes to structure the agenda, suggest new ways of looking at issues, and propose possible solutions. Finally, at the heavy, controlling end of the scale lie manipulation tactics whereby a mediator may threaten, bribe, or otherwise pressure disputants to make concessions and seek compromise.

A useful generalization that has received support in many settings is that the less capable the disputants are of negotiating their own agreement, the more third parties should rely on heavy, controlling tactics.[2] In situations that are highly favorable to settlement—such as when disputants are on otherwise good terms, their negotiating positions are not far apart, or they are highly motivated to settle their conflict—third parties need only use mild tactics that improve communication. Indeed, vigorous efforts to restructure the agenda or push solutions on the disputants are likely to be counterproductive. In unfavorable situations—such as when disputants are hostile and distrust each other, their positions are far apart, or they lack the motivation to settle—the disputants will never reach agreement unless third parties control

[1] Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, eds., *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 10–14.

[2] Dean G. Pruitt, "Social Conflict," in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 4th ed., ed. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), p. 491.

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the agenda, press for solutions, and, if possible, manipulate the disputants' incentives.

The Oslo Talks between Israel and the PLO

One example of the success of light tactics in a favorable setting is the secret Oslo talks in 1993 that led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority.[3] The third parties were Norwegians, most notably Terje Larsen, a sociologist who was doing research in the Gaza Strip. The conflict between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was long standing and severe, and the parties were far apart in their demands. But a break appeared in these clouds in 1992, and both sides became highly motivated to settle their conflict. In Zartman's terms, the situation became ripe for resolution.[4]

As Zartman points out, ripeness develops when a mutually hurting stalemate exists, especially if the parties are also facing an impending catastrophe. Israel and the PLO were in a stalemate in that Israel could not defeat the PLO or vice versa. The stalemate was hurting Israel by exposing it to significant conflict-related costs: the uprising of Arab youth, or intifada, had eroded popular support for continuing to control the West Bank; the government perceived a danger that Iran or Iraq would eventually attack Israel out of sympathy with the Palestinians; and concern was growing about American support in the wake of the Gulf War.[5] As a result, Yitzhak Rabin, head of the Labor Party, won the 1992 election on a promise of settlement with the Palestinians.[6] At the same time, Yasir Arafat faced an impending catastrophe in that the PLO's funds were running low and the Hamas movement (a radical outgrowth of the intifada) was gaining strength as an alternative Palestinian leadership. Rabin was also worried about the rise of Hamas.

Another way of describing the situation that developed in 1992 is that the Israeli government became dependent on the PLO to provide not only

[3] Accounts of the Oslo talks are found in Mahmoud Abbas, *Through Secret Channels* (Reading, Eng.: Garnet, 1995); Jane Corbin, *Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace between Israel and the PLO* (London: Bloomsbury, 1994); David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996); Shimon Peres, *Battling for Peace* (New York: Random House, 1995); Dean G. Pruitt, Jacob Bercovitch, and I. William Zartman, "A Brief History of the Oslo Talks," *International Negotiation*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1997), pp. 177–82; and Uri Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East* (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 3–89.

[4] The progression of ideas that constitute Zartman's ripeness theory can be seen in I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict Resolution in Africa*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 231–37; I. William Zartman, "Bargaining and Conflict Resolution," in *Coping with Conflict after the Cold War*, ed. Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 271–90; and I. William Zartman, "Explaining Oslo," *International Negotiation*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1997), pp. 195–215.

[5] Dean G. Pruitt, "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks," *International Negotiation*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1997), pp. 237–50.

[6] It took Rabin a while after the election to recognize that the PLO was the only valid spokesman of the Palestinians.

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peace with the Palestinians, but also better relations with the Arab world and the United States, while the PLO became dependent on the Israeli government to give them legitimate authority in Palestinian territory so that they could collect taxes and marginalize Hamas.

At his listening post in Gaza, Larsen sensed the ripening moment and arranged for his government to host twelve secret, back-channel meetings in and around Oslo over an eight-month period. The PLO delegation was led throughout the talks by Abu Ala, a high-level associate of Arafat. Israel was represented at first by a low-level delegation of two university professors who gave informal reports to the Labor government. Israel's participation became formal and "high level" after five meetings, by which time it was clear that a reasonable agreement could probably be reached. Two diplomats who had access to the top levels of government were sent to take over the talks.

The Norwegians mostly employed communication tactics, providing the disputants their "good offices." They arranged for common meals and recreational facilities to help the delegates develop friendly interpersonal relations. Larsen sat outside the negotiation room and only intervened to smooth over interpersonal problems and urge continuation of the talks when they were in danger of breaking down. When talks were not in session, he passed messages between the parties.

A lot of hard bargaining ensued, and several major flare-ups occurred. Nevertheless, a warm, even jocular, atmosphere developed, along with a common understanding of the issues and a common vocabulary. There was also a solidarity of purpose, with each side ready to engage in the kind of give-and-take necessary to reach a negotiated settlement and convinced that the other side shared this outlook. The participants had the luxury of time to go over the many proposals and sift out those most acceptable to both sides. The declaration of principles that emerged from these meetings produced a major new entity, the Palestinian Authority, and paved the way to what may well become a Palestinian state.

The London Talks That Established Zimbabwe

A sharply contrasting third-party effort can be seen in the 1979 Lancaster House talks in London that settled the civil war in Zimbabwe.[7] The third party was Lord Carrington, Margaret Thatcher's foreign minister. On one side of the dispute were representatives of the white settlers (led by Ian Smith) and a black government the settlers had recently installed (led by Bishop Muzorewa). On the other side were the representatives of two black

[7] For an authoritative account of the Lancaster House talks and the events that preceded them, see Stephen John Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974–1980* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

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insurgent armies led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo and headquartered in Mozambique and Zambia.

In contrast to the light tactics used in Oslo, the third party in London put a good deal of pressure on the participants and kept them on a tight leash by means of threats and promises. The delegations could communicate with each other only via Lord Carrington, who also set the agenda and imposed a "single text" procedure by which only he could put proposals on the table. (Occasionally, and with great reluctance, he altered these proposals in response to substantive objections from the delegates.) He arranged meetings between leaders of the insurgents and their African allies (the presidents of Mozambique and Zambia), who urged them to accept the third party's proposals and threatened to abandon them if they failed to do so. The third party set periodic deadlines for the acceptance of his proposals and finally insisted that his government supervise implementation of the agreement.

The result of these negotiations was a cease-fire, a new constitution that reduced the power of the white minority, and an election supervised by the British. Mugabe won this election and remains in office to this day.

Why the huge difference in the styles of third-party intervention between the Oslo and London meetings? The situation in the Middle East was ripe for resolution before the talks began, but this was not the case for Zimbabwe. Mugabe, far from being mired in a stalemate, believed that his army was winning the war and only went to London because of pressure from his allies and threats from the British. Reluctance to settle existed on the other side as well. The situation was only thoroughly ripe for the *allies* of the insurgents, who were suffering because of the war.[8] Since the situation was not ripe, the British had to use heavy-handed tactics to prevent the sort of wrangling that had destroyed prior conferences. British pressure fell particularly heavily on Mugabe. Lord Carrington threatened diplomatic recognition of Mugabe's opponents if he proved less compliant than they. Carrington also arranged for Mugabe's allies to put pressure on him and produced a draft agreement that gave him enough concessions that his allies felt justified in threatening to forsake him unless he accepted. In the end, Mugabe settled. But his motivation to do so stemmed not from preexisting ripeness, but from carefully orchestrated pressures during and just before the London meetings.

In short, the light, facilitative tactics of the third party in Oslo were effective because the situation was ripe for resolution, but heavy, directive tactics were needed in London because that situation was not ripe. But that implies in turn that there had to be a difference in the type of third party involved. Light tactics can be used by any third party, but heavy tactics require a strong third party. Norway was useful in the Oslo talks insofar as it could provide facilities, assure secrecy, and help with communication. But a

[8] Ibid., p. 236.

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strong nation like Britain, under a leader who was viewed as the toughest since Churchill, was needed for the London talks because the delegates had to be pushed around. The British also had the advantage of understanding the disputants well enough to locate an agreement that was minimally acceptable to all of them in light of the situation they were in during the meetings.

Intermediaries, Chains, and Track-Two Diplomacy

Let us turn now to a special kind of third party, the intermediary, who moves back and forth between the disputants in what is sometimes called "shuttle diplomacy." Intermediaries transmit messages from one side to the other, develop proposals that serve the interests of both sides, and sometimes put pressure on one or both sides. They are Janus-faced, presenting a visage in both directions, and they sometimes become the meat in the sandwich, taking pressure from both sides. Mediators act as intermediaries when they go into "caucus" sessions with the disputants.[9] This was Carrington's role in the London meetings, and it was Larsen's role between sessions in the Oslo talks. Most negotiators are also intermediaries, transmitting messages between the leaders on both sides, trying to devise mutually acceptable proposals, and putting pressure on one or both sides.

Most interorganizational and international conflict resolution involves several intermediaries who are organized into communication chains.[10] For example, if a mediator is shuttling between two negotiators, this becomes a five-party chain involving at least three intermediaries:

Organization 1 ↔ Negotiator for Organization 1 ↔ Mediator ↔ Negotiator for Organization 2 ↔ Organization 2

In practice, chains are often longer, as they continue into the organizations at either end. For example, a defense department officer may communicate with a country desk officer who communicates with the negotiators for their side. And these two officers may well communicate with each other through a liaison. There may also be more than one mediator in the middle of a chain. For example, Kraslow and Loory report that during the Vietnam War a mediation chain went from the U.S. government through officials in Britain to officials in the Soviet Union and finally to the government of North Vietnam.[11]

A major strength of communication chains is that people who are closer together in a chain usually have greater access to each other, under-

[9] For a discussion of caucusing, see Dean G. Pruitt, "Process and Outcome in Community Mediation," *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 11, no. 4 (1995), pp. 369–70.

[10] For a theory of communication chains in interorganizational negotiation, see Dean G. Pruitt, "Negotiation between Organizations: A Branching Chain Model," *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 10, no. 3 (1994), pp. 217–30.

[11] David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory, *The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 220.

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stand each other better, are more sympathetic with each other, and trust each more than those at a greater distance. Hence, they can have better conversations and are more likely to generate solutions to the conflict. They also have more influence over each other, increasing the likelihood that agreement will be reached. Chains also allow the leaders at either end to conceal their contacts with each other. If it was impolitic for the president of the United States to be talking with the North Vietnamese at the height of the war, he could tell Congress and the press that he was only talking with the British.

Some of the most useful chains involve unofficial intermediaries. In the period before the start of formal negotiations between severely alienated parties, chains of unofficial intermediaries are often at work, trying to find a basis for launching formal talks. This phenomenon is a useful first step in resolving ethnic conflicts in which the parties to these conflicts are unable or unwilling to deal with each other directly. Unofficial (track-two) diplomacy will often lead to official (track-one) diplomacy if it creates a hopeful situation in which both sides are motivated to settle and a possible agreement is on the horizon.

Communication chains allow rivals to conceal their contacts with each other.

The early stages of the Oslo negotiations are an example of track-two diplomacy. Terje Larsen had no official standing, but his extensive contacts with both Israelis and Palestinians enabled him to detect the readiness for negotiation on both sides. In a series of secret and informal meetings he persuaded the PLO to send Abu Ala and the Israeli government to nominate the university professors. The talks themselves began as track-two diplomacy because the professors were not official representatives, although they were in regular contact with the Israeli government. The talks only turned into track-one diplomacy when the Israeli government found that considerable progress was being made. Even then, the talks were kept secret because of the danger that hawks on both sides would scuttle them if they knew what had transpired.

Track-two diplomacy is most likely to succeed if the intermediaries conducting it are bridge people with prior understanding of and trusted access to both sides.[12] Both Larsen and the Israeli professors are excellent examples of bridge people who had played roles in Israeli-Palestinian contacts over a number of years. This suggests that problem-solving workshops and other informal contacts between disputants should be cultivated in anticipation of the arrival of a ripe moment. An extraordinary example of a bridge person is Jimmy Carter, who enjoyed good relations with scores of national leaders around the world. In the early years of the Clinton administration, this good will allowed him to mediate conflicts between the United

[12] Pruitt, "Ripeness and the Oslo Talks," p. 247.

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States and North Korea, Haiti, and Serbia. The unofficial nature of his activities was criticized at the time, but he was quite effective.

The Northern Ireland Peace Process

The importance of chains and track-two diplomacy can also be seen in the events leading up to the formal negotiations that produced the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement in 1998.[13] The main adversaries in this conflict were the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its political wing, Sinn Fein, on the one hand, and the British government and the Protestant militias on the other. The IRA/Sinn Fein and other Catholic political groups sought a unified Ireland that did not include the British. The British government and most Protestants insisted that the northern counties remain in the United Kingdom.

From the early 1980s on, both sides recognized that they were locked in a stalemate with little chance of victory. The stalemate was a hurting one for Britain in light of the costs of maintaining soldiers in Ulster, grants to prop up the Northern Irish economy, and criticism from abroad about human rights violations. And the stalemate began to hurt the IRA/Sinn Fein as well after the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, in which Dublin pledged to work harder to contain the IRA in return for an intergovernmental conference and secretariat that gave the Irish government a limited say in the affairs of Northern Ireland. That agreement provoked a vigorous debate within IRA/Sinn Fein circles because it threatened to undermine the IRA's military campaign and Sinn Fein's political campaign. This debate culminated in some statements made by Gerry Adams, the head of Sinn Fein, hinting at a desire to move toward negotiation.

Adams's remarks allowed track-two diplomacy to begin and an impressive communication chain to be forged. A would-be intermediary, John Hume, head of the moderate Catholic Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), met with Adams several times in 1988. Hume also had a number of talks with Charles Haughey, prime minister of Ireland, and some of his assistants. By 1991 a four-party, secret communication chain was in full swing, as follows:

Sinn Fein	↔	SDLP	↔	Irish government	↔	British government
(Adams)		(Hume)		(Haughey, then Reynolds)[14]		(Major)

[13] For detailed accounts of the Northern Ireland peace process, see Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, *The Northern Ireland Peace Process 1993–1996: A Chronology* (London: Serif, 1996); George Drower, *John Hume: Man of Peace* (London: Vista, 1995); Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick, *The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story behind the Irish Peace Process* (London: Heinemann, 1996); and Peter Taylor, *Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Fein* (New York: TV Books, 1997).

[14] Albert Reynolds took over from Charles Haughey as *taoiseach* (prime minister) of Ireland in 1992.

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The chain was actually longer, since it reached from Sinn Fein to the IRA and from the British government to Northern Ireland Protestants. But the most active segment of the chain is charted above. This chain operated effectively despite a stepped-up IRA military campaign that was heavily targeted on Britain. One of the chain's accomplishments was coordination of an alternating sequence of conciliatory statements and actions—a kind of courtship dance—by Sinn Fein and the British government. This process moved steadily forward, though at a frustratingly slow pace:

- In 1988, Sinn Fein sent signals that it was reexamining its policies, most notably by engaging in the Hume-Adams dialogue.
- In 1989 and 1990, the British secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, made conciliatory speeches in which he said that Britain had no selfish economic or strategic interests in Northern Ireland and would respond with "imaginative steps" if the IRA abandoned violence. Hume had urged him to make these statements, which challenged some of Sinn Fein's stereotypes about Britain. (This communication jumped over the Irish government segment of the chain because Hume had legitimate access to Brooke.) The violence continued, but the IRA did declare a three-day cease-fire at Christmas 1990.
- In 1992, Sinn Fein published a conciliatory statement, "Towards a lasting peace in Ireland," and the following September Hume persuaded Adams to state that Sinn Fein was "more willing than ever to explore new avenues toward a settlement."
- October 1993 produced the Downing Street Declaration by Britain and Ireland, in which Britain indicated that "new doors could open" if the IRA would renounce violence. A comparison of texts reveals that, despite British denials, this declaration was heavily influenced by Sinn Fein and SDLP ideas that had been transmitted through the chain.[15] Shortly after this declaration, Major indicated that he would talk with Sinn Fein if the IRA stopped its violence.
- Finally, in August 1994, the IRA declared a cease-fire *sine die* and called for negotiations.

Again, as in the case of Oslo, unofficial track-two diplomacy was an indispensable prelude to official diplomacy. Again, a third party (John Hume) became active when it became apparent that there was motivation to settle on

[15] Mallie and McKittrick, *The Fight for Peace*, p. 271.

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both sides. And once again, a communication chain evolved that turned out to be of great importance.

Between 1990 and 1993, there was another secret communication chain that linked the British government and Sinn Fein through a single intermediary, the "contact." However, this chain appears to have been primarily a conduit for messages that produced no concessions or ideas.[16] The longer chain diagrammed above had an advantage over this shorter one because it involved conversations at each juncture between people who knew each other well, shared common values, respected and trusted each other, and thus could engage in joint problem solving.

Secrecy

The Oslo negotiations were secret, as were most of the conversations about Northern Ireland. Secrecy is facilitated by communicating through chains of intermediaries, and has the great advantage of providing political cover and deniability to the main disputants. Thus, John Major could claim truthfully that all he ever did was hold conversations with that reasonable fellow, the *taoiseach* (prime minister) of Ireland. This is especially advantageous in severe ethnic conflicts in which direct talks are often politically perilous because they appear to grant legitimacy to the adversary. Had the Oslo negotiations become known, they would probably have been blown out of the water by extremists in Israel and the Arab world. Had the chain connecting Major to Adams become known, Ian Paisley (a Northern Ireland Protestant leader) and other extremists might have forced Major to abandon it on the grounds that it involved contact with "murderers." A related advantage of secret contacts is that they can survive violent episodes that would close down official contacts. Thus, it was possible to start the Oslo talks at a time when the official Washington negotiations between moderate Palestinians and Israeli officials were on hold in the wake of Israel's expulsion of a large number of Hamas members. Likewise, the Northern Ireland chain produced results despite a stepped-up IRA military campaign heavily focused on Britain.

Secrecy needs to be distinguished from privacy. All negotiations must be private in the sense of being out of the public eye. Otherwise, negotiators tend to grandstand and become overly committed to their initial positions. Secrecy is needed in addition to privacy when substantial parts of the polity on either side are likely to question the very existence of negotiation with the opponent.

[16] See Mallie and McKittrick, *The Fight for Peace*, p. 254; and Sinn Fein, "Setting the Record Straight: A Record of Communications between Sinn Fein and the British Government, October 1990–November 1993," pamphlet (Jan. 5, 1994).

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Chain Shortening and Final Negotiations

One more point needs to be made about chains. Chains that work well and produce results tend to become shorter in the long run, with intermediaries dropping out and parties at or near the ends of the chains meeting each other directly. This is due to the development of optimism, which is based on a perception of the other side's motivation to settle and the emergence of an outline of an agreement.[17]

For instance, at its longest, the Oslo chain involved six parties:

PLO leadership (Arafat)	↔	PLO delegation (Abu Ala)	↔	Israeli professors	↔	Israeli diplomats	↔	Israeli foreign minister (Peres)	↔	Israeli prime minister (Rabin)

First, the Israeli professors were dropped from the chain, and eventually the entire middle segment was dropped in favor of a phone conversation in which the Israeli foreign minister (Peres) essentially talked with Arafat.[18] Such chain shortening also occurred in the Northern Ireland peace process when the British government talked with Sinn Fein officials during the final negotiations that produced the peace agreement in 1998.

When chains shorten, the people who drop out of the middle often stay on as advisers to help the remaining chain members maneuver across the chasm that still divides them. This happened in most of the examples just described.

Conclusions

This paper has focused on the processes by which third parties can contribute to conflict resolution and how these processes can be applied to ethnic conflict. Among its broad generalizations, the most notable are these: third parties need to use heavier tactics with more intransigent disputants; track-two diplomacy often precedes track-one diplomacy; serious conflicts are often moved to the verge of settlement by chains of intermediaries; chains that produce results tend to become shorter as intermediaries drop out; and secrecy is usually essential for resolving severe conflicts. There is no question that long-standing ethnic conflicts, fed by memories of reciprocal violence and the perception of incompatible ends, can frustrate the most earnest efforts of even the most powerful and prestigious interlocutors. But if third parties remain patient and on the lookout for those moments of "ripeness" in an ethnic dispute, the diplomatic tactics outlined above can be highly effective.

[17] Kelman calls this "working trust." Herbert C. Kelman, "Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough," *International Negotiation*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1997), p. 189.

[18] This was the next thing to a direct conversation. Peres and Arafat conversed through spokesmen who were in the rooms with them. These spokesmen were not intermediaries, in the sense used in the rest of this paper, because they simply relayed messages rather than discussing the issues or negotiating.

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Ethnic Conflicts

Mediating Conflicts of Need, Greed, and Creed

by I. William Zartman

While civil wars are often seen as the product of unfulfilled basic needs, internal ethnic conflicts are commonly driven by private gain and collective beliefs as well. Such combinations of motives—mixing need, greed, and creed—pose especially complex challenges for mediators and underscore the importance of prevention over cure.[1] For once the three combine to spark and nourish a conflict, mediation becomes a tough job of uncertain entry and long duration.

The Nature of Ethnic Conflict

A perceived collective need that is denied is the basic condition for conflict. Denied need refers to a broad range of grievances, from relief from political repression to redress for economic deprivation. The claims of some theorists notwithstanding, it is not possible to establish a hierarchy of needs.[2] Perceived needs are flexible and satisfied at different levels under different circumstances, and needs satisfied at one time do not always remain so. Above all, satisfaction of needs—like all other satisfactions—is a function of expectations, which are themselves malleable. Nevertheless, conceptualizing conflict in terms of needs is useful, for it points to the basic dimension of grievances, hence of solutions.

[1] These categories draw on the creative work of Paul Collier at the World Bank; see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Justice Seeking and Loot Seeking in Civil War" (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999); and Paul Collier, "Economic Consequences of Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers*, vol. 51 (1999), pp. 168–83. See also I. William Zartman, "Managing Ethnic Conflict," Foreign Policy Research Institute *Wire*, vol. 6, no. 5 (1998).

[2] Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review*, vol. 50, no. 3 (1943), pp. 370–96; Edward Azar, "Protracted International Conflict: Ten Propositions," in *The Understanding and Management of Global Violence*, ed. Harvey Starr (New York: St. Martin's, 1999).

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Nondiscrimination in meeting needs is a public good, and therefore solving a given conflict may require unhindered access to common or equal justice. But justice per se is not really one of the issues in a conflict so much as a concept through which issues and grievances can be analyzed and resolved.[3] Resolution of need-based conflict requires problem-solving skills (including detachment) not always available to parties caught up in it.

To the extent that people feel themselves to be targets of repression and deprivation, discrimination can become a cause for rebellion and a source of solidarity among the rebels.[4] People may feel targeted because of their political beliefs, social position, or ascriptive membership, but whatever the cause of the discrimination, it provides the coin of identity for the conflicting party. While a conflict can be resolved in its initial stages by removing the grievances, such a response in the middle stages may not be heard by those in revolt (particularly by the leadership) as they focus their attention on the more important challenge of building unity and solidarity behind their revolt.

One of the sources of a sense of discrimination is creed, referring to generalized beliefs and identity feelings. Ethnic conflicts (and, by definition, religious ones) are creed-based conflicts. Creed itself is a "need," as all individuals need to feel some level of identity, through ascriptive membership and/or belief systems. Such needs vary according to the individual and context, the latter being a social phenomenon of greater interest to the present discussion than the former. People have a greater need to know who they are in some circumstances than in others. Three such circumstances have a particularly important impact on the need for identity: rapid or profound change, breakdown of other identities, and discrimination.

So much has been written about these three elements that they need only be noted briefly here. Times of deep change strike at the very notion of one's identity and accentuate a need to know who one is as uncertainty swirls about. Identity at such times is not just a "taking" affair, but also a matter of "making" and doing, imposing demands on others to respect or honor the requirements of one's newly (re)affirmed identity. Creed then becomes a specific aspect of identity, as belief systems and actions give content to simple identification. Similarly, when other creeds fail, new ones arise to fill the void and gather energy from their offensive momentum. Thus, Islamic fundamentalism capitalized on the failure of Arab socialism, and ethnic identities have gained force from the failures or even just the challenges of nation-building.

But selective, targeted deprivation is the most frequent cause of identity-based conflict. Collective needs for identity turn deprivation into discrimination. When deprivation hits identifiable parts of the population, or

[3] I. William Zartman et al., "Negotiation as a Search for Justice," *International Negotiation*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1996), pp. 79–98.

[4] Ted Gurr, *Minorities at Risk* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993).

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when those parts perceive themselves to be selective targets, they take offense, using discrimination as a source of solidarity. When discrimination continues, the goals of the rebels turn from the redress of substantive grievances to procedural demands for control of the system, because redress at the hands of others is no longer trusted. Procedural demands are harder to resolve, since they can be satisfied only by a reallocation of positions as well as benefits, providing both an additional grievance and a cause for greater solidarity. And because stronger grievances and solidarity are mutually reinforcing, problem-solving becomes more difficult.

Creed adds fear for security to need as a source of conflict. Not only do creed-based groups perceive discrimination in distribution (too few benefits or too much repression), but they also fear for their very existence, creating a reciprocal fear in the dominant group—a vicious cycle known as the security dilemma—that lies at the basis of much ethnic conflict.[5] A group (or government) feeling threatened at a low level takes measures to assure its security, thereby decreasing the security of the threatening group, which in turn takes measures to bolster its security, forcing the originally targeted group to respond, and so forth. This security dilemma best explains the vicious violence between groups that formerly lived harmoniously in Bosnia, Kosovo, Burundi, Rwanda, Congo-Brazzaville, and elsewhere. By producing the material that holds groups together and gives them solidarity, creed creates the conditions for a security dilemma to erupt, conditions not provided by need alone.

In broad conceptual terms, creed-based conflicts call for access to separate or preferential justice, either to redress the discrimination or to achieve preferential treatment as demanded by the creed. Demands of the latter type are extremely difficult to satisfy because they call for compensatory justice or "affirmative action," that is, positive discrimination toward the aggrieved group. Although a return to equality is less difficult to achieve, it usually is not satisfying to the rebel group, which seeks compensation for past grievances as well as removal of future ones, and in procedural as well as substantive terms.

Deprivation-based grievances produce political entrepreneurs who articulate demands and organize demand-bearing groups to carry out the conflict.[6] Under their leadership the process of conflict continues its circular route: conflict aims at redress of grievances, but also establishes solidarity, which in turn is necessary for the effective pursuit of conflict. Sometimes leaders are merely the selfless agents of group demands, but in other cases

[5] Barry Posner, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Stephen John Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael Brown (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).

[6] I. William Zartman, ed., *Elusive Peace: Negotiating to End Civil Wars* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996).

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their personal ambitions become a source of new demands separate from need and creed. Such greed is the basic impetus for political entrepreneurs who turn collective need into an instrument of action and solidarity. The more greed can mask itself in general (need) or specific (creed) grievances, the more it can attract a following and hide its personal nature. Greed is often not oriented toward solutions or problem-solving, but toward private gain and continuation of conflict, which is the source of its legitimation. Greed-based leaders of ethnic conflict include Slobodan Milosevic, Charles Taylor, and Rauf Denktaş.

Obstacles to Mediation

In most cases (two out of every three in the twentieth century), internal conflicts end in a one-sided victory rather than a negotiated compromise, but such outcomes are notoriously unstable. Victories over ethnic rebels tend merely to push them underground, where they lick wounds, build myths, and bide time until circumstances permit their resurgence. Furthermore, half of the negotiated solutions were achieved by mediation involving third parties. The challenges of negotiations go far to explain the duration of ethnic conflicts and suggest that their abiding nature stems from tactical and situational concerns rather than the two sides' inherent, need-based irreconcilability.[7] The obstacles to mediation can be overcome, but only through skillful attention to their causes.[8]

1. Elements of compromise are characteristically missing in ethnic conflict. In their demands for separate or preferential justice, ethnic rebels seek terms that are ipso facto repulsive to the other side. A formula for agreement based on a shared sense of justice is difficult to find when separate justice is demanded, and terms of trade are hard to identify since the ethnic rebels have nothing to offer to the government except an end to the rebellion. Eritrea and Kosovo present instances where the preferential demands were not palatable to the Ethiopian and Serbian governments, respectively, and where the rebels had nothing with which to buy the government's satisfaction except the possibility of ceasing its agitation. Preferential justice is simply not subject to compromise, as the debate over the legal aspects of identity in Sudan illustrates.[9] In ethnic conflict, from Algeria to Palestine to East Timor, recognition is the top and bottom line—once achieved, the ethnic rebellion has won and the government lost. All these aspects make the stuff of a negotiated or mediated agreement difficult to achieve.

[7] Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts: Theory and Cases* (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Press, 1990).

[8] I. William Zartman, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts," in *Stopping the Killing*, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993).

[9] Francis Deng, *War of Visions* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).

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2. Elements of context are also missing. Conflicts cannot be negotiated just any time; rather, the context must lend itself to a search for a bilateral solution. Parties—whether the government or rebellion—that are winning or have an expectation of achieving eventual victory are not likely to be interested in coming to terms with the enemy. Normally, they need to find themselves in a mutually hurting stalemate, in which each side's hopes of victory are stymied and the continuing blockage hurts.[10] But in internal conflicts, such a stalemate is a harbinger of victory for the ethnic rebellion, since its separateness and equality are implicitly recognized. The more typical situation is a soft stalemate, which yields no solution, but rather a stable, bearable, de facto compromise, thereby preventing victory by either side and keeping the conflict alive. Such is the situation in the Western Sahara and in Palestine, conflicts of long duration.[11] In the absence of a mutually hurting stalemate to push the parties to negotiate, a mutually enticing opportunity can theoretically serve to pull them in the same direction. But, again, in internal and particularly ethnic conflicts, such an opportunity is almost always unobtainable, since procedural grievances and preferential justice leave little room for mutual enticements.

3. The elements of agency are also frequently missing. Negotiation and mediation require a valid spokesman for both sides, yet the position of spokesman is characteristically a source of conflict within the ethnic group. This is true for all three phases of ethnic revolt. In the beginning, ethnic groups tend to be pluralistic and divided, producing several leaders seeking to deal with the government in various ways and usually splitting over the question of tactics. Later, during the consolidation period, a leader seeks to unite his group behind him, but is in competition with others for the position of supreme spokesman. Even when the struggle seems to be won and victory or negotiations are near, break-away leaders are tempted to make a separate deal for a part of the aggrieved group on terms more favorable to the government than those the mainstream would offer. Indeed, negotiation itself can delegitimize a leader as his rivals hew to a harder line. The division between Ibrahim Rugova and the Kosovo Liberation Army, among the various Palestinian liberation groups, among the national liberation parties in Rhodesia prior to its emergence as Zimbabwe, and between the successive Eritrean liberation fronts are all examples of intra-movement struggles for

A mutually hurting stalemate represents victory for the ethnic rebellion.

[10] I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); I. William Zartman, "Ripeness Revisited," in *Conflict Resolution*, ed. Alexander George and Paul Stern (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Science, forthcoming 2000).

[11] See Khadija Mohsen Finan, *Le Sahara occidental* (Paris: Findational nationale des sciences politiques, 1996).

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ethnic spokesmanship involving debate over tactics as well as elements of greed and creed.[12]

Nor are these struggles purely intraparty. Each side in the conflict also contests the legitimacy of another side and of a particular person to speak for them, preferring their own candidate. Thus, each side enters into the debate over the tactical question within the other side. The struggle for leadership in Chechnya is a striking example and has served to renew and prolong that conflict.[13]

4. Furthermore, elements of third-party entry beyond a mutually hurting stalemate are also missing.[14] Ethnic conflicts are internal affairs in which mediation is by definition perceived as meddling. Mediation automatically strengthens the rebels because it suggests that the government is unable to handle its own internal problems. It is therefore resisted by the government for procedural as well as substantive reasons. Third-party intervention to help a weaker side—usually the rebellion—only exacerbates the solidarity of the government side. Kosovo was a case in which humanitarian efforts to help the minority made the government feel, or claim to be, more justified in its repression.

As a result, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) pursuing second-track diplomacy are often more likely candidates for mediation than are other governments. However, second-track diplomacy is unable to provide any of the constraints and inducements for a solution that official agencies can offer, either to block alternative paths or to reward cooperating parties. It is therefore obliged to rely on the only remaining weapon, simple persuasion, which is no more effective than the presence or absence of more attractive alternatives allows it to be.[15] Thus, the Carter Center, mediating in the Congo-Brazzaville dispute in 1999, suffered the same weakness as the special representative of the secretaries-general of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity two years before: the inability to prevent troops from Angola from offering a better alternative to one side than reconciliation with the leaders of the other, largely ethnic parties.[16]

5. Finally, identity and solidarity tend to be dependent on conflict. Creed requires protection (separation) or assertion (superiority), which is achieved by conflict, and conflict is also the way to achieve the solidarity necessary for effective action. As a result, normal cost-benefit calculations on which negotiation behavior is based may no longer work.

[12] Barry Rubin, *Revolution until Victory: Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994); Stephen John Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil Wars* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Ruth Iyob, *The Eritrean Struggle for Independence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[13] Gail Lapidus, "The War in Chechnya," in *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized*, ed. Bruce Jentleson (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

[14] Mohammed Maundi et al., *Getting in the Door: Entry into Mediation* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, forthcoming 2000).

[15] I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "Mediation in the Post Cold War Era," in *Managing Global Chaos*, ed. Chester Crocker, Ren Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, forthcoming 2000).

[16] I. William Zartman and Katerina Vogeli, "Prevention Gained and Prevention Collapsed: Competition and Coup in the Congo," in *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized*.

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The Need for Preventive Rather Than Remedial Action

This is a formidable list of obstacles to the mediation of ethnic conflict, and some may find it so daunting that they would simply write off ethnic conflicts as protracted or primordial by nature and beyond any remedial attention. But there are many other ethnic situations that exist peaceably, without conflict, and, indeed, long periods of stability and coexistence have at previous moments interrupted most ethnic conflicts. The protracted social conflict school cannot explain these apparent exceptions, or the difference between conflict and nonconflict situations, in time or place. Even in times of profound change, competing identities, and targeted deprivation, some situations produce conflict while others do not.

Explanations for this discrepancy come from two different directions. On the one hand, the contextual conditions for conflict lead to an outburst of violence only when political entrepreneurs consciously throw a match into the tinder.[17] On the other hand, conflicts have been prevented by specific measures applied before the conflict broke out. That is, third-party efforts can prevent creed-based conflicts from developing, in part through measures to block would-be political entrepreneurs. These efforts may not usually be thought of as mediation, but that merely indicates that the usual definition needs to be expanded if the challenge of containing conflict is to be met. Identifying measures that can really forestall violence is an ongoing challenge, but some that follow from the previous discussion are evident.

1. *Standard-setting efforts.* Mediation by human rights groups and global forums to establish criteria for creed-blind opportunity, access, and allocation, as well as for avoidance of creed-based dominance of functions, is an important and growing method to prevent perceptions of discrimination and ethnic grievances. Standards alone will not ensure nondiscrimination, of course, but by setting up visible, normative guidelines they can constitute targets and yardsticks by which actors can judge themselves and be judged.

One of the most important efforts has been the Helsinki Declaration with its basket of human rights, which gave rise to a European Commissioner for Human Rights and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Helsinki experience was adapted in the Kampala Document by the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa, which is even more explicit on standards for equitable ethnic treatment.[18] Critics noted at the time that the World Bank, in its programs in Rwanda in the late 1980s, could have attached standards for equitable benefits to its agricultural development programs and thus helped avoid the

[17] Zartman, "Managing Ethnic Conflict"; Jane Holl et al., *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1997).

[18] Olesegun Obasanjo, *The Kampala Document* (New York: African Leadership Forum, 1991); Francis Deng and Terrence Lyons, eds., *African Reckoning* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998); Francis Deng and I. William Zartman, *Norms for Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming 2000).

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genocide of the 1990s.[19] Such norms and standards are not self-implementing or self-enforcing, and so it is unrealistic to expect too much from them. But like other norms, they trumpet an ideal that is hard to ignore even if disobeyed. And as the community of obeyers grows, pressure mounts on the disobeyers.[20] Enforcement can then follow, by peers and then institutions. This is a long and bumpy process, to be sure, but once norms are established they cannot be dismissed lightly.

2. *Preempting Need from Creed.* Needs can also be addressed before they become creed-based conflicts. To eliminate deprivations entirely may be a counsel of perfection, but the more inequalities in the distribution of deprivations are reduced, the more manageable the challenge of preventing violence becomes. Studies have shown that populations accept austerity and structural adjustment if the changes have been fully explained beforehand and if the government can persuasively demonstrate competence.[21] Absent these conditions, "IMF riots" take place, which can attract targeted populations if the deprivation has been accompanied by discrimination, as in the Revolutionary United Front rebellion in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, or if specific populations are subject to neglect at a time of rising expectations, as in Chiapas in the 1990s, the Moroccan Rif in the 1950s, and Algerian Kabylia in 1980.[22]

All of these creed-based rebellions could have been avoided by proper government measures of equitable distribution. However, the mediator's role is particularly difficult, since it involves convincing sovereign governments to do what they should be doing on their own. In none of the cited cases was a third-party role as clearly indicated as the role of the government itself. In Mozambique, the National Resistance Movement (Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana—ReNaMo) that fed on rural disruption and neglect was brought into dialogue with the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique—FreLiMo) government by external mediation before the resistance was able to consolidate a particular ethnic base. It must be said, however, that the mediator benefited from a mutually hurting stalemate, induced in part by a local drought, that brought home the urgency of settlement to both parties.[23]

3. *Preempting Greed from Creed and Need.* The role played by the pyromaniac in setting off ethnic conflagrations makes it important to separate

[19] John Eriksson, "An Institutional Framework for Learning from Failed States," in *Evaluation and Development*, ed. Robert Picciotto and Eduardo Wiesner (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Rene Lemarchand, *The World Bank in Rwanda* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana African Studies Program, 1982).

[20] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).

[21] Joan Nelson, "Poverty, Equity and the Politics of Adjustment," in *The Politics of Economic Adjustment*, ed. Stephen Haggard and J. Kaufman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[22] Jeanne Favret, "Revolt by Excess Modernization," in *Arabs and Berbers*, ed. Charles Micaud and Ernest Gellner (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1972).

[23] Ibrahim Msabaha, "Negotiating and End to Mozambique's Murderous Rebellion," in *Elusive Peace*.

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the political entrepreneur from his potential following. The image is only figurative, since the entrepreneur is generally not known before he starts on his adventure. But the opportunities for his appeals to take hold can be reduced by the actions of either the government or external parties. Holding federation-wide elections in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s rather than separate elections in each of the republics, for example, would have reduced the opportunity for ethnic campaigning.[24] Reducing rent-seeking by enlisting diamond magnates to ban diamond sales from areas of conflict would close the opportunity to reap enormous financial gains from ethnic conflicts in Angola or Sierra Leone.[25] Some suggestions can be generic, while others must be adapted to the specific situation. But in general it is better to deter entrepreneurs at the beginning of the adventure than be faced with the need to remove them at the end.

4. *Establish Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.* Confidence and security are the only solutions to the security dilemma, because parties need to be shown that their fears are groundless and that security can be provided them without provoking countermeasures. Joint patrols, dialogue sessions, and enforceable laws of equal treatment are among the measures that can be used. Consider the Turkish experience in the late 1990s. After a hardline campaign against the Kurdish Labor Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdistan—PKK), the Turks extracted a call for nonviolence from the captured leader, Abdullah Öcalan, while also benefiting from a public opinion survey that showed the PKK to have less Kurdish support for a separatist program than originally feared by the Turks.[26] At the same time, earthquakes in Turkey and then in Greece increased the mutual help and cooperation between the old rivals at a time when the issue of Turkish entry into the European Union provided an occasion for an official rebuff and then an apparent reconsideration by the union. In sum, a number of disparate events pointing in different directions broke the logjam in two sets of internal and international ethnic conflicts. These measures tend to be dependent on actions of the internal parties themselves, but NGOs have been successful in promoting dialogue and confidence-building measures and in training nationals to manage conflict-prone areas.[27]

Specific Possibilities for Mediation

Successful mediation is a matter of containing, enticing, and mending. The mediator must be able to block the impending or escalating conflict,

[24] Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).

[25] The idea is John Collier's.

[26] Meltem Müftüler Baç, "Addressing Kurdish Separatism in Turkey," in *Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management*, ed. Marc Howard Ross and Jay Rothman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

[27] Harold H. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

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draw the parties away from hostile perceptions and actions, and bring them together in a more harmonious relationship. "The mediator is in fact also a participant, a wielder of power who compels a recalcitrant party to make a compromise it does not want to make."[28] Mediation requires an ability to create incentives for need-based situations to receive evenhanded government attention, open opportunities for creed-based groups to overcome their fears, and close possibilities for greed-based leaders to achieve their goals by destroying other groups. Optimally, mediators need to have the power and authority to threaten the parties with endless conflict if their solutions are not accepted, and to ensure implementation if their solutions are accepted. This is a tall order, requiring the mediator to tap local resources as well as his own and to collaborate with both the government and ethnic parties. A number of areas for action can be suggested.

Mediation requires more than a single act, whatever its duration. Rather, it is a process that involves the establishment of trusting relations with all parties, the opening and closing of alternatives, and the gradual withdrawal of the mediator as trust builds between the conflicting parties. All this requires a mix of strategies both to strengthen and soften the separate identities of the contending sides.

The process of mediation needs to address the parties' grievances, both substantive and procedural, in an effort to identify difficult compromises and compensations. Once that is done, it must focus on setting up mechanisms for handling future grievances that may arise. The situation of ethnic relations in Sri Lanka was a story of measures and backtracking in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, until the revolt of the Tamil Tigers finally broke out in unmanageable violence.[29] The Dayton Accords in 1995 were likewise followed by a year of inattention when monitored implementation could have moved the process forward.[30]

Constructive ambiguity is needed for creative new solutions. Sovereignty is one of the most difficult challenges in ethnic conflict because it has long been treated as sacrosanct. However, solutions to seemingly nonnegotiable dilemmas have been crafted through looser and more creative concepts of divisible sovereignty. The 1998 Good Friday Accords in Northern Ireland, for instance, contain a provision for three overlapping jurisdictions: the Northern Irish, the British, and the Anglo-Irish. In the 1995 Dayton Accords, a Serb republic was established alongside a Muslim-Croat federation within the united state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Tatarstan, a 1994 agreement provided all but sovereignty for Tatarstan and all but unity within Russia.[31]

[28] "The Disturbing Niceness of George Mitchell," *The Economist*, Apr. 11, 1998, p. 45.

[29] Michael Kuchinsky, "Yielding Ground: Losses and Conflict Escalation in Sri Lankan Protracted Social Conflict," in *The Understanding and Management of Global Violence*; Howard Wriggins, "Sri Lanka: Negotiations in a Secessionist Conflict," in *Elusive Peace*.

[30] Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1996).

[31] P. Terrence Hopman, "Disintegrating States," in *Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation*, ed. I.

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Not all sovereign states can be divided, but in many cases stark indivisibility can give way to creative solutions. Jerusalem and southern Sudan still await such creativity.[32]

Communication and interaction are necessary ingredients in any attempt to end conflict and prevent its future occurrence. Left to themselves, ethnic communities are bound to retreat into their own myths and histories, develop an exclusivist creed, and be quick to take umbrage at any perceived slight. Hence, dialogue cannot be permitted to cease.[33] To be sure, intense intercommunity dialogue has not won complete reconciliation in Israel, Ulster, or Cyprus, but it is certain that those situations would have been worse without it.[34] The question remains open as to whether personal integration, in which creed-based groups lose their importance, or communitarian power-sharing and local autonomy, in which they become consolidated, is the better solution. Arguably, the second may be the temporary expedient while the first gradually works its effects.

Left to themselves, ethnic communities often retreat into their own myths.

Where creed-based groups are homogeneous, contiguous, and undivided by minorities of their own, where solutions of reconciliation have been worn out, and where the conflict has gone to a point of no return, separation may be the only solution.[35] Even negotiated under the best conditions with the best attention to mechanisms for handling future problems, as in the Czech-Slovak and Ethiopian-Eritrean separations, problems are certain to arise and, as in the latter case, may break out in sustained violence. The difficulty in achieving a happy divorce points up the need to exhaust all creative solutions for cohabitation before separation is undertaken.[36]

Practical Advice

Where does all this leave us with regard to Kosovo, Sudan, Congo-Kinshasa, Congo-Brazzaville, Sri Lanka, and the other ethnic conflicts sure to appear over the horizon? The lessons underscore the difficulty of mediation, it goes without saying, but they also suggest that creed-based conflicts need

William Zartman (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

[32] Cecilia Albin, "Negotiating Indivisible Goods: The Case of Jerusalem," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, vol. 13, no. 1 (1991), pp. 45–76; Deng, *War of Visions*.

[33] Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*.

[34] Ross and Rothman, *Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management*.

[35] Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security*, Spring 1996, pp. 136–75.

[36] Separation cannot be treated here in depth. See Lawrence Farley, *Plebiscites and Sovereignty* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986); I. William Zartman, "Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again," in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. David Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars," *Security Studies*, January 1996, pp. 62–100.

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not be permanent and irresoluble, but rather may be susceptible to careful analysis and intervention.

The first such lesson is: Do not repress your minorities, or they just may end up being a majority in a territory you claim. Minorities can regroup geographically if they do not already inhabit contiguous territory, forming a majority in an area for which they then claim self-determination. Similarly, groups that break away with their territory in the name of self-determination may well find their homogeneity illusory and face claims from minorities within their own midst. Once self-determination enters the agenda, it can become a runaway locomotive.

Secondly, ethnic relations require tending lest mending become necessary, and mending lest rending become inevitable. There is no substitute for good governance, accountable democracy, and normal politics.

Thirdly, what history has joined together, let not momentary passions put asunder. Secession is costly, rarely as satisfying as promised, and almost never preferable to a solution based on autonomy and federalism.

Fourthly, court-mandated counseling is preferable to divorce, and if divorce should occur, do not count on alimony. Since courts are not available to handle internal or interstate disputes, states—alone and in community—need to take advantage of available official and unofficial mediators to help maintain their unity and harmony. If a state does break up, the breakaway part should not count on any largesse from its former sovereign, which will be preoccupied with restoring its torn soul and honor.

Fifthly, find ways to improve your own status that do not damage the status of others. Both ethnic communities and their opponents, be they governments or other ethnic communities, need to adopt the uncomfortable practice of thinking of each others' needs while pursuing their own creed and needs. Obviously, an ethnic conflict tends to reinforce self-centeredness, but that only makes concern for the other side more necessary.[37]

Lastly, if you have to call in the cops, be sure they shoot the gangsters and not the victims. Peacekeeping forces should strive to make things better, not worse. There is often an *auto-da-fé* quality to measures punishing creed-based conflict, in which the greed-based actors are the last to feel the punishment. Only now is awareness growing about how expensive remedial conflict management is by comparison to preventive action, in terms of money, lives, and productivity.[38] The high costs of punishment and rehabilitation by the world's policemen, whether from the United Nations, NATO, regional organizations, or the United States, should lead them to devote more attention and energy to preventing ethnic conflicts before they erupt into violence.

[37] Jeffrey Rubin, Dean G. Pruitt, and Sung Hee Kim, *Social Conflict* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1994).

[38] Michael Brown and Richard Rosecrance, eds., *The Costs of Conflict* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

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Ethnic Conflicts

Islamism in Sudan's Civil War

by Harvey Glickman

During a recent public debate over the role of science and religion in history, Dr. Steven Weinberg remarked that, although religion had done some good in the world, "its influence on balance has been awful. With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion."[1] A millennium that has produced several Islamic jihads, the Crusades, the Inquisition, and the Holocaust would seem to provide much evidence in confirmation.[2]

For most of the past century the communist challenge overrode and diminished other contestations. Nonetheless, the vitality of faith-based movements in politics was amply demonstrated by the resistance to communism of elements of the Catholic Church in the satellite states of Eastern Europe, and by the organization of Muslim fighters in Afghanistan. Even before the end of the Cold War, the power of religion-based politics exploded over Iran and swept away the secular, modernizing regime of the shah. Now in its twentieth year, the Islamist state in Iran, by act and example, injects a puritanical, political Islam into issues of governance in the states of large Muslim populations around the world. Despite much academic argumentation over the causes of contemporary violence between and among states in the world today, it seems rather clear that many demonstrable fears and hatreds are linked to religious beliefs and perceptions. While these emotions are linked to ethnic and national identities, their religious content renders them exceedingly difficult to deflect or compromise.

[1] Carey Goldberg, "Crossing Flaming Swords over God and Physics," *New York Times*, Apr. 20, 1999.

[2] The author gratefully acknowledges the help of his research assistant, Beth Harris. Part of this paper was presented to the colloquium "Religion, Ethnicity and Identity: Implications for Conflict and Conflict Resolution," Haverford College, Nov. 11, 1998. Several commentators, especially Ann Mosely Lesch, provided valuable remarks. A later version was prepared for the Foreign Policy Research Institute conference "Ethnic Conflict: The Role of Religion, the Role of Mediation, and the Role of the Media," Philadelphia, May 25, 1999.

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The effective crippling of ideologies that challenged market capitalism and liberal democracy, such as Soviet communism and other forms of Leninist Marxism, has failed to mark an "end of history." The uneven spread of modernization and the uneven distribution of gains derived from free markets and democracy beyond the West have caused lagging populations to question the rationalist, secularist promise of accelerating prosperity. Economic modernization and state re-formation and reconstruction can in fact stimulate conflict by promoting closer contact among potentially hostile groups. Increasingly free of the residues of colonialism and unencumbered by the demands of the Cold War, peoples in the Third World, as well as in the successor states of the former Soviet empire, seek new patterns of meaning in their lives and new patterns of legitimacy in their home countries—often in the form of revived religious or ethno-national sentiments that have important consequences for political and social movements. These consequences can be seen most clearly in the breakup of Yugoslavia, but equally potent ethno-religious conflicts divide Armenia and Azerbaijan, Chechnya and Russia, Sikhs and Hindus in India, and Buddhist Sinhalese and Tamil Hindus in Sri Lanka. Religion and nationalism have remained a volatile mix in India and Northern Ireland. Efforts to reduce conflict and seek justice and reconciliation are clearly complicated by the strong impulses of faith-reinforcing communal solidarity.

Religious Ethno-Nationalism and the Case of Sudan

The connection of religious ethno-nationalism to the state has been sufficiently illustrated by ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and by cultural suppression and abuse of human rights in Iran and Afghanistan. In the latter cases, the partial unraveling of traditional communities and attenuation of family ties have been politicized into sentiments hostile to outsiders and women. In such "noncommunal fundamentalism," greater stress is placed on the centrality of religion in all spheres of life, opposition to "evil" secular governments, and restoration of male patriarchy.[3] In the case of Islam, an ideology that seeks a unity of law, education, and social service, it can start from a religious ideology of opposition to the existing government and expand into generalized anti-Westernism. Within the sphere of international politics, this ideology typically takes the form of hostility toward America and Israel, two countries at the spearpoint of a Western imperialism supposedly designed to humble and transform the Muslim world.

Since the Iranian revolution, the idea of the radical Islamic state has challenged the various consultative monarchies and authoritarian govern-

[3] See Nikki R. Keddie, "The New Religious Politics: Where, When and Why Do 'Fundamentalisms' Appear?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 40, no. 4 (1998), pp. 696–723.

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ments that have characterized the crescent of countries from Morocco across North Africa and through the Middle East to Indonesia. In addition to Qaddafi's Libya, there are now three states poised to spread their brand of unitarist Islam: Iran, Afghanistan, and Sudan. In each case there is evidence of political unrest in neighboring states directly related to the Islamist project. Islamist parties and organizations provide some of the most significant opposition in virtually every country with a large Muslim population.

Sudan is important to consider for several reasons. It lies on the southern fringe of Muslim cultural hegemony and is the scene of a long-term attempt to extend that hegemony by force to its own non-Arab, non-Muslim population. Government-supported Islamization has proceeded through military regimes, civil war, and now electoral authoritarianism. An Islamist victory in Sudan would resonate among Muslim minorities in East Africa, in the conservative Muslim regimes in the Arabian peninsula, and across Arab North Africa.

Sudan sits astride the cultural and geographic divide of North and sub-Saharan Africa. Directly south of Egypt, it abuts eight other countries. Sudan's population is estimated at 30 million, and, at nearly a million square miles, the country is roughly the size of Western Europe. The census of 1956 (the last to include information on the ethnic background of the population) listed nineteen major ethnic groups and 597 subgroups. Arabs constituted the largest, at 40 percent, followed by the Dinka (12 percent), Beja (7 percent), and Fallata (6 percent). In 1997, semi-official figures stated religious affiliations as 60 percent Sunni Muslim, 25 percent "indigenous beliefs," and 15 percent Christian.[4]

In Sudan's conflict, each side is far from homogeneous.

At one level, the conflict in Sudan exemplifies a "fault-line war" as prophesied by analysts of the post–Cold War world order.[5] In this view, combat along a line of a religious and cultural cleavage reflects the broader force of religious nationalism and threatens to attract the intervention of "kindred" countries or adherents within sympathetic countries. In Sudan the fighting can be broadly characterized as a conflict between the Arab, Muslim north and the non-Arab, non-Muslim south. Moreover, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Libya have in fact been aiding the Sudanese government, while Ethiopia, Uganda, and the occasional CIA program have aided southern Sudanese rebels.

However, such a view greatly oversimplifies the complexities of the conflict. Various ethnic and cultural differences, racial tensions, and differential access to natural and financial resources all play significant roles. For

[4] Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), *Country Profile: Sudan, 1997–98* (London: EIU, 1998), pp. 15–17.

[5] See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 246–65; and Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

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example, the south's burgeoning oil fields present in themselves sufficient reason for the government to resist secessionism. Furthermore, broad generalizations tend to ignore the heterogeneity of both sides and the fact that both the government militias and rebel forces fight among themselves, sometimes switching allegiance with bewildering alacrity. In the south, followers of traditional religions outnumber Christians, and although tribal solidarities have been invoked against the government, the Nuer and the Dinka have had supporters in both camps in the civil war.[6] Nor are southern opposition forces unified politically, and they often continue to fight despite calls for cease-fires from political leaders. The north of Sudan is also divided in its support for the Islamist government. So-called non-Arab ethnic groups, such as the Beja, Fur, and Nuba, have been subject to intense Arabization, and fighting occurs between elements of these groups and government militias.

Bearing in mind these caveats, it is fair to claim that the Islamist nationalism advocated by Sudan's rulers has long been at the heart of the ongoing civil war. For the black peasants and herders in the south, the state's campaign to establish an explicitly Islamic Sudanese identity bears the earmarks of a religious crusade. Underlying and rekindling the hostilities that have continued intermittently since independence in 1956 "is the attempt by the north not only to define the identity [of Sudan] as Arab and Islamic, but to structure and stratify the life and role of citizens along those lines."[7] Moderate Muslims and adherents of other faiths, especially in the south, have confronted increasing intolerance of their beliefs and practices. The spread of this extremism has destroyed lives and property, but has only strengthened southerners' resolve to preserve their separateness. "The more the threat from the North loomed over the South, the stronger became the sense of a new identity welding notions of Africanism with the more recently acquired Christian and Western cultural values."[8] The conflict has become more intractable as southerners' demands for either a secular, pluralistic Sudanese state or regional autonomy have given way to a desire for outright secession.

Empire and Jihad on the Nile

To understand the origins of the competing identities, one must examine Sudan's history. In the early nineteenth century, Sudan was governed from Egypt, which was still part of the Ottoman Empire. In the Sudanese economy of the time, Arab northerners and black African southerners generally stood on opposing sides of the flourishing slave trade. Southern Sudan and the area around the source of the White Nile were

[6] Ann Mosely Lesch, "Sudan: The Torn Country," *Current History*, May 1999, pp. 218–22.

[7] Francis Deng, "Ending Civil War in Sudan," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Winter 1994, p. 47.

[8] Francis Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1985), p. 494.

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considered by the British to be extensions of the mission of David Livingstone in Central and East Africa. In 1879, General Charles Gordon succeeded to the Sudanese governorship in the employ of the Egyptians, charged with pacifying Sudan and ending the slave trade. In 1885, he was killed trying to quell a revolt by Muhammad Ahmad al Mahdi and his followers in the Ansar *turuq* (sect or brotherhood), who sought to revive and purify Islam. Al Mahdi (a title meaning "restorer of the faith") and his immediate successor, Khalifa Abdallah, governed Sudan for thirteen years, planting the seeds of Sudanese nationalism tied closely to Islam.

In 1898, Lord Kitchener arrived with a British force that defeated Khalifa Abdallah and the Ansar's "Mahdist" state, leading to the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, which lasted until 1956. During that period, political decisions made by Britain were to have a significant impact on Sudan's future as an independent state. For one, the colonizers cultivated Sudanese nationalism in order to counter the spread of Egyptian influence and protect their interest in the Suez Canal. Encouraging emergent nationalism worked largely to the benefit of two competing Sufi *turuqs*, the Ansar and Khatmiyyah, and each eventually spawned its own political party. The militant Ansar, whose members claimed descent from companions of the Prophet Mohammad, eventually formed the "neo-Mahdist" Umma Party in 1945, and it was for decades the strongest party in Sudanese politics.[9] The Khatmiyyah, a more moderate and pragmatic movement, is closely identified with the al-Mirghani family, who formed the National Unionist Party (later the Democratic Unionist Party), which played a significant political role as both governing party and opposition from the 1950s to 1980s.

While Islamic groups promoted Sudanese nationalism in the north, British colonial administration was also instrumental in enforcing a southern Sudanese identity that was distinctly African and safe from the spread of Islam. Although small numbers of Coptic Christians had lived in Sudan for centuries, the British promoted Christian missions in the south and established a native administration that followed the pattern of Britain's East African territories of Kenya and Uganda. As part of the colonial policy of "native administration," education and English language instruction were provided through officially sanctioned Christian missionary activity. "The British did not create the differences between north and south, but in almost sixty years did little deliberately to moderate them and much to sharpen them."[10] As a result, despite Britain's reversal of its separation policy in the decade leading to Sudanese independence in 1956, only a thin veneer of

[9] Peter Woodward, *Sudan, 1898–1989: The Unstable State* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 20–25.

[10] M. W. Daly, "Islam, Secularism and Ethnic Identity in the Sudan," in *Religion and Political Power*, ed. Gustavo Benavides and M. W. Daly (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 22; see also Woodward, *Sudan 1898–1989*, pp. 4–5, 77–78. The region informally recognized as southern Sudan consists of about four million people in the provinces of Eastern and Western Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr el Ghazal.

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national administration and political institutions connected the north and south. Once the British left, the south was marginalized by the government's development policies and national politics betrayed no appreciable involvement of southerners.[11] Politics in the south existed only as "an appendage to developments in the north and offered only a weak link to the southern communities themselves."[12]

British colonial policies widened the rift between north and south, but the underlying animosities have origins more directly tied to northerners' ambivalent self-identification with Arabism and their refusal to relinquish southerners from a united Sudanese state. Some observers of northern Sudanese Muslims detect an insecurity about their connections to Arab culture, which is the high culture of the north. Many northerners claim Arab heritage, despite their generally darker skin color than Arabs elsewhere in the Middle East.[13] Having assimilated themselves in varying degree into Arab culture, northern Muslims pressed to spread it along the Arab world's southern frontier. Francis Deng has claimed that "the threat of demotion to the supposedly inferior African identity" lies at the psychological roots of northerners' "exaggerated attachment to Arabism." This "deeply entrenched inferiority complex has developed the Arab superiority complex" among northern Sudanese that plays out as aggressiveness against the south.[14] Exacerbating that feeling of inferiority was the fact that, as one Sudanese scholar wrote, "although Christians constitute a small minority of the country as a whole, they are educated leaders of the tribes and communities in the south."[15] In addition, southerners' strong racial, cultural, and historical links to tropical Africans have "deepened their African consciousness . . . [and] their value systems resist assimilation into the Arab Culture."[16] It is significant that, whatever other disagreements may exist among northern political groups, there has been general consensus against considering southerners as equal partners in the formation of public policy.

[11] Daly, "Islam, Secularism and Ethnic Identity," p. 89.

[12] Woodward, *Sudan 1898–1989*, p. 107.

[13] Francis Deng, *Dynamics of Identification: A Basis for National Integration in the Sudan* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1973); Dunstan M. Wai, *The Arab-African Conflict in the Sudan* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981).

[14] Deng, *War of Visions*, p. 421.

[15] Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, "Christian-Muslim Relations in the Sudan, Peaceful Co-existence at Risk," in *The Vatican, Islam and the Middle East*, ed. Cail C. Ellis (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987), pp. 266–67; see also Gabriel Warburg, "National Identity in the Sudan: Fact, Fiction, and Prejudice in Ethnic and Religious Relations," *Asian and African Studies*, July 1990, p. 185.

[16] Dunstan M. Wai, "Revolution, Rhetoric, and Reality in the Sudan," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, March 1979, p. 74.

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Islamism and Sudanese Politics

Northerners' identification with Arab culture is intricately bound up with their orientation toward Islam, and with regard to their program for building a Sudanese state the two are not necessarily separable. As Arnold Toynbee observed over thirty years ago, northerners equate the spread of Islam to a nation-building mechanism.[17] And in 1966, the Umma's Sadiq al-Mahdi stated unambiguously, "The dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arab, and this Nation will not have its entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival."[18]

However, in the programs of the Umma and NUP, while Islam has often been viewed as dominant, that position has not necessarily entailed the programmatic *exclusion* of other beliefs. By far the most significant development in Sudanese politics since independence has been the rise of the radical Islamist project, which seeks to establish a state governed under the Islamic laws of *shar'ia* and accepts jihad as a strategy for attaining it. As Hasan al-Turabi, the chief ideologist of the National Islamic Front (NIF), has declared, "Because Islam considers God to be everywhere, it does not separate religion from government."[19] Adherents look to Islamism to combat the social fragmentation and demoralization that they detest in Western, secular societies. Moreover, Islamists believe that their religion's transcendent worldview holds out the possibility for integrating Sudan's diverse populations as well as integrating the individual in society. Unsurprisingly, non-Muslims have steadfastly opposed the creation of an Islamic state, and the universal imposition of Islamic law has been the single greatest point of contention in Sudan's decades-long civil war.

Sudanese Islamism began with the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940s, an offshoot of the organization founded in Egypt in 1928. It grew to prominence in the 1960s, when Turabi, a highly educated lawyer, shouldered other Brotherhood leaders aside and created the Islamic Charter Front, which became the NIF in 1986. Its supporters display the social and political characteristics of Islamists in other countries of large Muslim populations, and include members of the urban intelligentsia, students at the University of Khartoum, small-business owners discontented with the ties of bigger business to the traditional political parties, and lower-class elements suffering economic hardship.[20]

[17] Arnold Toynbee, *Between Niger and Nile* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965), pp. 5–6.

[18] Quoted in Wai, "Revolution, Rhetoric, and Reality," p. 73.

[19] Arthur Lowrie, ed., *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr. Hasan Turabi* (Tampa, Fla.: World and Islam Studies Enterprise, 1993), p. 13.

[20] Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "The Fundamentalist Impact on Law, Policy and Constitutions in Iran, Pakistan and Sudan," in *Fundamentalisms and the State, Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance*, vol. 3 of *The Fundamentalism Project*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 110–51.

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Turabi's program represents in some ways an attempt to create a radical Islam with Sudanese characteristics. Like Iranian Islamism, it fosters a contemporary interpretation of the Koran and its principles. Unlike that version, Turabi does not favor rule by mullahs (who are not so revered in Sudan), but rather emphasizes cooperation with civilian and military institutions. Turabi's views encompass opposition to the entrenched ulema, opposition to the older schools of law and jurisprudence, and support, more recently, for an elected government under the NIF.

Although the NIF has not always been a major party, shrewd opportunism has given it political weight disproportionate to its apparent popular support. It has also been the greatest beneficiary of governmental shifts toward Islamism that were often made for reasons of political expediency rather than religious conviction. As the Islamist program gained ground in successive northern-dominated governments, opposition to it intensified apace. The Islamists' success has thus had the effect of polarizing Sudan and reducing the chances for a peaceful settlement to the conflict.

Independence, Coups, and Intolerance

Sudan formally declared independence from Britain in 1956, and under its new constitution the state was officially secular. But the new government proved ineffective, especially at unifying the north and south of a country that Britain had left with the weakest of shared identities. In 1958, General Ibrahim Abboud staged a coup, abrogated the constitution, and attempted to unify the country by instituting policies that marginalized Christians and promoted Islam and Arabic culture by nationalizing Christian mission schools, abrogating Sunday as a day of worship, establishing Koranic schools, replacing English with Arabic as a medium of instruction, and expelling Christian missionaries. Government support flowed in to construct mosques and establish Muslim cultural and social organizations, and it became a capital offense for a Muslim to convert to Christianity. The Missionary Societies Act of 1962 banned missions altogether.

Abboud's regime lasted only until the "October Revolution" in 1964, when Turabi's Islamists helped oust him, but the shift away from a secular state continued unabated.[21] After Abboud's ouster, the original constitution was reinstated, but a 1968 constitutional bill made Islam the basis of Sudanese law, thereby rendering the original constitution's secular provisions largely irrelevant. Abboud's removal also taught Turabi some important political lessons. Steering clear of the older party politicians and their conventional rivalries, his followers infiltrated the military, thereby gaining influence with

[21] Woodward, *Sudan 1898–1989*, p. 111.

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an important institution that would later overthrow two more elected governments.

Meanwhile, in response to increased persecution, new southern political organizations and guerrilla movements thwarted Khartoum's unification drive. The Anya Nya guerrilla movement, which emerged in the south in 1962, gave rise to the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement in 1971, whose military campaign was one impetus leading the government of General Jaffar Numeiri (who seized power in 1969) to the negotiating table. The 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, which granted considerable autonomy to the south, established a quasi-federal arrangement for addressing southern grievances and laid the groundwork for years of relative peace. The affairs of the south would be controlled by the region's own legislature and executive, and Anya Nya soldiers were to be integrated into the Sudanese army and police. A new constitution promulgated in 1973 legislated religious freedom within a one-party state under the aegis of a new national movement, the short-lived Sudan Socialist Union. In 1977, when a policy of national reconciliation permitted opposition parties to make peace with the government, Turabi became attorney general in the new coalition.

Despite the promise of those years of calm, the matter of Sudan's relation to Islam had never been resolved, and conflict arose once again. In 1983, Numeiri was faced with economic decline, growing opposition from the Umma Party, and pressure from southern rebels. Numeiri himself was a pious Muslim who had patronized a Sufi *turuq* for some years, and turned to Islamism to curry favor with northerners. After eleven years in which hopes had grown for a lasting settlement, he renewed the enforcement of *shar'ia* throughout the country with the passage of the "September laws"—a major victory for the NIF.[22] In 1983–84, thousands of public punishments, including floggings, amputations, and executions, were meted out after ten-minute trials. Islamists apparently did not instigate the new policy, but they acceded. Numeiri lost their support only after he ordered the arrest of Turabi himself.[23] During the same period, Mahmud Taha founded the Republican Brothers, an Islamic group that campaigned against the strict enforcement of *shar'ia* and called for mercy and tolerance toward backsliders and non-Muslims. Taha was executed as an apostate in 1985.

In addition to reinvigorating Islamization, Numeiri also began pursuing a harsh campaign against the rebels and in 1983 sent Lieutenant Colonel John Garang (a Dinka southerner educated in Iowa) to quell a mutiny of some five hundred soldiers in the south. Instead, Garang encouraged the mutiny, gathered troops around him, and formed the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which in turn spawned the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Arguments over ultimate goals split the SPLM, with one

[22] Ibid., p. 157.

[23] William Langewiesche, "Turabi's Law," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Aug. 1994, p. 27.

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faction supporting self-determination and the other, led by Garang, endorsing a unified, secular state.

Numeiri was overthrown in 1985, and a period of ineffective parliamentary politics ensued. In 1986, the NIF received fifty-one seats in parliament out of 260 in the last open, multiparty election held in Sudan. The Umma Party's Sadiq al-Mahdi, grandson of the Ansar's founder, served as prime minister from 1986 to 1989, during which time Sudan endured horrific drought and famine.

Although the NIF constituted only a minority in parliament, the party was catapulted to the forefront of Sudanese politics in June 1989, when it backed a coup led by General Omar Bashir and then functioned, in the view of one commentator, as a "shadow government."[24] The decade since then has been marked by increasing intolerance of political opposition. And although it is true that structural changes in the government have reintroduced an electoral system, to date they have not justified a new sense of hope that a peaceful solution to the civil war might be found, or that Sudan might be inclined towards either secularism or pluralism. Indeed, to the extent that there is any hope at all, it is to be found mostly in signs that the combatants are at last growing tired of the fight.

"De-Islamizing" the state is no longer even an issue.

Following the 1989 coup, Bashir, at the head of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), assumed control of the government and ruled by decree, making a clean sweep of all civilian representative and administrative institutions, removing the various individual and group freedoms that were still on the books, and banning all political parties except the NIF. Relying once again on Islamism to unify the state, the RCC could not afford to alienate Turabi and his followers. The Umma, which had been the largest party in Sudan prior to the ban, now operates from headquarters in London. Sadiq al-Mahdi, who voiced criticism of the NIF's prosecution of the war in the south, was placed under house arrest and escaped to Eritrea in 1996. The leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Muhammad al-Mirghani, is now in exile in Egypt. The DUP itself is among the members of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) of northern and southern groups opposed to the current regime.

The NIF has succeeded not only in disposing of most organized political opposition and accruing enormous power to itself, but also in institutionalizing an Islamic state. At this point, "de-Islamizing" the state is no longer an issue among northern politicians cooperating with the government.[25] *Shar'ia* has continued to form the basis of law and government, and

[24] Ibid., p. 28.

[25] John O. Voll, "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan," in *Fundamentalisms Observed*, vol. 1 of *The Fundamentalism Project*, p. 393; Peter Woodward, "Sudan: Islamic Radicals in Power," in *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?* ed. John L. Esposito (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1997),

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in fact has become even more explicit than in the later years of Numeiri's regime. The NIF declared a jihad against the south in 1989, effectively removing any hope that the government might agree to a secular Sudanese identity. The Islamic legal code of 1991, covering civil, criminal, and commercial law, is enforced throughout the country and exempts the southern provinces only from certain prescribed punishments—five of the code's 186 articles. In addition to legal measures, the NIF-backed government has maintained its authority by supporting various quasi-official police and military units "who fill the vacuum left by the inadequacy of civil government with a regime of continual terror."[26] The Popular Police Force enforces *shar'ia* and harasses noncompliant associations and individuals, while the Popular Defense Force acts as an internal security militia.[27] Thus, prosecuting the civil war, pursuing a unified Islamic state for the glory of God, and maintaining an iron grip on power complement one another quite effectively.

Despite outside accounts of discrimination and acts of suppression in Sudan, Turabi has publicly claimed that there is no tension between his movement and religious minorities.[28] In interviews with foreigners, Turabi maintains that the present regime favors a policy of "legal pluralism" based on "regional application" of *shar'ia*, apparently meaning that non-Muslims are exempt from "the Muslim provisions" of the penal code that concern such matters as the dress code for women, apostasy, and alcohol consumption.[29] Beyond the narrowly defined personal sphere, Islamic law governs the entire country, which means, for example, that women are treated as legal minors and their testimony in court is devalued compared to that of men. Observers further claim that non-Muslims are treated as second-class citizens.[30] Non-Muslims have been removed from the civil service, military, police, and judiciary and replaced by NIF supporters. Businesses owned and operated by non-Muslims are denied trading licenses and harassed in other ways. In 1993, the U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights for Sudan noted, "The NIF-dominated regime pursued religious, ethnic and ideological discrimination in almost every aspect of society."[31] The restriction of Christian

pp. 95–114.

[26] Langewiesche, "Turabi's Law," p. 29.

[27] U.S. Department of State, *Country Human Rights Reports 1997: Sudan* (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1998-hrp~report/sudan.html).

[28] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Africa Subcommittee, *Hearings on Sudan*, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., May 1992, p. 21.

[29] David Little, "Islam and Society: The Sudanese Experiment" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, n.d. [1998?]).

[30] David Little, *Islamic and Christian Cross-Currents in Sudan*, lecture notes, U.S. Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C., Apr. 3, 1997, pp. 1–4.

[31] U.S. Department of State, *Country Human Rights Reports 1993: Sudan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), archived online (see http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/hrp-reports-mainhp.html). The 1997 report provides a similarly grim account.

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activity culminated in 1994 when the status of Christian associations was reduced to that of voluntary agencies and nongovernmental organizations.[32]

Sudan has also been under international political pressure for reasons beyond its repressive policies. The government's welcome to implacably anti-Western figures such as Osama bin Laden and its support of subversion in Egypt, Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia led the last three of those countries to sever diplomatic relations with Sudan. Washington placed Sudan on its list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Despite such apparent isolation, Turabi, like Khomeini, harbors international ambitions for a purified Islam that would end divisive nationalism among Arab and Muslim countries. In 1991, Turabi helped organize the Popular Islamic and Arabic Conference (PAIC) and was elected secretary-general. The PAIC, now based in Khartoum, is regarded as a counter to the Organization of Islamic Conference, which was founded by the Saudis, whose support of the United States in the Gulf War the Sudanese leadership found intolerable. But Turabi does have the backing of the Muslim World League, headquartered in Saudi Arabia, which regards Sudan as a springboard for Islamist penetration of black Africa. Moreover, in the summer of 1997, a Sudanese official, Ghazi Atabani, called for a partnership with Iran: "Sudan aspires to unifying the Muslim nation, with Sudan and Iran being the nucleus of that unity, for confronting powers of arrogance."[33]

Domestically, a few events under the Bashir regime might be cause for optimism among those hoping for an end to the conflict and the creation of a democratic political system, but for the most part their net result has been mixed. According to a 1991 agreement, for example, the south was to be permitted to make laws for itself—but war prevented implementation of the agreement. And in 1994, a minister of state in the Office of the President rejected another call by southerners for self-determination and a secular state in a meeting of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Nairobi.[34] The evolution of governmental institutions under the Bashir regime likewise yielded little encouraging news. In 1992, a new national assembly was established, and in 1996 a new parliament. With Turabi named its speaker, however, constructive policies seemed unlikely to be forthcoming. In 1997, Bashir was given the title of president, and one year later, anticipating a new constitution that would permit multiparty politics, the entire parliament joined the newly created National Congress party, thus effectively

[32] Kate Almquist, "Religion and Politics in Sudan: A Humanitarian Agency's Perspective" (paper presented to the United States Institute of Peace conference "Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan," Washington, D.C., Sept. 16, 1997), p. 3; see also Gino Barsella and Miguel A. Ayusu Guixot, *Struggling to Be Heard: The Christian Voice in Independent Sudan* (London: Paulines Publications, 1998).

[33] *Sudan News and Views*, Sept. 1997 and July 2, 1998 (http://www.webzone1.co.uk/www/sudan/snv/snv28.html).

[34] Donald Rothchild and David A. Lake, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 208.

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shutting any potential opponents out of the body. The new constitution went into effect on January 1, 1999, leaving little doubt as to the future of Islamism in Sudan: it called the war against the SPLM "a jihad against infidels and apostates."[35]

The shrill tone of that document notwithstanding, some mitigating signs have in fact emerged in the past year. Since the advent of the new constitution and the lifting of the ban on multiparty politics, opponents have been invited home from exile and former president Numeiri returned in May 1999. Outside pressure on Sudan has also relaxed, perhaps expanding the government's negotiating space. Uganda's involvement in the Congo rebellion and the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea have combined to reduce outside support for rebels in the south of Sudan. Egypt remains concerned about the effect of an autonomous southern Sudanese entity on the waters of the upper Nile. Finally, the American case for isolating Sudan as a sponsor of terrorism has been weakened by the mistaken 1998 bombing attack on the Khartoum pharmaceutical factory suspected of manufacturing components of chemical weapons.[36]

Another new factor in Sudanese politics is the initiation of oil exports in June 1999. The oil fields are in or near the southern provinces, and the pipeline runs close to the Nuba Mountains, a scene of continuous fighting. While oil sales will not suffice to pay off Sudan's external debt or fully relieve the current account deficit (estimated at $17 billion and $700 million, respectively), the stakes of prolonged conflict are now higher for both sides. As an oil exporter, the government plays new cards in world politics and has new motivation to pacify the south. Although sabotage of the pipeline opens new possibilities for the rebels, the government's capacity to repair it rapidly, amply demonstrated in September 1999, effectively negates that tactic.

Toward a Lasting Solution?

Ultimately, only a benign and pluralistic Sudan that relaxes Arab-Islamist unitarism in favor of some sort of confederation appears capable of restoring peace and justice for all of that country's faiths and cultures. Sadly, the prospects for a compromise arrangement, such as that which largely held the peace in the 1970s, are not promising, and Sudan exhibits only a modest social base for a pluralistic civil society.[37] Under these circumstances, secession of the south must be considered a feasible option. However, it must be clear that such a "solution" is far from perfect. While secession of the southern provinces would detach a racially and culturally different region, it would not

[35] Lesch, "Sudan: The Torn Country," p. 220.

[36] "Sudan Loses its Chains," *The Economist*, June 12, 1999, pp. 39–40.

[37] Ann Mosely Lesch, "The Destruction of Civil Society in the Sudan," in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden: Brill, 1996), vol. 2, pp. 153–91.

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save the resistance groups in the northwest or help the political opposition that now exists in the north. Ironically, continuing the civil war offers the northern-based opponents of Islamic extremism their best hope for implementing a pluralistic constitution.

Self-determination appears to have gained considerable support, as witnessed by a flurry of talks that have recently taken place around that issue. The Kampala Declaration on Human Rights in Sudan, which emanated from a conference in February 1999 attended by exiled Sudanese political parties, supported freedom of religion, unity, self-determination, and a variety of political solutions—including partition—to the present discontents.[38] Bashir also held talks with the SPLA under the auspices of IGAD, and in an apparent victory for the rebels, the two sides concluded that Sudan should be a secular state, or, barring that, that the south should be able to exercise its right of self-determination. And in a Libyan-supported initiative, Turabi made overtures to al-Mahdi and the Umma Party in an attempt to attract the more conservative groups in the NDA that remain in formal coalition with the SPLA. The *demarche* issued after the talks avoided any public declarations, but the motivation behind the NIF's unmistakable attempt to weaken the opposition alliance is clear: the NDA formula for ending the war includes a decentralized government, separation of religion and the state, a pluralistic democracy that respects human rights, and the option of self-determination for the south.[39]

The U.S. position has until recently been difficult to discern, but in light of President Clinton's apology for the U.S. failure to intervene in Rwanda, self-determination may seem like a reasonable option.[40] Indeed, in October 1999, U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright met with SPLA leader John Garang in Nairobi and confirmed U.S. support for the IGAD principles. Nearly a year earlier, Garang had met with President Hasni Mubarak of Egypt, who had been a strong supporter of Sudanese unity and seeks significant influence in Sudanese politics, and the two signed a declaration notably silent on self-determination. And in November 1999, the National Congress introduced its own proposal that parliament name a prime minister charged with overseeing the direct election of the governors of Sudan's twenty-six states. But more upheaval lies ahead. On December 12, 1999, President Bashir, preempting a vote on constitutional changes that would have severely reduced the power of the presidency in favor of a parliament and ruling party dominated by Turabi, declared a state of emergency, suspended elements of the constitution, and dispatched troops to take over the parliament.[41]

[38] "Kampala Declaration on Human Rights in Sudan," *ACAS* (Association of Concerned Africa Scholars) *Bulletin*, Spring/Summer 1999, pp. 24–29.

[39] Moyiga Nduru, "Sudan: Exiled Opposition Rejects This Week's Peace Pact," July 2, 1998 (http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/apr/sudan2.html).

[40] Michael O'Hanlon, "How to Stop Genocide: Saving Lives with Force," *The New Republic*, July 12, 1999, pp. 21–23.

[41] Ian Fisher, "Oil Flowing in Sudan, Raising Stakes in Its Civil War," *New York Times*, Oct. 17, 1999; "Sudan,

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Ultimately, the present government's record of legal and political maneuvering, broken promises, and steadfast attachment to a unified Islamic state make it difficult to believe that a settlement satisfactory to all contenders is still possible. Yet the carnage of thirty years of war has earned the advocates of self-determination serious consideration on humanitarian grounds alone. Perhaps the most telling evidence of that is a recent declaration by President Bashir himself: "The option of separation with peace is better than that of unity with the continuation of the war."[42] The human cost—including two million deaths since 1983 and $2 billion in outside relief to southern Sudan in just the past year—continues to mount, with no indication that the conflict will be "ripe" for mediation any time soon. The war is nourished by roots so deep in Sudan's history that they will likely prove very hard to rip out.

Through the Looking Glass," *The Economist*, Oct. 30, 1999, p. 53; "Sudan Palace Coup," *The Economist*, Dec. 18, 1999, p. 41.

[42] Lesch, "Sudan: The Torn Country," p. 218.

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Ethnic Conflicts

The Mentality of Messianic Assassins

by Sonia L. Alianak

The Middle East has been a hotbed of ethnic conflict for centuries, but the level of violence there intensified in the twentieth century largely as a consequence of the struggle between Jews and Arabs for land and statehood in "holy" Palestine. Protracted efforts to end that struggle have spawned, *inter alia*, the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, and the Oslo Agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. But in these and other cases, religious extremists have opposed conciliatory efforts so fiercely as to resort not only to terrorism, but to assassination of the peacemakers themselves. What ties together assassinations such as those of Egyptian president Anwar el Sadat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin is a special type of religiously inspired political violence that might be termed messianism. The messianic model was first proposed by David C. Rapoport in his study of "holy terror," and further developed in my own application of the model to the Sadat and Rabin cases.[1] In this essay I shall test the model further by focusing on the assassination of yet another peacemaker, King Abdullah ibn Hussein al Hashem of Jordan, on July 20, 1951. He was killed by Mustafa Ashu (a Palestinian disciple of the exiled mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Muhammad Amin al Husseini), who thought the king was carrying out secret and separate peace negotiations with Israel. Should this third case study confirm the findings of the first two, one may conclude with confidence that the phenomenon of messianism is a major stumbling block on the road to peace in ethnic conflicts staked by spiritual passions.

[1] See David C. Rapoport, "Messianic Sanctions for Terror," *Comparative Politics*, Jan. 1988, pp. 195–213; and Sonia Alianak, "Religion, Politics, and Assassination in the Middle East: The Messianic Model," *World Affairs*, Winter 1998, pp. 163–79.

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Religious Delegitimation of Peacemakers

The messianic model stipulates that the first necessary condition for "holy assassinations" is the religious delegitimation of the peace-making ruler. Thus, Yigal Amir, the Israeli assassin of Prime Minister Rabin, was exposed to an atmosphere of violent denunciation of Rabin for more than two years—that is, since Rabin's 1993 Oslo peace agreement with Yasir Arafat. In Amir's mind, the preaching of right-wing rabbis effectively delegitimated Rabin's authority. Then, in early September 1993, the radical Right, both religious and secular, staged demonstrations against the peace agreement secretly negotiated by the government and called for Rabin's resignation. In the chants of right-wing crowds and speeches by certain religious authorities whom Amir trusted, Rabin and his supporters were labeled *rozhim*, *rodfim*, and *mosrim* (murderers, attackers, and traitors). Rabbi Avraham Hecht, among others, told the International Rabbinical Coalition for Israel on June 19, 1995, that Rabin's peace initiative was sinful, and he implicitly condoned an attempt to assassinate him. His sin was betrayal of the 3,000-year history of Jewish messianism.[2]

On a more practical level, fifteen rabbis asked soldiers in July 1995 to disobey Rabin's policy of evacuation of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) bases in Judea and Samaria, citing halachic authorities who wrote that a king's command to violate Torah law should be disregarded. The group was headed by Rabbi Avraham Shapira, who wrote that "there is a Torah prohibition against uprooting IDF bases and transferring the sites to Gentiles, since this contravenes a positive [Torah] commandment and also endangers life and the existence of the state."[3] The impressionable Amir heard this call for disobedience from the rabbis and believed their apocalyptic argument to the effect that any peace process involving the surrender of holy land would arouse God's anger and possibly lead to another Holocaust.[4]

A similar psychological atmosphere prevailed in Egypt after the 1978 Camp David Accords. The ulema of Ahli mosques (popular and private mosques) denounced Sadat in violent terms, whereas other co-opted ulema at older mosques had found religious justifications for his policies. The popular critics of Sadat were, among others, Sheikh Mahalawi, Sheikh Eid, and Sheikh Kishk, recordings of whose sermons were found in the possession of Sadat's assassins. These sheikhs expressed the anger of the newly urbanized Egyptian masses rebelling against a modernity that appeared to threaten their most cherished beliefs. It was to these types of mosques that

[2] See Haim Shapiro, "Protests mar Rabin's dedication of new school wing in Jerusalem," *Jerusalem Post*, Sept. 2, 1993; *Tikkun*, "Special Section: The Rabin Assassination," Jan.–Feb. 1996, pp. 41–42, 74, 81; Robert I. Friedman, "The Rabbi Who Sentenced Yitzak Rabin to Death" *New York*, Oct. 9, 1995, pp. 24–26.

[3] Herb Keinon, "Rabbis: Halacha forbids moving army bases from Judea, Samaria," *Jerusalem Post*, July 22, 1995.

[4] Larry Derfner, "The man in the middle," *Jerusalem Post*, Jan. 6, 1996.

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the new fundamentalists gravitated, where word had spread since the beginning of 1981 that Sadat was condemned to death.[5]

It was in one of the Ahli mosques that Khaled Ahmed el Islambouli met Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, a messianic theorist, and was exposed to his ideas about the delegitimation of the ruler and the need for assassination. Faraj quoted Ibn Taymiyah and others on the severity of the punishment awaiting an apostate ruler, and concluded that "it is the view of the majority [of the jurists] that an apostate has to be killed." What is more, according to Faraj, it was a believer's duty to do so. This would in turn lead to the establishment of the messianic Islamic state because "God will bring disgrace upon unbelief."[6]

Finally, in the 1951 Jordanian case, while there was no direct evidence linking the exiled Islamic mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin, to the assassination of King Abdullah, he indirectly attempted to delegitimate the king in the context of a long-standing competition for religious and political leadership of the Palestinian people. This was intensified when Abdullah annexed the West Bank and secret negotiations between Abdullah and Jewish leaders about a possible separate peace were revealed. Thereafter, Hajj Amin intensified his campaign to delegitimate the king's rule, accusing Abdullah of "betrayal" and being a "traitor" of the Arab cause. He was also viewed by the mufti as not being a true Islamic leader because he relied heavily on the British "imperialists" who dissuaded him from supporting the Palestinian Arabs' jihad (holy war).[7]

The Hajj also denounced his enemy Abdullah for wanting to compromise with the Zionists.[8] Indeed, since the Partition Plan of 1947, Abdullah sought a way to reach an understanding with the Zionists to end the ethnic conflict and continued his efforts during and after the 1948 war. By 1950, Jordan and Israel were on the verge of an agreement that involved a five-year nonaggression pact. The revelation of territorial concessions by Abdullah created an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, even though the king backed down at the last minute when the Arab states got wind of it.[9]

[5] See Mohamed Heikal, *Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat* (New York: Random House, 1983), pp. 243–44, 264; Karen Armstrong, *Holy War* (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 261–62, 278; Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967*, updated ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 160.

[6] Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, "The Neglected Duty" in Johannes J. G. Jansen, *The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), §25, p. 169; §66, p. 191; §§7–9, p. 162.

[7] Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti: Haj Amin al-Husseini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement*, trans. David Harvey, ed. Shmuel Himelstein (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 87, 126, 177–78.

[8] Majid Khadduri, *Arab Contemporaries: The Role of Personalities in Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 86.

[9] See Mary C. Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 200–206; and Philip Mattar, "The Mufti of Jerusalem: Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, a Founder of Palestinian Nationalism" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1981), pp. 200–202.

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Finally, Abdullah's annexation to Jordan of 80 percent of the West Bank in April 1950 thwarted the aspirations of the Palestinians, especially the followers of the mufti, for an independent Palestinian state. The mufti promptly called Abdullah a "plunderer" and held him responsible for the displacement of Palestinian refugees. Such statements by a moral religious authority led his irate followers to believe that they were called to punish the "traitor" by any means up to and including assassination.[10]

Another effort by the mufti to delegitimate Abdullah's rule centered on the creation of an Arab Liberation Army by the Arab League at its meeting in Lebanon in October 1947. The Arab League sided with Transjordan and Iraq and called for the recruitment of volunteers to be trained at Qatana, near Damascus. When the league appointed Fawzi al-Qawuqji rather than the mufti's choice of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni as army commander, the mufti accused al-Qawuqji of being a British and Jordanian agent. Convinced that a conspiracy was afoot to deny him his rightful role in Palestinian affairs, the mufti sent messengers to Qatana encouraging the Palestinian soldiers to defect to the armed force that the Arab Higher Institute was organizing under the supervision of the mufti.[11]

When the revelations of Abdullah's secret negotiations with Israel at El Shuni then surfaced, rumors circulated that the king was going to be assassinated. Actual death threats were made in anonymous letters sent to the king and British commander of the Arab Legion a few days before the murder. And so, in the judgment of scholar John Marlowe, Hajj Amin was "morally if not legally responsible for the murder of Abdullah" because he had delegitimated Abdullah's rule.[12]

In all three cases, therefore, the assassins and their co-conspirators had been exposed to influential views delegitimating the rulers through verbal political violence because the rulers sought to end the ethnic conflict in a way that appeared to frustrate the Islamic or Jewish messianic process.

The Murderer as Martyr

The second necessary condition for "holy assassination" is the existence of "devout" human agents from a militant minority ready to use violence to advance the messianic process.[13] Such assassins and plotters believe they obey a higher religious guidance than the ruler they view as an apostate.

[10] Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, p. 126; Mattar, "The Mufti of Jerusalem," p. 202.

[11] Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, pp. 83, 85, 86.

[12] John Marlowe, *Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism: A Study in Power Politics* (London: Cresset Press, 1961), p. 92. See also C. L. Sulzberger, "Slaying of Abdullah Worsens Crisis in Jittery Islam World," *New York Times*, July 21, 1951; Sir Alec Kirkbride, *From the Wings: Amman Memoirs 1947–1951* (London: Frank Cass, 1976), p. 136.

[13] Alianak, "Religion, Politics, and Assassination," pp. 174–75.

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Thus, Yigal Amir, the assassin of Rabin, believed that God rewarded him for his devoutness by granting him a role in bringing the messianic process to fruition. This process was threatened, he thought, by Rabin's agreement to exchange "holy" land for peace, whereas the religious Right instructed that the Israeli victory in the Six Day War of 1967 against overwhelming odds had proven that God intervened on behalf of the Jews. They perceived that victory as ushering in a messianic era because the biblical Holy Land was recovered. For them, the settling of the whole Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel) was a divine commandment, as deduced from Nahmanides (Ramban), a thirteenth-century sage.[14] The founding of the Zionist state of Israel and conquest of Judea and Samaria seemed obvious and inevitable steps in the process of redemption, as Rabbi Haim Druckman explained at an anti-government rally. Among the religious Right, Rabin was viewed as an enemy of God because he was surrendering "promised land" and thus interfering with the coming of the Messiah. He had to be removed. Indeed, Rabin's policy of trading holy territory for peace might arouse God's anger, leading to another Holocaust. This had a powerful effect on Amir's messianic reasoning, as Rabbi Yehuda Amital elaborated in an interview with the *Jerusalem Post*: "If you are convinced another Holocaust is coming . . . then you can come to the conclusion that it's all right to murder someone to stop it."[15]

Yigal Amir justified his assassination of Rabin in the name of God. "I did what I did for God and the Israeli people." He thought of himself as "God's emissary," and said, "For three years I tried to do something to stop Rabin's plan," implying that he had waited to see if nonviolent options worked before opting for assassination. He told the Tel Aviv District Court: "If you've tried everything else and nothing works, then you have to kill him."[16]

Amir and the religious Right as a whole felt powerless in the Israeli democracy and believed that the small minority of Orthodox Jews had become strangers in Israel as a result of Rabin's secretly negotiated agreement with the Palestinians, of which they had no part. When asked why he did not try to promote his views through the democratic process, Amir told the commission investigating the assassination, "What's all this crap about democracy? There is democracy, but there is also Judaism."[17] Amir believed that people would approve the assassination in the future, saying in court: "In another few years, everyone will thank me for what I did."[18]

[14] Derfner, "The man in the middle."

[15] Ibid. See also Herb Keinon, "We shall overcome some (other) day," *Jerusalem Post*, Feb. 3, 1996; *Tikkun*, "Special Section," pp. 61, 77.

[16] Raine Marcus, "Rabin's assassin gets life," *Jerusalem Post*, Apr. 6, 1996; Raine Marcus, "Psychologist testifies Amir was sane when he shot Yitzhak Rabin," *Jerusalem Post*, Mar. 23, 1996; Raine Marcus, "Amir: I wanted to murder Rabin," *Jerusalem Post*, Mar. 16, 1996.

[17] Bill Hutman, "Amir: I only meant to wound Rabin," *Jerusalem Post*, Jan. 27, 1996. See also *Tikkun*, "Special Section," pp. 74, 83.

[18] Marcus, "Amir: I wanted to murder Rabin."

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Khaled Ahmed el Islambouli, one of the assassins of Anwar el Sadat, also believed that God had designated him to assassinate Sadat. In a note left in an envelope for his sister he wrote: "I have not committed any crime. What I have done I have done for the sake of God, the Merciful, the Powerful."[19] Here, Islambouli accepted the theoretician Faraj's thesis that Allah is involved in bringing an end to the rule of an unbeliever (Sadat). When Islambouli heard that Sadat had imprisoned Islamic fundamentalist leaders, including his own brother, he told his grieving mother, "Be patient mother, it is the will of God . . . every tyrant has his end."[20] Likewise, when his military superior ordered him to participate in a military parade, he hesitated at first and then replied, "Very well, I accept. Let God's will be done." At his trial he testified: "I was reluctant to take part in the parade, but then I agreed to do so because it suddenly flashed into my mind that it was the will of God that I should take part, not for the sake of the parade but for the sake of the sacred mission." And he told his aunt, who asked him in prison whether he thought of the effect of his deed on his parents, "No. I thought only of God."[21] His last will and testament read: "God has guided us to this deed. . . . We decided that the Pharaoh of Egypt had to be killed so that God may rescue Egypt from its confusion, its friendship with Zionists, the ruin of morals caused by Sadat and his wife."[22]

The assassins believed they were carrying out God's will.

Faraj also rejected the democratic option in favor of a theocracy that he believed would lead to a messianic Islamic state and the reestablishment of the caliphate, the third stage of the messianic process. "The truth is that an [Islamic] State can only be founded by a believing minority," wrote Faraj, because the true believers of Islam "are always a minority." Only after the Islamic minority's victory would the masses rally, as taught in the Koran: "When comes the victory of God, and the conquest, thou seest the people entering into the religion of God in crowds."[23]

In King Abdullah's case, the assassin and three of the plotters were also from a religious minority and belonged to a "sabotage section" of a "Holy War" organization (Al-Jihad Al-Muqaddas) headed by Hajj Amin.[24] Details

[19] Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*, p. 253.

[20] Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh*, trans. Jon Rothschild (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 205.

[21] Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*, pp. 242, 246, 253.

[22] Ajami, *The Arab Predicament*, pp. 155–56.

[23] Faraj, §54, pp. 185–86; §57, p. 186. See also Hamied N. Ansari, "The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Mar. 1984, pp. 139–40; Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 84; Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalism and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 157–59.

[24] Albion Ross, "Abdullah, Jordan King, Slain by an Arab in Old Jerusalem," *New York Times*, July 21, 1951. The plotters included Abed Mahmoud Akku, a former terrorist and cattle merchant; his brother Zakaria Mahmoud Akku, a butcher; and Musa Ahmed Ayyubi, a merchant who had been a member of the "assassination group" of

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about the assassin, Ashu, were not fully divulged since he was killed by one of King Abdullah's guards before he was able to tell his story. What is known is that he was a 21-year-old tailor's apprentice who lived in the Old City and was described as a "former terrorist" and fanatical Arab nationalist. We also know that Ashu was associated with neighborhood boss Abed Akku and a group of assassins who had worked for the mufti during the 1937–39 rebellion.[25] The religious opponents of King Abdullah realized that they could never achieve their goals by democratic means because they were a minority, and in any case King Abdullah would never install a democracy. So they resorted to "holy" assassination—at the price of their own martyrdom.

Martyrdom is in fact one of three crucial factors that combine to make the existence of devout human agents a necessary condition for messianic assassinations. Amir believed that God directed him to kill Rabin, hence God would reward rather than punish him for the murder. He was therefore ready to commit "holy sin" and set aside the commandment "Thou shall not kill" on the strength of his "knowledge of Talmudic intricacies." When a Tel Aviv judge asked him whether he had heard of the Ten Commandments, Amir arrogantly replied, "It's sad if that's your whole knowledge of the Torah."[26]

Faraj, in turn, justified the act of a Muslim's killing a Muslim if the Islamic ruler was in truth an unbeliever. And if the assassin was killed in the process, he became a martyr. Islambouli, the principal assassin of Sadat, likewise quoted his mentor Faraj to the effect that "the greatest prize for a believer is salvation, and to kill and be killed in the cause of God." All four prospective assassins of Sadat—Islambouli, Abdel Salam, Abbas Mohamed, and Reheil—stated that they were ready for martyrdom when Faraj told them that their future action would lead to their certain execution.[27]

Finally, in the case of King Abdullah, the assassin did not live to state his views, and the Jordanian and British authorities promoted the theory that he was a contract killer motivated by money.[28] But the truth of the matter seems to lie elsewhere. One paper found on the assassin urged a "holy" assassination, and another read: "Kill and be not afraid, you are assured of safety." A *fatwa* (religious ruling) also assured Ashu that he would be exempt from punishment in the afterworld.[29] Thus, although the plotters were not telling Ashu that bombs would not be dropped to save him, Ashu received the note about the afterworld in case he were killed. This shows that he was aware of his own imminent death when he assassinated King Abdullah.

this terrorist organization. FO 371/91839, Walker report to the British Foreign Office, Aug. 20, 1951, p. 1.

[25] Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, p. 211; FO 371/91839, Sir A. S. Kirkbride to the British Foreign Office, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 1.

[26] *Tikkun*, "Special Section," p. 59. See also Marcus, "Amir: I wanted to murder Rabin."

[27] Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*, pp. 247, 250. See also Faraj, §103, pp. 207–208.

[28] Nasr al-Din al-Nashashibi, *Man Qatala al-Malik 'Abd Allah* (Who killed King 'Abd Allah) (Kuwait: n.p., 1980).

[29] Kirkbride to the British Foreign Office, p. 2.

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The choice of the place for the assassination (al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem) also appears to be symbolic. The religious "pretender," Abdullah, was to be gunned down in a holy place of "true Islam." The "devout" assassin would then ascend directly to heaven and not have to wait for the Day of Judgment, the culmination of the messianic process.

The Traumatized Assassin

Psychological shock, the second crucial element of messianic violence, was experienced by the assassins and plotters in all three of these cases. A major reversal of policy by a ruler, such as that from war to peace, can cause psychological shock, confusion, and violent reaction, especially when a messianic process is perceived to be threatened. Religious minorities opposed to all three peacemakers believed that the whole of Palestine was entrusted to them by God. Therefore, any compromise over land was an abomination.

To messianists, any compromise over land was an abomination.

In Israel, Amir believed that the architect of the Six Day War, Rabin, had contributed to the messianic process in 1967 through new "holy" territorial acquisitions, especially the liberation of Jerusalem and the West Bank, but also Gaza, Sinai, and the Golan Heights. Amir, however, perceived a sudden change in Rabin from the hero of the Six Day War to the "traitor" who signed a peace agreement with the PLO giving away most of the "holy" land acquired during the war. After forty-five years of enmity with the Palestinians, this major reversal of policy by Rabin caused psychological shock in Amir and the Orthodox religious Right. Amir concluded that the messianic process heralded by 1967 was in danger, and since the whole of Palestine was entrusted to the Jews by God, there could be no compromise over land. Amir's feelings were summed up by a settler: "But he [Rabin] committed a crime. *He changed his mind.*"[30]

Islamic extremists also believed that Egypt's relative success in the Ramadan War (Yom Kippur War) of October 1973 was a sign that God endorsed their messianic cause. They heralded Sadat at that time as a hero and experienced profound psychological shock when he suddenly reversed policy and signed the Camp David Accords in September 1978, ending thirty years of conflict with Israel. As his assassins recalled at their trial, this abrupt reversal destabilized his regime and confused his people, causing anger, fear—and ultimately his death. For Faraj, the true jihad had been stopped by Sadat's signing the Camp David Accords. Faraj called for the eventual liber-

[30] *Tikkun*, "Special Section," p. 49 (emphasis in original). See also Alianak, "Religion, Politics, and Assassination," pp. 169–71.

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ation of Jerusalem, but first Muslims had to get rid of their unbelieving rulers.[31]

King Abdullah's rumored peace overtures with Israel also shocked many Palestinians. He was commander-in-chief of the Arab armies in the field and was considered the "liberator" of Jerusalem in the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 because, when Arab Legion forces and their British commanders were reluctant to proceed to Jerusalem, he encouraged them to push on to victory.[32] As a result, the Arab Legion occupied al-Aqsa Mosque, near the Dome of the Rock, one of Islam's holiest shrines. He also revealed that his late father, the exiled Sherif of Mecca, had appeared to him in a dream and commanded that he capture Old Jerusalem.[33] Then, suddenly, Abdullah changed course and was seeking a separate peace with Israel. Shocked by this apparent betrayal, the zealots insisted on his death.

Messianic Confusion

A third and final crucial element in such assassinations is the influence of competing views about the use of violence, whether verbal or physical, against the ruler. Thus, Amir was exposed not only to the rabbis who opposed Rabin, but also to those who supported the prime minister, leaving Amir with a plurality of views about the messianic process and measures to be taken to complete it. Pro-Rabin rabbis included Yehuda Amital, who cited rabbinical writings suggesting that it was not a sin to trade land for peace if the result would save lives. Amital, who later joined the Peres government as minister without portfolio, argued that the return of Jews to Zion after two thousand years in exile showed that they were included in God's plan, which was messianic enough for him. Pro-Rabin rabbis viewed the state of Israel "as *the* redemption after the Holocaust." Amir, however, ultimately sided with rabbis who viewed the creation of Israel only "as a step in the redemptive process."[34] He turned to violence to protect the future steps of the messianic process endangered by Rabin. Other supporters of this position, including the Association of Professors for Political and Economic Strength in Israel, opposed what they considered "the irrational messianic zeal of the Rabin-Peres plan," which depicted "an imagined messianic age of harmony and peaceful coexistence."[35]

The Sadat assassins and Faraj likewise were exposed to ulema who

[31] Armstrong, *Holy War*, pp. 261–62; Alianak, "Religion, Politics, and Assassination," p. 170; Ajami, *The Arab Predicament*, p. 158; Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*, p. 246; Faraj, §59, p. 187; §§68–70, pp. 192–193.

[32] Kirkbride, *From the Wings*, p. 41.

[33] Ross, "Abdullah, Jordan King, Slain."

[34] *Tikkun*, "Special Section," p. 61. See also Derfner, "Man in the Middle."

[35] David Gershon, Israel Hanukoglu, and Michael Resenbluh, "Pied pipers of peace," *Jerusalem Post*, Oct. 13, 1993.

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held differing views of Sadat. The president's supporters included the ulema of al-Azhar (the renowned Islamic University of the Middle East), the grand mufti (the highest religious authority), and the ulema of some of the oldest Egyptian mosques, who stressed the unity of the community over violence. They supported the Camp David Accords, arguing that they derived from a position of strength after Egypt's success in the October 1973 war. They also cited a precedent of the Hudabiyah Treaty, concluded after the Prophet's diplomacy with the clan that controlled Mecca in 628 A.D. Hence, the treaty with Israel was in agreement with Islamic law. The Egyptian grand mufti also refused to declare Sadat an apostate, arguing that even if Sadat had neglected some part of the Koran and Sunna, he was not an apostate as long as he believed in the prophecy of Mohammad and the existence of God, and prayed regularly.[36]

But Sadat's assassins lived instead in an environment of violence—an atmosphere that cultivated hatred of the "apostate" leaders and led to the belief that if not stopped, those leaders would prevent the coming of the caliphate. Thus, as mentioned above, Islambouli and the three others were influenced by the violent arguments of Faraj, his *anqud* (cell) members, and the ulema of the Ahli mosques, who had spread the word since early 1981 that Sadat was condemned to death.

King Abdullah's assassin and other conspirators were also exposed to competing views about the messianic process. Both Abdullah and Hajj Amin claimed that they were entitled to create caliphates, and both used their lines of descent from the Prophet Muhammad to legitimate their aspirations. Abdullah based his claim to the caliphate on the fact that he was a Hashemite, a descendant of the Bani Hashem clan of Muhammad's own tribe, the Quraysh. From the tenth century until the second decade of the twentieth, members of Abdullah's family ruled Mecca and the Hejaz section of the Arabian Peninsula because they were direct descendants of the Prophet. It was because of their authority as protectors of the holy cities of Medina and Mecca that the British sought and got Abdullah's father's leadership of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. As a reward, the British installed Abdullah in the Transjordan sector of Palestine.[37] The Hashemites were defeated, however, by Ibn Saud in the Arabian Peninsula. But this did not prevent Abdullah from emphasizing his line of descent from the Prophet and hence his right to be caliph and to perpetuate his rule and that of his descendants in the name of God. Territorially, his ambition went beyond Jordan and Palestine to a Greater Syria, including Lebanon and Iraq. Once his dispute with Israel was settled he could concentrate on and pursue this plan.

[36] Ajami, *The Arab Predicament*, p. 233. See also Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*, p. 243; Ansari, "The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics," pp. 138–41.

[37] Lawrence Ziring, *The Middle East: A Political Dictionary* (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1992).

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Hajj Amin was also from a prominent family, the al-Husseinis, and based his claim on the fact that, almost without interruption since the seventeenth century, his family had served as chief protectors and administrators of the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. Even more impressive, Hajj Amin traced his lineage to Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet, and her husband Ali. Territorially, he imagined himself caliph of *all* of Palestine, hence his goal was the expulsion of the Palestinian Jewish community and the creation of an independent Palestinian state. He also demanded the retrocession of the land around the River Jordan, which Abdullah had annexed. But the Jordanian elections of April 11, 1950, resulted in a new parliament that ratified Abdullah's annexations, and the king declared them "irrevocable and not open to further discussion." This went against the mufti's plan of the restoration of the "Palestinian entity" and contributed to the feeling of abandonment and hostility to democracy on the part of the militant minority backers of Hajj Amin.[38]

It seems that the plotters wanted to put a stop to Abdullah's messianic aspirations in order to establish a theocracy dictated by Hajj Amin. The mufti thought Abdullah was a false caliph and British puppet, and saw himself as the harbinger of a "true" caliphate. Hajj Amin went into exile in Egypt, but that did not mean he was uninvolved in Palestinian affairs. Indeed, according to the late king of Jordan, Hussein bin Talal (grandson of Abdullah), the assassination of King Abdullah was planned in Egypt.[39] Although King Hussein did not directly implicate the mufti, many other scholars and observers did.

In sum, the rival messianic visions of Abdullah and Hajj Amin competed for the backing of Palestinians and Arabs at large. But once Abdullah secured the Jordanian crown, British support, and majority support at the polls, the defeated zealots had no recourse left except murder.

Conclusions

This brief analysis of the ethnic conflict between Arabs and Jews weaves together only a few of the threads in the complex fabric of Palestinian/Israeli politics. However, the three assassinations demonstrate the interrelation of politics, religion, and peace in the area, and the relevance of the messianic model to political violence. Messianically inspired assassinations are perpetrated in the name of God, but target secular rulers. They stem from irreconcilable disagreements about the domestic and international policies of

[38] Joseph B. Schechtman, *The Mufti and the Fuehrer: The Rise and Fall of Haj Amin el-Husseini* (New York: A.S. Barnes and Company, 1965), p. 301–2; Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti*, p. 123. See also Khadduri, *Arab Contemporaries*, p. 69; Maurice Pearlman, *Mufti of Jerusalem: The Story of Haj Amin El Husseini* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1947), p. 10.

[39] King Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head* (New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 1962), p. 5.

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the ruler, especially those involving "sudden" peace and surrender of "holy" soil. If there is any way local rulers and friendly third parties can reduce the risk of "holy" assassinations in the future, in the Middle East and elsewhere, it is to soften the "shock" suffered by zealous partisans who have been asked by leaders they have trusted in battle to embrace an enemy whom they have been taught all their lives to hate. Given the necessity of secret diplomacy in the resolution of protracted ethnic and religious conflicts, some "shock" would appear unavoidable. But if Sadat and Rabin, and perhaps Abdullah, misstepped, it was in their failure to prepare their own people for a change of course and promote dialogue, if not consensus, among their own more extreme clergy and partisans. God knows, that is no easy task.

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Better Tools for Humanitarian Missions

by James F. Miskel

Submitted for your approval, a nightmarish scenario worthy of Rod Serling.

Imagine, first, an unsettled international landscape, disturbed by a series of intense humanitarian emergencies in such economically disadvantaged regions as Eastern Europe, South Asia, and Central Africa. According to a recent estimate by the U.S. National Intelligence Council, the number and severity of humanitarian emergencies will probably remain high and may worsen in the foreseeable future. The council found that in 1999 there were twenty-three countries with "ongoing" humanitarian emergencies and another nine in which humanitarian emergencies were likely to develop. A humanitarian emergency is defined as a situation in which at least 300,000 civilians will starve or die without international assistance.[1]

Next, imagine that the organizations and individuals attempting to provide international assistance in these disasters are themselves becoming the victims of violence. Disturbing examples abound. In October 1999, for instance, two United Nations workers (one from UNICEF and the other from the World Food Programme) were murdered in Burundi.[2] Since 1990, fifteen representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have been killed in armed attacks.[3] Doctors and nurses from the explicitly neutral Red Cross have recently been attacked and killed in Chechnya, Rwanda, and Burundi.[4] In 1996 alone, humanitarian workers in Sudan had to be evacuated sixty different times because attack was imminent, and there were thirty-five

[1] U.S. National Intelligence Council, "Global Humanitarian Emergencies: Trends and Projections, 1999–2000" (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, Aug. 1999). The nine countries with potential for a humanitarian emergency are the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, India, Pakistan, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, and Russia. Eleven of the twenty-three ongoing humanitarian emergencies are in Africa. Among the others are Indonesia, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Bosnia.

[2] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Weekly Round-up 41 covering the period 9 Oct.–15 Oct. 1999," *Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa*, pp. 1–2.

[3] Mark Cutts, "Prime Targets," *The World Today*, Aug./Sept. 1998, p. 220.

[4] Michael Ignatieff, "Unarmed Warriors," *The New Yorker*, Mar. 24, 1997, pp. 51–52.

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bombings of relief sites.[5] In addition, relief supplies are frequently hijacked by local warlords and criminal gangs. In November 1999, for example, a thirteen-car convoy carrying emergency food supplies was intercepted and robbed by an armed gang in Afghanistan.[6]

Imagine as well that the costs of providing security to aid workers and to relief operations are increasing dramatically and often exceed by far the costs of the relief effort itself. A report by the Refugee Policy Group estimated that it cost the U.S. government $1.5 billion to protect relief operations in Somalia compared to the $310 million it spent on relief supplies and operations.[7] In fact, the United States spent two and a half times as much on security for relief operations in Somalia in late 1991 than it has invested in *all* forms of foreign aid to that country since 1970.[8]

Now imagine that the default tools, if not the tools of choice, for the provision of security to relief operations are military. That is to say, it is predominantly the armed forces of the United States and its European allies that provide security to relief operations in humanitarian emergencies. In some cases, of course, military forces from other countries have taken the lead, including the Australian military in East Timor and the Nigerian army in Sierra Leone, but whoever provides the guns, it is military forces that are usually called upon to provide security for relief workers, as well as logistics, engineering, and medical support.

Protecting relief workers in Somalia cost the U.S. five times more than the relief operation itself.

Imagine, too, that the U.S. and European militaries are increasingly stressed by their involvement in humanitarian emergencies. The U.S. Congress acknowledged the severity of this stress in the Defense Authorization Act for 2000, section 1235 of which reads in part: "It is the sense of Congress that (1) the readiness of United States military forces to execute the National Security Strategy of the United States . . . is being eroded by a combination of declining defense budgets and expanded missions; and (2) there may be missions to which the United States is contributing Armed Forces from which the United States can begin disengaging." The missions

[5] Carl Tinsman, "Operation Lifeline Sudan: United Nations professionals protect humanitarian workers in a war zone," *DHA News*, Dec. 1997, p. 43. The U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs has since been reorganized and is now known as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or OCHA.

[6] United Nations, daily press briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Nov. 18, 1999, p. 3. Available online (http://www.un.org).

[7] Dennis Gallagher, Michael Mousalli, and David Bosco, "Civilian and Military Means of Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict: A Comparative Analysis," *Refugee Policy Group*, Mar. 1997, p. 12. This report was commissioned by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Refugee Policy Group has since gone out of existence.

[8] Thomas Weiss and Cindy Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and the Dilemmas of Help* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), p. 114.

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being referred to are the humanitarian operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere.[9]

Imagine, as a consequence, that a belief is spreading that interventions in humanitarian crises would be more effective if they took place before the crises had reached full boil.[10] That is, more lives and property could be saved and the size (and cost) of an intervening force might even be minimized if the intervention took place while the crisis was still in its formative stages. Yet, because of domestic political concerns, Western governments routinely resist calls for early intervention. Thus, public support for an intervention may not develop until after violence has erupted on a large scale, while Western governments bicker about whether an early intervention in a remote crisis would be in the national interest and whether they should keep their military forces in reserve for higher-priority threats.

Finally, imagine that as a result of all the above the recognition is spreading that relief operations during a humanitarian emergency are more often a palliative than a cure. The vast sums that the international community spends on emergency relief and the even greater sums spent on protecting emergency relief operations fail to address the underlying causes of poverty and distress. Sometimes the relief actually complicates the process of long-term recovery. For example, the provision of food during an emergency can cause food prices to drop so low that farmers lose the incentive to plant, thereby further reducing the carrying capacity of the local economy and increasing the community's vulnerability to a future disaster.[11]

This nightmarish scenario, alas, comes not from the realm of the Twilight Zone, but from reality. And whoever wins the November 2000 presidential election in the United States will confront the plagues of civil disorder, ethnic conflict, and violent anarchy that will continue to afflict many less-developed countries in Africa, Central Asia, and elsewhere. The media will broadcast horror stories about these man-made disasters, making it all but impossible for the next occupant of the White House to ignore the humanitarian crises that lie ahead. Publicity may also force the next administration to answer difficult questions about its commitment to values such as respect for human life and human rights, regional stability, and the rule of law. The incoming administration will also have to face the fact that, barring dramatic policy innovations, the international community's responses to

[9] The U.S. Army recently reported that peacekeeping operations had consumed so many resources that were not being replenished through the budget process that two of its highest profile divisions were given the lowest possible readiness rating. Bradley Graham, "Two Army Divisions Unfit for Major War," *Washington Post*, Nov. 10, 1999.

[10] This point was made by President Clinton during a Mar. 1998 state visit to Rwanda. White House release, "Remarks by the President to Genocide Survivors, Assistance Workers and U.S. and Rwanda Government Officials," Mar. 25, 1998 (at http://www.whitehouse.gov.library). The U.N. Secretary-General has also argued that one key to more effective humanitarian action is early intervention. Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," *The Economist*, Sept. 18, 1999, pp. 49–50.

[11] Weiss and Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention*, p. 118.

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these humanitarian emergencies will continue to be both costly and inefficient, if not completely ineffective. By virtue of the United States' position as the world's leading economic and military power, the next president will have a unique responsibility for promoting new policy innovations.

Reliance on the Military Is Costly but Comfortable

A main reason why innovations have not already been crafted in Washington and other Western capitals may be the very responsiveness of the military tool, which is simultaneously too expensive for relief work and inherently tangential to core relief issues. Responsive military forces enable policymakers in the West to scratch the itch of complex humanitarian emergencies by providing immediate relief in situations of violence and suffering without having to assume responsibility for a positive long-term outcome. In effect, the military does such a good job of providing security for relief operations, air-dropping food, transporting supplies and equipment to remote locations, and running field hospitals that there is scant political incentive for investment in new policy approaches. Moreover, reliance upon the military tool generates political support in the West for a restrictive set of ground rules for humanitarian intervention. Public and legislative reluctance to dispatch military forces overseas indirectly simplifies the otherwise complex political calculus of deciding when and where to intervene. Political support for a restrictive approach to military intervention gives decision-makers in Washington and other Western capitals a ready-made rationale for doing nothing beyond sending donations to private relief organizations like the Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services, or for delaying intervention until after crises have passed their peak (as was the case in Rwanda, Zaire, Bosnia, and even Somalia).

Of course, sound reasons exist for a restrictive approach to armed interventions. Military forces are expensive to build, and when they are deployed into harm's way serious concerns about national will and national prestige are necessarily raised. Physical violence against official, armed representatives of the United States has foreign policy implications and domestic political repercussions that attacks against nongovernmental relief workers simply do not have. To the financial costs and foreign-policy stakes one must add the opportunity costs absorbed whenever military assets are dispatched on missions of secondary or tertiary importance to the nation. Forces deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo are obviously not readily available for other missions that may develop. Furthermore, frequent use of military forces on secondary missions would seem to have one or both of two consequences: a degradation of primary mission capability, or increased investment in secondary mission capability. The military's primary mission is to deter wars and to win those wars that are not deterred. So long as there are threats to the

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national security, any degradation in this primary mission capability can have serious consequences. But even if the U.S. and other Western militaries increased their investment and training in the secondary mission of humanitarian intervention, important opportunity costs would be paid in the loss of incentive to find better and cheaper ways to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies and provide security to relief operations with methods that do not engage the national prestige of the United States and other major powers. If such better and cheaper methods could be devised, then they could be applied earlier in humanitarian crises or in crises where there would otherwise be no intervention at all.

Yet, in spite of the fact that the scenario described above cries out for new approaches to humanitarian emergencies, alternatives are not being pursued in a serious, organized fashion. One of the reasons has already been suggested. The status quo, as unsatisfactory as it is, is politically acceptable to leaders in Washington and other Western capitals and indeed to the various federal departments and agencies responsible for formulating and implementing U.S. relief policy. Theorists of organizational behavior would, of course, not find that surprising.[12] Few organizations (or individuals, for that matter) enthusiastically embrace initiatives that could cause them to write off sunk costs, abandon established capabilities, or forgo missions for which they are rewarded. The Pentagon has invested heavily in both time and money to hone its peacekeeping and relief support capabilities, and is rewarded for its efforts with appropriations from Congress. It would be unrealistic to expect the Defense Department to advocate new strategies that could result in the divestiture of its hard-won humanitarian capacities and skills.

What is more, no other organizations in the federal structure have sufficient incentive or bureaucratic heft to aggressively explore alternatives to the status quo. The State Department is underfunded for humanitarian activities. For a variety of reasons, the budget for all of its functions is about 1.0 percent of the federal budget. Of that, less than one-twentieth (i.e., less than 0.05 percent of the total federal budget) involves the provision of relief in humanitarian emergencies.[13] In terms of political and bureaucratic priorities humanitarian relief is, so to speak, *where the money isn't.* One consequence is that issues concerning the delivery of humanitarian relief under conditions of civil war or anarchy do not get the attention they deserve by the State Department. This is consistent with many of the observations made by students of organizations and management.

One of the most noted of these scholars, James Q. Wilson, observed that organizations with a clearly defined sense of mission and core compe-

[12] One of the basic texts on the organizational behavior model is Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).

[13] Data on the State Department budget is available online (http://www.state.gov/www/budget/2000-table-pg4.html).

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tencies deliberately underinvest their intellectual and financial capital in peripheral missions and competencies.[14] In the case of the State Department, the mission and core competency clearly revolve around the maintenance of productive diplomatic relations with well-established national governments. The productivity of state-to-state relations is measured principally in terms of economics and traditional realpolitik. Humanitarian assistance in parts of the world with minimal geopolitical or economic significance to the United States, and where the indigenous national government is either not functioning (e.g., Somalia) or is itself to blame for the violence (e.g., Rwanda and Bosnia), is understandably seen by the Department of State as peripheral to its primary mission. According to a former head of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), State Department professionals widely view assignments in humanitarian offices as damaging to their careers because they know that the department as a whole views the humanitarian mission as considerably less important than traditional diplomacy.[15]

Humanitarian relief in violent or anarchic situations is a primary mission of the Bureau of Humanitarian Response (BHR) and its subcomponent, OFDA. Both BHR and OFDA are part of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which itself is a small, independent agency subject to policy oversight by the secretary of state. If any bureaucratic agency has the incentive to improve the modalities of humanitarian relief, it ought to be BHR/OFDA. But neither has the bureaucratic throw-weight to push successfully for change.

What the Next President Must Do

A change in administration in 2001 will provide the federal government with an opportunity to rectify this situation by creating an organization with an explicit charter for identifying and promoting new approaches to relief in humanitarian emergencies. This may sound like an overly bureaucratic approach to problem solving, but it is consistent with the strategies adopted by many private sector corporations when they grasp the need to retool. Indeed, much of the scholarship concerning change in large public and private sector organizations notes the importance of top-down empowerment of those charged with reform and the establishment of organizational units with different core competencies and incentive systems.[16] Moreover,

[14] James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), chap. 6, pp. 90–110.

[15] Andrew Natsios, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. 44.

[16] John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996); Richard Tanner Pascale, *Managing on the Edge: How the Smartest Companies Use Conflict to Stay Ahead* (New York: Touchstone, 1990); Jon R. Katzenbach, "Real Change Leaders," *The McKinsey Quarterly*, 1996, no. 1, pp. 148–63; Clayton M. Christensen, *The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).

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the organization could be temporary, established with a sunset clause in its charter.

Several organizational models are readily conceivable. One would be a high-level, bipartisan presidential advisory commission charged with recommending broad policy options. Another would be a White House task force patterned after the National Performance Review chartered by the Clinton administration and chaired by the vice president. The National Performance Review was charged with streamlining various federal programs: Notwithstanding the controversy over the extent to which the National Performance Review really achieved all the savings it claimed, a similar task force could be an effective vehicle for developing new humanitarian relief policies. A more institutional approach would be to establish an assistant secretary–level unit at the State Department or a directorate on the National Security Council staff with specific responsibility for formulating and implementing new humanitarian relief policies. Any of these approaches could provide greater impetus for change.

Regardless of the exact organizational construct, it is important that the organization be at a sufficiently high level to ensure that the subject receives priority attention. In the case of an advisory commission, the members should have reputations in Congress and the media as influential statesmen. They might, for example, be former members of Congress with foreign policy expertise, or former national security advisers and secretaries of state. The model might be the Tower Commission that evaluated the charter and procedures of the National Security Council staff after the Iran-Contra affair in the Reagan administration. The Tower Commission consisted of two former senators and one former national security adviser. The advisory commission's purpose would be defeated if its members were perceived to be human rights zealots, spokespersons of relief organizations like the Red Cross, or political advisers or campaign contributors who were not chosen for a Cabinet or White House appointment.

Wherever policy recommendations originate, however, it is important that the broad policy options be coordinated with the European Community (EC) and the United Nations. Both the EC and the United Nations have organizations working in these areas: the European Community Humanitarian Office and the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. As a practical matter, humanitarian relief is almost always an international endeavor, and military interventions in humanitarian emergencies are usually multilateral. It stands to reason that the alternatives sought to military intervention should also be multilateral.

What types of policy innovations ought this proposed commission, task force, or assistant secretaryship consider? One item that is perennially on the list of unresolved issues is the relationship between national interests and humanitarianism. It is often argued that Washington should only take humanitarian action, or support U.N. interventions, when it is clearly in the

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national interests for the United States to do so.[17] A drawback to this approach is that national interests are not always clear and can, in any event, be interpreted differently by Democrats and Republicans, Congress and the president, and various segments of the American public. This would mean that, as a practical matter, firm and fast criteria may not be possible. They may not even be advisable. Explicit criteria can result in a form of triage with severe consequences for the people in regions where the United States has few geostrategic or economic interests. Extremist elements in countries such as Rwanda and Somalia might interpret explicit criteria as a green light to commit genocide, since no intervention by the United States or the United Nations would be forthcoming.

More fruitful than a quixotic search for intervention criteria would be an approach focused on ways of intervening more effectively and efficiently by building nonmilitary capabilities to provide security, airlift, and other support services in humanitarian emergencies. One of the reasons military intervention is so expensive is the high overhead of modern armed forces. Whenever U.S. forces are deployed on humanitarian missions, they use equipment that was designed to prosecute and support a war against a technologically advanced adversary. Military equipment is considerably more rugged and sophisticated than humanitarian missions ordinarily require. The substantial overhead associated with this sophisticated equipment (operator training, maintenance and repair, developmental research) inflates the cost of humanitarian intervention beyond what it could be if less rugged and sophisticated equipment were used. One could even speculate that the tremendous technological advantage which Western military forces enjoy contributed to the mission creep seen, for instance, in Somalia. If the intervening forces possessed a technological advantage sufficient to provide aid, but not so great as to tempt them into state-building, Western leaders would be immunized against the potential risks of mission creep.

Military provision of support is "efficient" only because we lack alternatives.

Overhead costs are also inflated by the understandable desire of the military to use humanitarian missions as training opportunities, or at least to shape the modus operandi of the mission so that it does not corrupt important skills and standard operating procedures. In other words, the Pentagon strives to conduct humanitarian missions in ways that are as consistent as possible with the way the armed forces prosecute and support a war effort.

[17] Johnathan Clarke, "The Conceptual Poverty of U.S. Foreign Policy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Mar. 1993, pp. 54–66. The issue of intervening only when important national interests are at stake has also been raised as an election campaign issue by Reform Party candidate Patrick Buchanan and Democratic candidate Bill Bradley. Bradley's position, as articulated in Nov. 1999, actually leaves room for intervening in the name of human rights or other important values. In other words, Bradley appears to acknowledge that intervening only on the basis of a strict interpretation of national interests is inadvisable. James Dao, "In Policy Talk, Bradley Urges More Trade and Less Force," *New York Times*, Nov. 30, 1999.

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This practice makes eminent sense from the Pentagon's point of view. It must also seem efficient from the perspective of the White House and Congress in that costly assets are being used twice. But both perspectives are too narrow. Military provision of security, logistics, and other support to humanitarian relief operations is an "efficient" option only because it is the only option. And unless and until governments examine less expensive and potentially more effective alternatives, it will remain the only option.

Models of Intervention for the Next Century

What sorts of refreshing approaches to humanitarian crises should the world community pursue? The first is robust investment in *regional security organizations*. NATO is the premier regional security structure in the world, and despite their high costs, military forces from NATO and from subsets of NATO members have been used in humanitarian missions around the globe. Regional organizations in other parts of the world may never match NATO's technological sophistication or logistics infrastructure, but one or two regional organizations could, with concerted help from the West, develop the ability to support humanitarian relief effectively and at lower cost.

There are two obvious ways in which the leading powers could assist regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, the Organization for African Unity, or ECOMAG (the military assistance group of the Economic Community of West African States) to develop their capabilities. The first is through provision of hardware. Many regional organizations need transport vehicles (e.g., armored personnel carriers), interoperable communications equipment, and other gear in order to intervene effectively under anarchic or violent conditions. For example, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Ghana offered to send peacekeepers to Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, but were unable to do so because they lacked transport vehicles and other equipment.[18] The cost of this type of assistance could be "paid" by the foreign aid budget through offsets in bilateral aid to the states in the regional organization.

To be sure, there are often doubts in the afflicted country about the motives and objectives of neighboring states that offer to intervene for "humanitarian" motives. But material aid to regional organizations could be made contingent upon their members' participation in a U.N. program designed to raise the professional standards of peacekeepers. Thus, the "beneficiaries" of an intervention could have more confidence that they would be treated fairly and that the regional forces would withdraw without taking financial or territorial advantage. This U.N. program could include training,

[18] Alex DeWaal and Omaar Rakiya, "The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response," *Current History*, Apr. 1995, pp. 156–61.

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certification of the professionalism and readiness of regional forces, and post-intervention oversight by the United States, NATO, or the United Nations. It could also include specific commitments by the regional organization to invite global media to observe all aspects of an intervention, including after-action reports.

The benefits of this option could be significant. Capable regional organizations would be considerably less expensive than NATO or U.S. military forces. Regional organizations would presumably have superior awareness of the geographic, cultural, economic, and political conditions in-country than a force cobbled together by distant NATO countries. Moreover, because of their superior knowledge of the "neighborhood" and interest in its stability, regional organizations would probably be willing to react sooner in a humanitarian crisis than would a multinational force led reluctantly by the United States or another Western power.

A second new approach that ought to be tried is improved information and intelligence. One response to certain humanitarian emergencies such as Rwanda and Bosnia has been to establish tribunals to institute legal proceedings against extremists only after the crisis has passed. Consideration could be given to a greatly expanded program of information collection about the complicity of individuals and organizations involved in fomenting ethnic violence, attacking humanitarian workers, or hijacking relief supplies. This program could encourage indigenous groups to collect documentation that might eventually be useful in a tribunal.

Another option would be to conduct information offensives targeting the perpetrators of violence against relief workers and the hijackers of relief supplies. The information offensive would attempt gradually to undercut any local support or sympathy for the groups responsible for such attacks. This could be done by educating people in-country about the consequences of the attack, such as the number of people who would not be fed because the supplies had been stolen, or the possibility that if attacks continue all relief operations in the country might be terminated. Tools for such an information offensive could include local private and government television, radio, and press outlets. When these outlets are inadequate or uncooperative, or the local government has ceased functioning, communications equipment could be introduced under U.N. auspices. The functional equivalent of "pirate" radio or television stations could be set up to conduct the information offensive and pamphlets air-dropped over population centers. To be sure, fears for the security of the information operation were what prevented the United Nations from setting up a radio station in Burundi in 1996 to counter ethnic "hate radio" broadcasts.[19] But protecting a small number of stationary broadcast sites is not an inherently daunting task.

[19] "In Face of Large-Scale Killings, Urgent Calls for Dialogue and Contingency Planning," *UN Chronicle*, Summer 1996, pp. 43–44.

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Last but not least, a new approach to humanitarian interventions must consider light security forces. One way of reducing the financial and opportunity costs of the status quo would be to develop nonmilitary capabilities for protecting relief operations. Security forces designed and developed for the sole purpose of protecting relief operations would be considerably lighter than forces drawn from active-duty military. This idea has been resisted by the defense establishment, which has sought to demonstrate the military's flexibility in serving the nation and take advantage of the training opportunities that relief missions can provide to transportation, logistics, and medical units. As noted above, fulfilling these desires makes sense from the perspective of the defense establishment, but results in suboptimal responses to humanitarian crises.

Consideration should thus be given to developing different configurations of light forces (or heavy police forces) that could be fielded on an experimental or pilot-test basis in small relief operations for the purpose of evaluating their suitability for larger missions. Light security forces would obviously not be suitable for humanitarian missions requiring heavy application of force, as was the case in Kosovo, but they could well provide security to supply depots, relief worker base camps, and food convoys threatened by unruly mobs, criminals, and street gangs. In other words, light security forces could suffice in situations such as Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.

This list of options is plainly not exhaustive, and developing new tools to deal with humanitarian crises will be a matter of trial and error as well as imagination and politics. But there is no question that the next administration should commission a new high-profile organization to promote innovative approaches to humanitarian relief. For if it does not, inertial agencies, governments, and international organizations will stumble along in the Twilight Zone, and the nightmare scenario described above will persist.

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Review Essays

Imagining Wars Yet to Come

by Bruce D. Berkowitz

Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age. By Paul Bracken. (New York: HarperCollins, 1999. 186 pp. $25.00.)

The Rosy Future of War. By Philippe Delmas. (New York: The Free Press, 1995. 236 pp. $24.00.)

The Changing Role of Information in Warfare. Edited by Zalmay M. Khalilzad and John P. White. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999. 452 pp. $25.00.)

Strategic Information Warfare Rising. By Roger C. Molander et al. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998. 82 pp. $15.00, paper.)

If there was a specific point in time when one could say the Soviet threat collapsed, it might have been March 1, 1990. That was the information cut-off date for a special memorandum prepared by U.S. intelligence for top government officials. It concluded that, as of that date, "Soviet defense planners would judge [Warsaw] Pact forces *incapable* of conducting a theater strategic offensive *even after full mobilization of reserves and deployment of standing forces within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) zone.*"[1]

For forty-five years U.S. military officials had prepared for a war against the Soviet bloc in Europe. Now, the CIA judged, such a war was no longer possible, and that meant, in effect, that the United States lost the yardstick it had used to measure its own military forces. Without such a yardstick, military planning is harder. What kinds of forces does the United

[1] See "The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact," memo, NIC M 90-10002 (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, Apr. 1990). A declassified version was published in *At Cold War's End: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989–1991*, ed. Benjamin B. Fischer (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), p. 321 (emphasis in original).

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States now need? How much and how many? And where should they be prepared to deploy? Ten years after the end of the Cold War, military planners are still trying to answer those questions.

It is obvious that the world remains a dangerous place. Even so, no one has provided a succinct, comprehensive, or convincing picture of the next war. Little wonder that the United States currently is fielding roughly the same army, navy, and air force that it built to deter or defeat the Soviet Union. To be sure, American forces are somewhat smaller than they were a decade ago, but that reflects natural attrition and declining budgets. It is also true that the armed services have introduced weapons such as new precision-guided munitions, the B-2 bomber, and JSTARS surveillance aircraft. However, these weapons were already in the pipeline and are really leftovers from Cold War research and development. Hence, our currently downsized forces and smarter weapons do not necessarily reflect any new systematic plan.

The four books reviewed here do not tell us everything about what the next war may look like. But they are steps in the right direction, because each identifies an important emerging development that will shape future military threats to U.S. security.

In *Fire In The East*, Paul Bracken analyzes a fundamentally important geopolitical change currently underway. A professor at Yale and contributing editor to *Orbis*, Bracken first gained a reputation for his writings about command and control systems.[2] He pointed out that nuclear deterrence depends as much on the invulnerability of communications links and command and control centers as on the nuclear weapons themselves. If these links and centers are vulnerable, even a weaker adversary could potentially render U.S. forces ineffective. In effect, Bracken applied the age-old principle of "hit 'em where they're weakest" to argue for the central importance in the potential targeting of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I) in military planning.

This emphasis on "weak links" that can leave even a powerful military force vulnerable to an apparently less capable adversary has since developed into a larger discussion of "asymmetrical strategies," which is essential to Bracken's thesis. According to such an analysis, U.S. military strength does not depend only on how many more missiles or tanks we have relative to our potential adversaries. Rather, we should anticipate that our adversaries will plan their forces and operations to attack U.S. forces at their most vulnerable points. The forces they may develop to strike those weak points could look quite different from our own.

In his new book, Bracken notes three important facts. The first is that Asian countries are developing their own, home-grown military industries. For years, Westerners thought Japan, China, India, and other Asian countries

[2] See Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).

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were merely aping the United States and European powers in weapons development. This is implicit when one hears an official say, "China *lags* the United States in the design of miniature nuclear warheads," suggesting that the Chinese are trodding the same path, but remain well behind. In reality, these countries are not merely copying us. They are developing militarily useful technologies with their own ingenuity and—even more important—according to their own military strategies.

The second fact Bracken notes is Asian geography. The Soviet threat during the Cold War was concentrated primarily in Europe, a relatively small region in which population centers are tightly clustered, transportation is constrained to narrow channels, and armies face each other on compact, linear fronts. Asia, notes Bracken, could not be more different. The distances between population centers are vast, as are the military fronts that must be defended or breached.

Even more important, the United States has only a tenuous toehold on the Asian mainland. Even though U.S. military planners knew that the ability of the United States to send reinforcements to Europe was essential to a NATO victory, the task was potentially achievable. The United States had a major presence throughout Western Europe and was thoroughly integrated in its political, economic, and military structures. In Asia, by contrast, the United States has only a thin, delicate string of allies, bases, and defense commitments reaching from Korea to Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines, stretched around a land mass containing a billion Chinese to the north, a billion Indians to the south, and hundreds of millions of Indonesians and Southeast Asians in between.

This is a most unfavorable geopolitical situation, and Bracken explains how emerging Asian powers are developing weapons and strategies to exploit American disadvantages. For example, ballistic missiles armed with nuclear or chemical warheads can cover the vast Asian distances quickly to destroy the far-flung bases the United States needs to defend its position in the region. In this context, North Korea's efforts to design even a rudimentary nuclear missile force make sense, and comparisons between the size of the Chinese navy and the U.S. Seventh Fleet are clearly less relevant than one might otherwise think.

The third fact Bracken notes is Asian nationalism and the desire of Asians to assert their own leadership in world affairs. As several authors have observed, there is a growing resistance by Asians, Africans, and even Europeans to what they perceive as an attempt by the United States to impose its hegemony over the world. There is also significant resentment by many of these people at what they perceive as the arrogance of Americans in imposing their values on other societies. These feelings are especially acute in the great civilizations of China and India, which view themselves as custodians of cultures that antedate America's liberal, capitalist "McWorld" by centuries, if not millennia. Even if geography and technology did not give Asians the

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opportunity to challenge the U.S. position in the region, they would not lack for the motivation.

Having drawn a clear picture of the perilous situation, however, Bracken is less sure about remedies. But his argument explaining why the "solutions" offered to date—arms control, for example—are likely to fail is at least the first step toward developing more effective policies. Bracken's implicit theme is that U.S. analysts have lost the cozy framework they used in the past to develop strategy and plans, and that the emerging future will be more confusing and less comfortable.

In *The Rosy Future of War*, Philippe Delmas, a French national security analyst, offers an analysis from a similar perspective, but with a different emphasis. Like Bracken, Delmas observes that great changes are afoot in technology, economics, and politics. More countries and nonstate actors have access to advanced military technology. Deregulation and global communication are breaking down the ability of national governments to control trade. Ethnic groups within countries are challenging the authority of national governments. However, where Bracken focuses on the challenge that emerging Asian states will soon present to U.S. interests, Delmas is more of a nihilist. He warns of the general breakdown of international order:

> The world is without precedent. It is as different from the Cold War as it is from the Middle Ages, so the past offers no basis for comparison. The planet continues to become more and more unified and at the same time more and more fragmented, and the distinction between war and peace is getting lost. There are no more world wars, but instead we have local wars, which have increased in cruelty and multiplied to record numbers. . . . Legal and economic integrations (*sic*) keep on growing, but they are powerless to keep the peace, because war cannot be stopped by wealth or by laws (p. 213).

The result, Delmas predicted when he wrote his book four years ago, would be a plethora of messy conflicts among subnational groups, sometimes within a country, sometimes overlapping boundaries. Events have borne out his prediction: in the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, the Kurdish homelands, and many other areas, especially in Africa. But his term "small wars" hardly conveys their essence. The first Russian effort to quash the Chechen resistance in the mid-1990s resulted, according to some reports, in the loss of up to 80,000 lives. Iraq resorted to the use of nerve gas in its war against the Kurds. And the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir recently raised fears of a nuclear exchange.

Delmas believes the problem has been compounded because international organizations such as the United Nations are impotent and industrialized democracies are reluctant to become entangled (to use Neville Chamberlain's words) in "a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing." The risk is that the costs of such wars can spill over boundaries as refugees seek shelter and combatants try to turn a war to their

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favor by drawing in great power patrons. The credibility of international institutions and national governments worldwide will be further damaged if they do not take action.

How should the leading industrial democracies cope, in light of international organizations' proven ineffectiveness? Delmas recommends that the great powers act through regional pacts such as NATO or, if necessary, through ad hoc alliances. But since they cannot intervene everywhere, they should perform a sort of triage, with their highest priority being to support the stability of democratic governments, especially in Europe. In effect, Delmas is advocating the kinds of intervention exemplified by Operation Allied Force in the former Yugoslavia.

It is likely that some will criticize Delmas's prescription because it leads to moral inconsistencies. During the Cold War, Americans and their allies had a clear goal all could support (in principle, if not in application): deter the Soviet Union and wait for its regime to mellow out or collapse. In effect, the objective was to maintain the peace while containing communism. The goal of the new policy is simply to avoid war wherever possible, implying that cases exist in which the United States should take no action. The result is that American leaders need to explain not only why they intervene in the Persian Gulf or the Balkans, but also why they are *not* intervening in Rwanda, Congo, Chechnya, or East Timor.

Technology May Trump Geography

Whereas Bracken and Delmas focus on hypothetical future wars driven largely by geopolitics, a team of four scholars at RAND examines the potential for future conflict driven mainly by technology. In *Strategic Information Warfare Rising*, Roger Molander, Peter Wilson, David Mussington, and Richard Mesic have written a short but informative overview. (In the interest of disclosure, the reviewer admits to serving as a consultant to RAND.)

Advanced societies today have become extremely dependent on information systems—communications, computers, and other things that process data. This is most clear in the United States, where the information revolution has fueled a nine-year economic boom. But the effects of that evolution are global. Pacific Rim and Latin American countries have enjoyed an economic boom of their own, based in large part on the manufacture of electronic hardware. Caribbean countries have provided low-cost data entry services. Even countries such as India that have an overall low level of economic development have carved out high-tech niches for themselves by producing software. Most important, low-cost information technology is available worldwide and is being used for military as well as commercial applications.

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As countries have become more dependent on information technology, they have also become more vulnerable to attack. In the past, the most effective way to defeat a country in war was to attack its forces on the battlefield. Now it may be far more effective to attack the information systems on which those weapons depend, or the information systems that support a country's industrial base.

According to Molander and his colleagues, we are now in the "first generation" of information warfare (or IW, as it is called in defense circles), in which information warfare operations are integrated into an overall military plan. For example, in Operation Allied Force the United States reportedly penetrated the computer systems controlling Serbia's air defense network, making it safer for U.S. bombers to attack their targets.[3] In "second generation IW," the RAND team postulates, information operations may be the primary means through which the United States brings down its military opponents. For example, U.S. forces might freeze an enemy's communications systems so that its military forces are utterly paralyzed, and then attack the information systems that its civilian infrastructure requires to function.

Molander has directed several IW games during the past five years, using representatives from the Defense Department, intelligence community, industry, and academia as players. He and his colleagues have demonstrated how the United States might carry out IW—and also how the United States might be attacked. Through these exercises, he and his colleagues have presented several IW scenarios and identified many of the issues that the U.S. government must address to deal with the potential of IW. For example, what kinds of IW capabilities should the United States seek? Should it seek dominance? What is required to achieve this objective? What are American strengths and vulnerabilities in an IW scenario? What policy guidelines are necessary to guide U.S. military commanders in the use of IW?

To answer these questions, Molander and his colleagues use a methodology based on past RAND studies that analyzed options in a strategic nuclear war. The investigators postulate several alternative "end states." For example, in one case the United States may enjoy global dominance in IW; in another it may be competitive, but not dominant. The analysts then work backwards to assess what conditions would have to be met to achieve these end states. The resulting conditions then form the basis for policy options that officials would need to adopt. Alas, RAND, chartered to serve as an impartial advisor to the government, does not recommend one option over another. But the importance of IW for America's future security is clearly established.

The fourth book, *The Changing Role of Information in Warfare*, is also a RAND study and gathers fourteen essays examining the broader issue of how the information revolution will affect national security policy. The

[3] See Robert Wall, "USAF Expands Infowar Arsenal," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, Nov. 15, 1999, p. 102.

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editors, Zalmay M. Khalilzad and John P. White, reinforce the importance of information technology and the opportunities and vulnerabilities it is fashioning for the United States.

The information revolution is the force behind what has come to be called the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The term is often attributed to Andrew Marshall, director of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessments, and accordingly Marshall has written the forward to this book. Thanks to better, lower-cost information systems, commanders are able to create communications networks that provide a clearer view of the entire battlefield. This technology also makes possible precision-guided munitions that greatly increase the probability of destroying a target with a single shot. These technologies are supposed to make possible military forces that are smaller, more maneuverable, and more able to achieve their objectives with fewer casualties. Proponents of the RMA first cited the overwhelming success of U.S.-led forces in Operation Desert Storm as a vindication of their view, but Operation Allied Force in the Balkans would seem to provide further proof.

In this collection of essays, the authors look at a broad range of issues. They examine the economic, social, and policy conditions that are required to cultivate the kind of information technologies on which the RMA depends. But the essays also try to see beyond the RMA by examining how the information revolution will allow entirely new kinds of offensive capabilities (among them, IW). They also consider how new information technologies and practices for using information will affect defense planning, tactics, and civil-military relations.

The U.S. may be most vulnerable to IW attacks.

The contributors show that the information revolution will create new opportunities for U.S. officials, but also new problems. For example, the United States is at least as vulnerable to IW attacks as its potential adversaries, and perhaps more so, because no other country depends so much on information technology. Thus, while the impact of a successful IW attack against the systems controlling transportation in Somalia would be small, the impact of a similar successful IW attack on commercial transportation in the United States would be huge (although the attack itself would be difficult to orchestrate).

Moreover, the U.S. military depends on the commercial sector for communications, transportation, and other support. Thus, its opponents are at least as likely to concentrate on U.S. civilian targets as on military targets. Imagine the difficulty U.S. military forces would have in attempting to deploy in the Middle East or the Korean Peninsula in the event an enemy succeeded in crippling the information systems supporting U.S. harbors and airports or the damage that the United States would suffer if an enemy succeeded in attacking its financial institutions. Indeed, because the U.S. military and commerce are so dependent on information systems, and because the cost of developing some form of IW capability is so low, targeting these systems has

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become another example of the asymmetric capabilities that opponents of the United States are likely to try to develop.

As one might expect in a collection of essays by several authors—each with his own focus and set of concerns—the book provides no clear conclusion, and the collection as a whole appears somewhat disjointed. (As an associate member of the RAND community, the reviewer freely admits that trying to develop consensus among more than two RAND researchers is like trying to herd cats, and brokering agreement between even two—or one—is a trial.) So the best way to appreciate this collection is to consider it as a smorgasbord rather than a *prix fixe* menu.

A consistent underlying message nonetheless emerges from all of these books. It is not only that the threat of war with the Soviet Union has been replaced by many threats of different kinds of war, none of which is likely to reach Cold War levels of angst for the foreseeable future, but also that the threats that will emerge are bound to be much more complex. The Soviet threat was singular and enduring. Partly because of the nature of the Soviet system and partly because of the nature of twentieth-century technology, the threat changed incrementally and along a predictable path. Future military threats, as these books demonstrate, will be more varied, emerge from many directions, and materialize rapidly. Moreover, they are more likely to be aimed at precisely those areas in which the United States is most at risk.

Therefore, the challenge for U.S. military planning is not simply one of mustering adequate forces to meet a specific new threat. It is to develop a planning process and a military organization that are sufficiently agile and adaptable to respond to new threats, whatever their form or source.

This challenge is unlike any the United States has faced before. Unfortunately, the country has allowed almost a decade to pass without undertaking the changes U.S. armed forces need to make in order to adapt to this new environment. Instead, the three components of military planning under the Clinton administration during the 1990s have been drawdown, inertia, and the search for military missions other than combat. Nor has the response of the administration's critics been much more useful: a general reluctance to use military force under any conditions, combined with a call for larger defense budgets without explaining how more dollars translate into more capability.

Adapting the U.S. military for future wars will require measures that go far beyond the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the 1980s. It will probably require entirely new approaches to both the military planning process and how the U.S. military organizes itself to fight. It will also require rethinking how defense dollars are spent. Recent decisions to press ahead with weapons designed for an earlier age, such as the army's 110-ton Crusader artillery system and the air force's F-22 Raptor fighter, combined with decisions to cancel innovative systems such as the navy's low-manpower "arsenal ship," are not encouraging. To be sure, public opinion made it inevitable that the

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United States would freeze major weapons procurement during the 1990s. But the country would have been better off using the opportunity to cut off the existing family trees of weapons systems, force structure, and doctrine, and start from scratch where necessary. We shall no doubt have to wait until after the presidential election to get another chance to prepare for our uncertain future.

Trachtenberg on Europe's Cold War Chessboard
by Timothy Naftali

A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963. By Marc Trachtenberg. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. 448 pp. $60; $19.95, paper.)

International relations are messy. States are more than neat billiard balls caroming off each other with predictable regularity. As actors in the drama of international politics, they are an amalgam of capabilities and intentions, misunderstanding and malfeasance. Nor are states the only players of note. The public demonstrations at the 1999 Seattle conclave of the World Trade Organization were a reminder of how sub-state actors—domestic unions, international political movements, and boys dressed in black—can apply pressure with decisive results. Yet, every so often, despite these layers of complexity, international relations seem to approach equipoise. In the narrative of international affairs, these periods of relative peace are called settlements. In William Langer's classic studies of international history, settlements reflected the enlightened self-interest of the most powerful states. Thus, Otto von Bismarck, the German chancellor and architect of the long peace before World War I, did not so much restructure Europe as deftly forge alliances between countries that "had been for years groping in the dark to join hands."[1]

Over a decade ago, Marc Trachtenberg set out to explain the strange peace that prevailed in Europe between the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Like all European settlements since 1871 (if not 1648), this required solving the German question. But the Cold War solution involved breaking Germany in two, hence the settlement that brought her a lengthy peace could not be the brainchild of a German mind. The result of Tracht-

[1] William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890*, 2nd. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1950), p. 505.

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enberg's quest is *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963*. It is a masterwork of international history based on path-breaking research in Western archives, and its controversial thesis is sure to define future debates about the roots of the Cold War in Europe.

Trachtenberg offers up no "Bismarck." During the Cold War, no president, chancellor, or Soviet general secretary could single-handedly orchestrate stability in Central Europe. Instead, Trachtenberg's story is that of many hands, West European, American, and Soviet alike, groping in the dark, sometimes (though not always) in search of each other. And unlike the system that developed out of the head of Bismarck in the 1870s, there would not be just one Cold War settlement in Europe, but three. Two were failures and only the last one took.

What made the Cold War so unusual in world politics was that for nearly fifty years European stability depended on two non-European powers. The 1945 Potsdam agreements and the 1954 Paris Accords, two serious attempts at getting things right in Central Europe, both failed because they never enjoyed the simultaneous support of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Potsdam settlement, which established the basis for four-power administration of occupied Germany, lasted only a year. U.S. secretary of state James Byrnes never really believed in letting the Russians participate in decisions about the three western zones, and then Soviet misbehavior in Turkey and Iran in 1946 turned President Truman as well against four-power administration and the sharing of German reparations among the former allies. Warped by mistrust and the rising passions of the Cold War, four-power administration soon dissolved into a Germany with two masters, one in the west and one in the east.

The second attempt at answering the German question failed for similar reasons. The Paris Accords of 1954 were based on the recognition that Germany was effectively occupied by two antagonistic military alliances and that the Federal Republic of Germany would be integrated into the Western defense alliance. Although Trachtenberg's general opinion of the Soviet Union is that it was aggressive and expansionist, he lays primary blame for the collapse of the Paris settlement on the United States. A series of miscalculations by President Eisenhower and his administration set the stage for its demise.

Trachtenberg is nothing short of brilliant in teasing out the unintended consequences of the Eisenhower administration's NATO strategy. One may disagree with the argument, which admittedly has certain weaknesses, but that does not detract from the clarity of Trachtenberg's presentation. Eisenhower comes under severe criticism for lacking the strategic empathy that allowed Bismarck to understand the ambitions and terrors of his adversaries. Arguing that the key to any successful European settlement was Allied containment of German militarism, Trachtenberg decries Eisenhower's shortsighted attempt to reduce U.S. defense spending by introducing more

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burden sharing in NATO. "Allies should be treated as allies," Eisenhower said publicly in 1960, "not as junior members of a firm who are to be seen but not heard." When Eisenhower included nuclear weapons as an asset that might well be shared with the European allies, the Paris settlement was doomed. Not only did this public flirtation with a German bomb feed dark tendencies in West Germany, but it also unsettled the Soviet leadership to such an extent that Stalin's successors were willing to risk war on three successive occasions rather than acquiesce in any major militarization of the Bonn republic.

By paying such close attention to the changes in American attitudes toward German power in the 1950s, Trachtenberg provides an elegant explanation for the protracted Berlin Crisis of 1958–1963. Unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin Crisis—which was a greater preoccupation of American and European analysts at the time—still lacks thoroughgoing historical analysis. There is, as yet, no one-volume international history of the crisis. In *A Constructed Peace*, the crisis emerges as Khrushchev's personal response to the dangers inherent in the Eisenhower strategy of nuclear diffusion. Sensing that Washington was no longer committed to the containment of Germany, Khrushchev became impatient with the lack of a lasting equilibrium in Central Europe. This is, Trachtenberg believes, what lay behind Moscow's startling ultimatum of November 1958, which called for the liquidation of what remained of the Potsdam agreement and the division of Berlin into four occupation zones, and also included demands that West Berlin become a "free" city and that East Germany be recognized as a sovereign state.

Sleuthing Out Soviet Motives

Trachtenberg argues that a lasting European settlement was possible when both superpowers, particularly the United States, finally came to grips with the roots of the Berlin Crisis. Stability returned to Central Europe as soon as the Kennedy administration understood that it had to reassert the U.S. position of containing German power, and that the Kremlin needed assurances that Bonn would never be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons or in any other way pose a significant threat to European security. In 1963 Kennedy formally rejected plans developed by his own State Department for a multilateral nuclear force, a more sophisticated means to achieve the Eisenhower goal of a European nuclear deterrent. And once Washington backed away from nuclear sharing with Germany, the center of Europe became peaceful for the next twenty-five years.

The flaw in this otherwise persuasive account is Trachtenberg's discussion of Soviet motives. Essential to his explanation of the failures at settlement in the late 1950s and the final success in 1963 is the assumption that what lay behind Khrushchev's initiation of the long Berlin Crisis of 1958–1963 was a desire to prevent a nuclearized West Germany. The evidence in support of this thesis is, at best, fragmentary. Another careful

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scholar, Hope Harrison, has written that months before Khrushchev launched the Berlin Crisis, Presidium member Anastas Mikoyan warned Konrad Adenauer of the folly of trying to acquire nuclear weapons.[2] KGB-era materials from the SVR, the foreign intelligence services of the Russian Federation, indicate that the KGB collected a lot of material for the Kremlin in the late 1950s on the rearmament of West Germany.[3] But perhaps the most intriguing information comes from Oleg Troianovskii, Khrushchev's former speechwriter, who has argued in his memoirs that fear of a nuclear Germany may well have pushed Khrushchev to opt for a series of "shock treatments" to move the West toward his vision of European security.[4]

Unfortunately, there is not enough relevant Kremlin evidence to interpret these fragments. Despite the excitement over selective releases from Soviet archives, the key decision-making materials for the first half of the Cold War—those of the Politburo or Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—remain locked away in an archive controlled by the Russian president, and little of it is available for research. In fact, scholars have been able to consult Politburo records covering only a few topics dating from the twenty-year-long Stalin-Khrushchev phase of the Cold War: Korea in 1949–1950, Eastern Europe in 1956, and Cuba from 1958 to 1963. As yet, no Kremlin files on Berlin and the German question have been opened. The two best works on Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, those by Hope Harrison and Vladislav Zubok, draw on lower-level documents from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Russian Foreign Ministry, and on the more plentiful East German materials.[5]

The lack of suitable sources, however, does not mean that historians must be complete agnostics about the sources of Soviet conduct. Enough evidence exists to discern certain significant patterns in the Khrushchev period, at least. Despite all of their public bluster, Kremlin leaders were well aware of the vulnerability of the Soviet Union. From the high-level table talk available, it is clear that the very existence of American power constituted a looming threat. Yet this recognition of strategic weakness did not translate into strategic caution. The Soviets were prepared to take the initiative in foreign policy, but they usually preferred to do so in secret to avoid any precipitate U.S. response. The impression, therefore, is that of a weak power

[2] Hope Harrison, *Ulbricht and the Concrete "Rose:" New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet–East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1961*, Working Paper No. 5, Cold War International History Project (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, May 1993). See footnote 43 of that paper for the discussion of Mikoyan's visit in April 1958 to Bonn.

[3] David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 308–10.

[4] Oleg Troianovskii, *Cherez Gody i Rasstoiania* (Through Time and Space) (Moscow: Vagrius, 1997), pp. 210–11.

[5] See Harrison, *Ulbricht and the Concrete "Rose"*; and Vladislav Zubok, *Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958–1962)*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993).

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led by men with big ambitions, whose preferred modus operandi was the *fait accompli*.[6] Outside Central Europe, the Soviets were eager revisionists, seeking changes in the balance of power. In the late 1950s, the Soviets made major investments in Egypt, Indonesia, India, and ultimately Cuba in search of influence. Within Europe, the Soviet pattern was to confirm the audacious gains of the Second World War. The process of consolidation was only just completed—Czechoslovakia was not firmly within the Soviet zone until 1948—when Stalin died, and seemed about to unravel throughout the Khrushchev years.

The evidence from the other side of the hill sustains Trachtenberg's view that Berlin mattered to Khrushchev. But in arguing that the Kremlin was prepared to hinge decisions of cooperation or conflict on how Washington managed West German power, Trachtenberg underestimates the broader symbolic meaning of Berlin for Khrushchev. A look at the so-called Pen Pal letters between Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy suggests that the German question was a general barometer of superpower relations and the level of mistrust, albeit not necessarily the *cause* of that mistrust. From the fall of 1961, the two leaders exchanged remarkably candid messages outside the ordinary channels of diplomacy. As shown by his behavior at the Vienna summit in June 1961, Khrushchev could be brutally frank about his country's demands and the consequences of their not being met. Yet not once in the Pen Pal letters, which contain proposals and counterproposals, does Khrushchev suggest that his primary concern is the growth of German military power. Occasionally it is mentioned among a laundry list of reasons why Khrushchev wanted, as he put it, that "finally the line should be drawn under the Second World War."[7] Instead, he stresses the achievement of a German peace treaty that recognized two German states, removed the occupation forces, and established a "a Free City of West Berlin." Nowhere does Khrushchev ever suggest a trade between recognition of the status quo in West Berlin and a nonnuclear West Germany.

A West German nuclear force was apparently not Khrushchev's main concern.

It was not like Khrushchev to hide his demands under a fig leaf of respectability. The peace of Europe would be "under constant threat," he warned, "until the countries that participated in the [Second World] war recognize and formalize the results of the war in a German peace treaty."[8] This meant legal recognition of the postwar borders of the two German states. Khrushchev seems to have believed that right-wing sentiment in West Germany was strong enough to jeopardize Poland's territorial gains at the ex-

[6] See, for instance, Kremlin discussions in 1958 and 1959 about military supplies to Cuba. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).

[7] Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy, May 12, 1961, in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter, *FRUS*), vol. 6, 1961–1963, pp. 20–21.

[8] Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy, Sept. 29, 1961, in *FRUS*, vol. 6, p. 29.

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pense of eastern Germany in 1945. By early 1962, he listed as his priorities in Central Europe: recognition and due respect for sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic; "the non-arming of the two German states with nuclear weapons and barring them from producing those weapons"; and a nonaggression pact.[9] The nuclear issue appears, but not at the head of Khrushchev's list.

The conundrum for the historian is that Kennedy, in early 1962, was prepared to yield on almost all of these points, especially the matter of a German nuclear force, yet Khrushchev did not ease the pressure on West Berlin. In February of that year, Kennedy specifically addressed the nuclear West Germany issue: "I am certain that these concerns could be satisfactorily met if an understanding could be achieved."[10]

Given that Khrushchev had all of the elements of a settlement at that time, why did he spurn it? If, as Trachtenberg argues, Soviet revisionism in Central Europe sprang from fears of a German finger on the nuclear button, why did the Berlin Crisis not end once and for all in February 1962? One explanation is that Khrushchev remained concerned about the viability of East Germany, and until that issue was satisfactorily resolved Berlin remained a problem for the Kremlin. Trachtenberg discusses the possibility that the crisis was about stabilizing East Germany (a position identified with the scholarship of Hope Harrison), but he is unpersuaded. Harrison's work demonstrates that in the Khrushchev era Moscow was under strong pressure from East German leader Walter Ulbricht to seek international recognition for East Germany and expel NATO from West Berlin. And the Kremlin responded, to a certain extent. In cooperation with their East German allies, the Soviets imposed travel restrictions, tightened control over rail and road traffic across East Germany into West Berlin, and raised the volume on their propaganda campaign aimed at West Berliners.

All imperial metropoles face pressures from the periphery. But the Khrushchev era is probably unique in Soviet history due to the panoply of challenges mounted to Soviet hegemony during those years. The end of Stalinist tyranny fed hopes of liberation in Eastern Europe, and no Kremlin leader could forget that Berlin had been the scene of the first open challenge to the World War II settlement in the uprising of June 1953. Between 1953 and the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution in November 1956, Central Europe was rocked by political earthquakes in Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Simultaneously, the Kremlin faced a challenge from China, which at the Bucharest meeting in 1960 openly challenged Soviet leadership of the Socialist camp. It must not have been easy to dismiss the East German regime's concerns about its survival, and perhaps a sense of impending crisis contributed to Khrushchev's willingness to make Berlin a test of wills.

But new evidence from the former Eastern Bloc suggests that Khrush-

[9] Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy, n.d. (Jan./Feb. 1962), in *FRUS*, vol. 6, p. 82.
[10] John F. Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev, Feb. 15, 1962, in *FRUS*, vol. 6, p. 94.

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chev could also be pragmatic about Berlin. He modulated Soviet pressure on West Berlin and was prepared at times to tell his allies, particularly the East Germans, to be patient. Days after Kennedy offered a settlement in 1962, for example, Khrushchev explained to Ulbricht that he had to calm down. East Germany was too vulnerable at that moment to risk pressing the Americans to the wall over a peace treaty. "One must consider the situation realistically," counseled Khrushchev, ". . . the main question, however, is not the peace treaty, but a consolidation of the economic situation."[11] Interestingly, the East Germans seemed more sensitive than the Soviets to the perils of waiting. In fact, they were the ones who made the point to Khrushchev, at least in 1962, that the march of time made it ever more likely that Bonn would get the bomb. Khrushchev, however, seemed to have other, bigger things in mind and ignored his East German allies. In the summer of 1962 he once again threatened to sign a German peace treaty, and the Kennedy administration rushed to prepare for a possible military clash in Central Europe.

Khrushchev understood that West Berlin was as much of a strategic headache for the Americans as East Germany was for him. A hundred miles inside East Germany, the city was an indefensible capitalist enclave. Apparently, he understood Berlin to be a useful button to press whenever he wished to distract the United States, and referred to Berlin as a foot corn, on which he could apply pressure whenever the need arose. The utility of Berlin becomes quite clear when one looks at the Soviet leader's options. If he wished to take the initiative in the Cold War—or sought to retard Western gains—what cards did he have to play? He could irritate the United States in Cuba, but there the balance of power was not in the Kremlin's favor. The situation was better for the Socialist bloc in Indochina, but by 1959 Soviet relations with China had begun to sour dramatically, and Beijing was a major power in that region. Berlin, by contrast, was a military trap for the West, a symbol of the Soviet victory over Hitler, and a stopcock to prevent a further economic and human drain from East Germany. To be sure, it was understandable for the Soviets to fear a Bundeswehr armed with nuclear weapons, but in the late 1950s it was just one of many potential Soviet fears.

Kremlin discussions during the Hungarian crisis of 1956 provide powerful evidence that Khrushchev was capable of thinking in terms of a global balance of power. The Politburo dithered over the reintroduction of troops into Budapest in late October 1956 until news arrived of the Anglo-French attack on the Suez Canal. Hearing these reports, Khrushchev exploded, seeing the Western challenge to Soviet influence in the Middle East as a challenge to Soviet power everywhere. Kremlin opposition to an aggressive move against Budapest virtually disappeared as Khrushchev and most of

[11] "Discussion Between Khrushchev and Ulbricht in Moscow, 26 February 1962," trans. Douglas Selvage, from the former East German Archives, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Winter 1998, issue 11, document 3, p. 225.

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his colleagues interpreted a show of force as necessary to quell the possibility of further challenges to their authority.[12]

Khrushchev's ability to link challenges in the Middle East to those in Eastern Europe suggests that he might well have been capable of exploiting Berlin in order to achieve general international gains and/or specific gains in some other region. The logic of using Berlin as "shock therapy," a term employed by Troianovskii, makes sense if the goal were something outside Germany. Khrushchev's initiation of the Berlin Crisis coincided with his efforts to raise the international profile of the USSR, making it a player for the first time in the Third World. Perhaps forcing the United States to relinquish West Berlin was a bid by the Soviet leader to formalize the achievement of superpower status. The very competitive Khrushchev well recalled that in 1948 Stalin had been unable to get his way in Berlin. In 1962, perhaps Khrushchev's motive for harassing Berlin changed. His reanimation of the Berlin Crisis in the summer of 1962 coincided with Operation ANADYR, the secret deployment of massive military might, including nuclear missiles, to Cuba. The Berlin bogey turned out to be useful in confusing Kennedy about the significance of events in the Caribbean. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the conditions under which Khrushchev's manufactured Berlin Crisis, especially the phase in 1962, could have achieved the European aims Trachtenberg assigns to it. If anything, Khrushchev's demands were guaranteed to stir West German fears of abandonment by Washington and oblige Washington to pay *more* attention to Bonn's dreams of a nuclearized Bundeswehr. Or, if an American president accepted an agreement with Moscow, then the Khrushchev initiative might prompt Konrad Adenauer to go it alone or move closer to France's Charles de Gaulle. Indeed, Kennedy warned Khrushchev in 1962, "further pressures on the West in Berlin only increase the pressure within France and the Federal Republic of Germany to build a greater military force, to secure an independent nuclear capacity and to adopt a more rigid attitude on any accommodation."[13]

The Status Quo and the 1963 Settlement

Trachtenberg's thesis encounters still more trouble as the book reaches the settlement of 1963. The Kennedy-Khrushchev détente and the ensuing settlement make no sense if Berlin was the cause of it all because in 1962 or early 1963 nothing happened in or around Berlin to warrant a change in Soviet perceptions of the threat from West Germany. Trachtenberg's explanation is that Khrushchev perceived that Kennedy had rejected the policy of creating a multilateral force and was prepared to reassert American

[12] Mark Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises," pp. 358–84 and "The 'Malin Notes' on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956," pp. 385–410, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, issues 8–9, Winter 1996/1997.

[13] Kennedy to Khrushchev, Feb. 15, 1962.

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"containment" of West Germany. Yet there is no evidence that the Kremlin understood this was happening, let alone that it was a prime factor in Khrushchev's thinking. What we do know is that Khrushchev abruptly changed his policy on nuclear testing in the summer of 1963. Trachtenberg makes much of the signing of the partial test ban as symbolic of a resolution of the nuclear Germany problem, and therefore of the Berlin problem.

The evolution of Khrushchev's policy on the test ban, however, suggests that a different dynamic was at work. The three declared nuclear powers—the United States, Britain, and the USSR—could not agree on a verification regime for a comprehensive test ban. Many of the same arguments that doomed congressional passage of a comprehensive test ban in 1999 also limited Kennedy's ability to negotiate in 1961–63. He understood that the Russians could always cheat, but he wished to complicate cheating enough to prevent the Soviets' achieving nuclear superiority. But to complicate the Soviet ability to cheat, the United States needed to have the right to inspect suspicious explosions detected by seismic stations on Soviet soil. Because Khrushchev opposed all on-site inspections, Kennedy's fall-back plan was a partial test ban that only outlawed testing in the air, underwater, and in outer space. Explosions in any of those environments were easily verifiable. For Khrushchev, whose scientists had only just begun to test underground—the only legitimate medium for testing under a partial test ban—this compromise seemed unacceptable. He feared that if left to test underground, the United States would widen its lead in strategic power. Hence, until the summer of 1963 Khrushchev insisted on a moratorium on underground testing to last as long as negotiations continued on a comprehensive test ban. But in July of 1963 Khrushchev suddenly and inexplicably withdrew that demand, a decision that paved the way to a nuclear test ban.

What appears to have happened in 1963 is that Khrushchev decided to risk cooperation with the United States to achieve some sort of détente. But was this the result of a European settlement or the cause of one? The test ban agreement occurred in the summer, but Khrushchev was still willing to make worrisome noises about Berlin through the fall of 1963 and did not stop until after Kennedy's assassination that November. The evidence of when a settlement took hold in Europe is so ambiguous that one could argue a different relationship between the modest Kennedy-Khrushchev détente and the petering out of the five-year Berlin imbroglio. In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, what reason did Khrushchev have to play the Berlin card any more? The contest of wills in Cuba proved that the old approach of shock diplomacy was not working. The Americans were simply too strong. There is evidence that, at the very least, Khrushchev's rivals in the Kremlin were beginning to see things this way.[14] The Kremlin had no stomach for another clash in

[14] Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 353–55.

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Central Europe. In this respect, it is useful to recall how many one-sided concessions Khrushchev made to settle the clash in the Caribbean peacefully. In November 1962, without receiving anything substantive in return, Khrushchev withdrew his atomic-capable IL-28 bombers from Cuba, evacuated some Soviet troops, and accepted that he would not receive an unconditional noninvasion pledge from John F. Kennedy. Meanwhile, he decided to take pressure off the neutral Laotian government because he knew that Washington was watching.[15] Not playing the Berlin card in 1962–63 was perhaps less the product of a new European settlement than of the Kremlin's reluctant acceptance of the international status quo.

If the settlement of 1963 was a Soviet surrender, the question remains as to why there were no more Berlin crises later in the Cold War. Perhaps one answer is that individuals do matter. Khrushchev was removed in October 1964, and his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, was not a devotee of the *fait accompli* anywhere. Meanwhile, the Kremlin's favorite German bogeyman, Konrad Adenauer, left the scene in 1963. But perhaps there is a realist explanation. Changes in the balance of power in the late 1960s eliminated the Kremlin's need to use blunt instruments such as Berlin to hit Washington over the head. It may not be a coincidence that the Soviets' achievement of nuclear parity coincided with the Western and Socialist acceptance of *Ostpolitik* and the formal recognition of the two Germanys and a West Berlin. Until more high-level evidence flows from the former Soviet Union, however, the role of the Berlin card in Soviet foreign policy must remain a matter of speculation. In any case, there appears to have been much more at stake than simply Moscow's concern over German nuclear weapons.

The rebuttals above, however, only demonstrate how thought-provoking and profound is Marc Trachtenberg's book. It sets the agenda for the next wave of studies on the high politics of the Kennedy-Khrushchev years and should be an instant classic for students of power politics, not to mention the point of reference for future researchers in Kremlin materials.

Economists to the Rescue
by Francis J. Gavin

Towards a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda. By Barry Eichengreen. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1999. 200 pp. $18.95.)

[15] Ibid., p. 323.

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The Return of Depression Economics. By Paul Krugman. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1999. 176 pp. $23.95.)

Money on the Move: The Revolution in International Finance since 1980. By Robert Solomon. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 224 pp. $29.95.)

Two recent events highlighted the importance of the new books reviewed in this essay. The protests in Seattle that scuttled the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting revealed a stunning ignorance of the basic facts of international economic life among the protesters, politicians, and pundits. The second event, while obscure, was perhaps more disturbing. The official listserver of American diplomatic historians, H-Diplo, recently discussed the Bernath Lecture delivered by Robert Buzzanco of the University of Houston.[1] If historians are wondering why their voices are so rarely heeded by policy-makers or the public, they need look no further than this speech and the debate it engendered.[2] Buzzanco ranted against the retreat of "materialist" and economic interpretations of American foreign policy among historians, targeting in particular those who failed to understand the Cold War as a product of America's relentless search for markets and resources. The United States militarized its domestic economy, established a hegemonic trading order, and pursued murderous imperial policies in order to impose a global market that exploited the rest of the world—all, Buzzanco claims, to bring profit to Wall Street and American arms merchants. Nor did that process end with the Cold War: "Powerful countries, such as the United States, must maintain power by preventing other nations or systems from succeeding and thereby providing an alternative model of development."[3]

The motives and wisdom of America's foreign policy during the past fifty years certainly leave ample room for debate. But as any knowledgeable economic historian could tell you, few major economies have ever been less dependent on global markets and resources for their well-being than was the United States in 1945. Even today, at the height of globalization, a collapse of world trade would hurt the United States far less than it would most other countries. How many empires have watched their total share of world gross domestic product (GDP) drop so quickly as the United States during the Cold War? American Cold War policies actually *encouraged* major allies to install

[1] The Bernath Lecture Prize is given out by the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations in order "to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars" (http://www.ohiou.edu/shafr/prizes.htm).

[2] Robert Buzzanco, "What Happened to the New Left? Toward a Radical Reading of American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History*, Fall 1999, pp. 575–608. See also the online discussion of this lecture (http://h-net2.msu.edu/~diplo/).

[3] Buzzanco, "What Happened to the New Left?" p. 598.

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capital controls and form trade and currency blocs that discriminated against dollar goods. Indeed, the United States allowed Japan and Western Europe to become its major economic *competitors* with the help of billions of dollars in aid and military protection. Moreover, since wealthy countries rarely trade with poorer ones, America's economic interaction with the developing world as a percentage of total GDP has always been tiny.[4] And the fearsome military-industrial complex that purportedly drove American foreign policy could not stop sudden and dramatic cuts in military spending in the late 1940s, the 1970s, and the 1990s, or keep dozens of defense contractors from going out of business over the last fifty years.

Pernicious historical myths such as those peddled by Buzzanco feed into the skewed logic employed by the anti-WTO protesters. To be sure, economic globalization is a complex and at times frightening process, and legitimate and important issues must still be addressed. But to argue that it is part of a decades-old American conspiracy to exploit the developing world is not only ludicrous, but irresponsible. Economics has demonstrated one simple, indisputable fact: international trade makes nations, particularly poor nations, wealthier. Before historians, environmentalists, unionists, or anarchists criticize the global financial order and its history, they should consider the lives of everyday people throughout the world. As Paul Krugman points out, export-led growth between 1968 and 1990 increased life expectancy in Indonesia from 46 to 63 and per capita caloric intake from 2,000 to 2,700 calories per day (p. 18). As anyone living in North Korea would understand, the issues debated on H-Diplo and in Seattle are not about academic tenure or the corporate practices of Starbucks Coffee. They are about *how much people eat* and *how long they live*.

Professional economists undoubtedly share responsibility for this woeful ignorance. Hiding behind obscure theoretical models and highly technical quantification, they have failed to engage and instruct the general public about the basic facts of international economic life. Fortunately, that appears to be changing as economists have begun to recognize the gap between their expertise and the layman's incomprehension. In the works reviewed here, Barry Eichengreen, Paul Krugman, and Robert Solomon successfully translate the complicated world of international financial, regulatory, and monetary economics into lively prose and sensible policy recommendations. Given the nonsense swirling around Seattle and the academic listservers, they arrive none too soon.

[4] Perhaps some obscure (and wrong-headed) economic motivation inspired America's involvement in Southeast Asia, but by the early 1970s the war helped usher in a decade of low growth, high inflation, and increased unemployment. After claiming that America's actions in Southeast Asia were motivated by economic gain, Buzzanco correctly points out the Vietnam War was an economic disaster. Bizarrely, he fails to comprehend that you cannot have a foreign policy driven by domestic economic gain when that policy worsens your domestic economy, especially when the policy is resisted by the same "elite" that supposedly drove these policies—bankers, corporate leaders, and the Federal Reserve. See ibid., pp. 593–96.

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In these short works, all three authors highlight the fragility of the world's monetary system, agree that the financial revolution has benefited some countries and classes more than others, and advocate reforms to the international financial architecture to avoid destabilizing crises. But they also stress the enormous benefits that international trade and capital mobility have brought and will, one hopes, continue to bring to those countries that participate in the global system. Anyone who wants to debate the merits of the international trade and monetary order and America's role in it—past, present, and future—should be required to read these books.

Money—Keep on Moving

It is not widely recognized that the worldwide explosion of capital flows came only *after* the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and dollar-gold convertibility collapsed in the early 1970s. By the end of that decade, many developed countries began to abandon the array of capital controls that had been necessary to maintain strict par values. Exchange-rate flexibility, deregulation of the financial markets, improved technology, and the development of innovative financial hedge instruments that protected against exchange-rate risks all combined to encourage a massive increase in cross-border capital movements. Even more significantly, the direction of these flows changed as more capital began to move to the developing economies around the world, particularly in East Asia and Latin America.

Has this revolution in capital mobility been a good thing for the world? An excellent place to look for an answer is Robert Solomon's *Money on the Move: The Revolution in International Finance since 1980.* Solomon, for many years the chief international economist at the Federal Reserve Board, is the author of the well-respected book *The International Monetary System, 1945–1981.*[5] In the shorter sequel, he chronicles the profound transformation in the world's economy during the last twenty years. Previously poor East Asian economies have become economic dynamos in record time, most of the former Soviet empire has joined the world trading system, and the European Union has begun a once-unthinkable experiment with a single currency. Never in history has there been such breathtaking change in international monetary relations in so short a period of time.

While Solomon lays out the unquestionable benefits that the international financial revolution has brought to the world, he does not gloss over the more disturbing aspects of capital mobility: the volatility of the dollar's exchange rate in the 1980s, the debt crisis that burdened Latin America and threatened the solvency of major Western banks, and the bumpy road to the European Monetary Union. But Solomon gives a balanced assessment of the

[5] Robert Solomon, *The International Monetary System, 1945–1981* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982).

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history of these events and the debates among economists over what policy options are best. Most important, he correctly links the vicissitudes of international finance to the macroeconomic policies of the countries involved. In other words, Solomon recognizes that most monetary and financial crises are not simply the product of "unfair speculation" or herd behavior. A real-world culprit almost always exists, be it loose monetary policies, fiscal largesse, or insufficient supervision of domestic financial institutions. Fortunately, as the links among macroeconomics, regulatory problems, and monetary chaos are better understood, destabilizing crises should become far more rare.

Peddling Depression Economics

I was not prepared to like Paul Krugman's new book, *The Return of Depression Economics*. First, I was suspicious of the title—what depression was he talking about? A quick glance at the Emerging Market Indicators in a recent issue of *The Economist* revealed a robust recovery in East Asia. In the third quarter of 1999, South Korea's GDP increased 12.3 percent, Taiwan's 5.1 percent, the People's Republic of China's 7.0 percent, and Malaysia's 8.1 percent. Even Thailand and Indonesia, the hardest hit by the Asian financial crisis, saw third-quarter growth of 3.5 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively. All of these countries have rebuilt and increased their holdings of foreign reserves to protect themselves against further currency crises. Despite the turmoil of the past two years, the World Bank has predicted that in the next ten years East Asia's per capita GDP will increase 5.2 percent annually. And the mature yet dynamic American economy continues to perform beyond expectations, growing by an astounding 5.5 percent in the third quarter of 1999.[6]

Secondly, Krugman often writes as if he were the Stephen Jay Gould of international economics—a clear, vivid, but occasionally condescending popularizer who often wins easy debating points by knocking down intellectual straw men. Supply-siders, strategic traders, and Lester Thurow become the economic equivalents of Gould's evolutionary determinists and creationists.[7] But whatever its merits in evolutionary biology, this method works poorly in international monetary economics, where (as Eichengreen's and Solomon's accounts make clear), broad agreement exists as to the causes of crises.

Finally, this breezy essay sails all over the place, from the East Asian financial crisis to slow growth in Latin America to financial irregularities in

[6] Statistics taken from *The Economist*, Dec. 11–18, 1999, pp. 96 and 98.

[7] Interestingly enough, as if to inoculate himself from this obvious comparison, Krugman has written an essay criticizing Gould's writings on evolutionary biology. See Paul Krugman, "What Economists Can Learn From Evolutionary Theorists" (A talk given to the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy), Nov. 1996 (http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/evolute.html).

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Russia to hedge fund abuses in the United States to the disturbing economic slowdown in Japan. These phenomena are all related, some more directly than others, but it would be impossible to cover all these subjects in the depth necessary in just 168 pages.

In the end, however, one cannot help but be impressed by Krugman's sheer intelligence and the clarity with which he lays out complicated ideas. Unfortunately, he is less insightful than Eichengreen and Solomon on the causes of and plausible solutions to international monetary instability. Krugman seems reluctant to admit what Eichengreen and Solomon understand—that greater exchange-rate flexibility combined with more financial oversight, instead of an unworkable "Tobin Tax" on short-term capital flows, could prevent or at least soften currency crises in the developing world.

Two parts of Krugman's book are especially impressive. The first deals with Japan's decade-long slowdown, and Krugman is rightly outraged that the vast underperformance of the world's second-largest economy has sparked so little discussion. Krugman argues that Japan, like the United States in the 1930s, is in a liquidity trap. In other words, Japan's citizens refuse to spend enough to use the economy's capacity, even as the country's interest rates hover around zero. The United States finally escaped a similar (though far more severe) situation through massive deficit spending during the mobilization for World War II. But such desperate fiscal measures are often politically unpopular, and Krugman instead recommends a radical monetary policy of "managed inflation" to encourage Japanese consumers to spend. While many would jump to predict the policy's failure, Krugman should be commended for his willingness to think "outside the box" about a problem that has vexed Japan for years.

The other fascinating argument in this book involves the character and sources of growth in East Asia in the past few decades. Using Robert Solow's growth theory and total factor productivity (TFP) analysis, Krugman compares East Asia's and Latin America's growth with that experienced by the United States and Great Britain in earlier periods. It turns out that East Asia's growth may have been similar to that experienced in Khrushchev's Russia (1956–64)—high output based on increasing investment, but with little productivity growth. Without increases in labor productivity, such as those produced by technological innovation, returns on capital are bound to diminish, and at some point GDP growth must stop. The seemingly robust recovery currently under way in East Asia may ultimately contradict Krugman's TFP analysis, but he again should be lauded for innovative thinking. And although his tone seems arrogant and provocative at times, those are desirable traits in a gadfly, and Krugman should be applauded for playing this role.

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The Return of Political Economy

Barry Eichengreen has positioned himself as a worthy successor to Charles Kindelberger, weaving economic theory within thoughtful historical narratives to provide a fuller understanding of how "real-world" global monetary relations work. Eichengreen is the author of several outstanding works of international financial history, including *Golden Fetters* and *Globalizing Capital*.[8] His new book, *Toward a New International Financial Architecture*, offers a sound analysis of the causes of the Asian financial crisis. More important, Eichengreen has laid out a feasible agenda for international financial reform. In the past two years, many economists and public policy experts—including Krugman—have given in to the temptation to use frightening headlines to propose innovative but politically unreasonable solutions. In this short book, Eichengreen assesses these proposals for reform and suggests a politically practical agenda for change. While he finds merit in many of the plans, they are either so bold as to be politically impractical (such as plans to create an international bankruptcy court, central bank, and credit-rating agencies) or too timid. In response, he prescribes his own remedies.

Eichengreen trains his analysis less on governments' macroeconomic policies than on institutional arrangements such as bank regulation and bankruptcy. In order to prevent crises, he recommends international financial standards that include recognized accounting and auditing procedures, creditor rights, protection against insider trading, and fair bankruptcy procedures. Banks must be encouraged to adopt more effective risk-management policies. He also suggests a number of steps to restructure international debt, including the creation of standing committees of creditors, encouragement of exchange-rate flexibility, prevention of weak banking systems from short-term borrowing abroad, and an increase in the International Monetary Fund's powers of surveillance over troubled economies. While modest, Eichengreen's proposals are politically feasible and would strengthen the world's international financial architecture without changing its fundamental character.

In sum, Eichengreen, Krugman, and Solomon have all tried in their own ways to reach beyond their discipline to educate policymakers, academics, and laymen about the facts of international economic life, and should be commended for their efforts. But the riots in Seattle and the nationwide apathy that greeted the collapse of the WTO conference in the United States provide proof enough that they have their work cut out for them. The next time a group of historians decides to debate international economics, let us hope Eichengreen, Krugman, and Solomon can be persuaded to join the fray, for it is high time that myth be refuted by fact.

[8] Barry Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); and *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

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